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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
by
Pavel Andreyanov
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor John William Asker, Co-chair
Professor Tomasz Marek Sadzik, Co-chair
My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-
freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can
be ranked above the others without the exact knowledge of distributions and/or utilities.
According to the Wilson critique, the knowledge of fine details of the setting such as distri-
butions and utilities is an unrealistic assumption and, moreover, optimal mechanisms in the
classic (Bayesian) sense are often too complex to be implemented in reality.
In the first chapter I study a scoring auction and the welfare implications of switching
between the two leading designs of the scoring rule: linear (“weighted bid”) and log-linear
(“adjusted bid”), when the designer’s preferences for quality and money are unknown. Mo-
tivated by the empirical application, I formulate a new model of scoring auctions, with two
key elements: exogenous quality and a reserve price, and characterize the equilibrium for
a rich set of scoring rules. The data is drawn from the Russian public procurement sector
in which the linear scoring rule was applied from 2011 to 2013. I estimate the underlying
distribution of firms’ types nonparametrically and simulate the equilibria for both scoring
rules with different weights. The empirical results show that for any log-linear scoring rule,
there exists a linear one, yielding a higher expected quality and rebate. Hence, at least with
risk-neutral preferences, the linear design is superior to the log-linear.
ii
In the second chapter1 I study robust allocation of a divisible public good among n agents
with quasi-linear utilities, when the budget is exactly balanced. Under several additional
assumptions, we prove that such mechanism is equivalent to a distribution over simple posted
prices. A robustly optimal mechanism minimizes expected welfare loss among robust divisi-
ble ones. For any prior belief, we show that a simple posted prices is robustly optimal. This
justifies a restriction to binary allocations commonly found in the mechanism design litera-
ture. Robustness comes at a high cost. For certain beliefs, I show that the expected welfare
loss of an optimal posted price is as big as 1{2 of the expected welfare in the corresponding
optimal Bayesian mechanism, independently of the size of the economy. This bound is tight
for the special case of two agents.
In the third chapter2 I provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private informa-
tion and interdependent values, which are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible,
generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly efficient, when there are many agents. Our
framework is entirely prior-free, and I make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can
be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge
of information structure or utility functions. I also show that no other mechanism satisfying
the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.
1Co-authored with Jernej Copic and Byeong-hyeon Jeong, UCLA
2Co-authored with Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA
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CHAPTER 1
Mechanism Choice in Scoring Auctions
1.1 Introduction
A first-score auction is often used in procurement to determine the best supplier among
a variety of candidates. This mechanism weighs the price bid together with the non-price
attributes of the firm using a publicly known scoring rule, and the participant with the
highest score wins the contract at the price equal to its bid.
There are multiple shapes of the scoring rule, see [DPV06] and [MY07] for an overview,
but two of them are especially widespread. The linear (“weighted bid”) rule is used, for
example, in Delaware, Idaho, and Oregon, while the log-linear (“adjusted bid”) rule is used
in Alaska, Colorado, and Florida, for various public works contracts. The latter, also known
as ”price-quality ratio”, is used extensively in Japan. It is unclear how a scoring rule is
chosen in any given case, and the existing literature offers limited guidance on how to rank
them. The theoretical literature was focused primarily on the optimal mechanism design
and the differences between various auction formats, such as first-score and second-score,
see [Che93], [AC08] and [AC10], but not on the comparisons of the existing shapes of the
scoring rule.
This paper is the first to compare the two leading designs of the scoring rule — linear
and log-linear — in a first-score environment, and to rank them in terms of welfare using
a structural approach. To achieve this goal, I formulate a novel model of scoring auctions,
which allows for both linear and log-linear cases, and derive a tractable equilibrium char-
acterization. I employ the equilibrium structure to analyze a novel dataset on bidding and
quality assessments in Russian procurement auctions, and propose a computationally feasi-
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ble procedure for nonparametric estimation and simulation of counterfactuals. Finally using
the simulated equilibria, I compare the two designs in terms of welfare.
I leverage a novel dataset on bidding behavior and relevant quality measurements in
scoring auctions using a public archive of Russian procurement auctions which took place
from 2011 to 2013. Through this period, 46,387 contracts were assigned using the scoring
auction format, across multiple industries and regions of the country. I select 3,228 auctions,
based on criteria, such as uniformity of the scoring procedure and low market concentration.
The data are split into ten parts based on the type of economic activity and the weight in
the scoring formula.
The data exhibit two distinct features. First, all auctions in the sample use quality mea-
surements such as a firm’s experience, qualification of firm’s personnel, or previous successful
contracts. These characteristics cannot be exchanged for cost reduction in the short run,
which I will exploit in the model by treating them as exogenous (nonstrategic). Second,
the reserve price is chosen by a significant portion of bidders, a phenomenon that is often
referred to as bunching.
Clearly, the model should reflect the patterns observed in the data. However, none
of the existing models feature a reserve price, and the quality is always assumed to be a
strategic choice variable. While the endogenous quality could be, to some degree, considered
as a generalization of exogenous quality, the addition of the reserve price creates a distinct
theoretical challenge due to its interaction with the scoring rule. Indeed, from the viewpoint
of the score, the constraint is variable, so it might be binding for some firms, thus producing
the bunching.
I build a novel model of a scoring auction in which quality is exogenous and the reserve
price is explicitly set. The key to solving the model is to think of the firm’s strategy as an
unconstrained choice of the score, which is later censored at the reserve price constraint. Due
to the feedback loop between the strategic shading and the expectations about the bunch,
an additional level of endogeneity appears that was not featured in classic auction models.
Despite its complexity, the model remains tractable with a wide set of scoring rules, which
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I call affine, nesting both linear and log-linear rules.
A construction of the equilibrium and a proof of its existence and uniqueness are the main
theoretical results in this paper. At the core of the equilibrium is a one-dimensional strategy
that captures the unconstrained choice of the score, pinned down by a simple (ordinary)
differential equation. Moreover, this strategy is similar to the bidding strategy in a classic
first-price auction, allowing the traditional nonparametric estimators to be applied.
To estimate the joint distribution of firm’s cost and quality pairs from the observed
bid and quality pairs, I use an algorithm similar to the two-step smoothing procedure in
[GPV00]. In the first step, I use kernel smoothing and the optimality conditions derived
from the model to estimate the amount of strategic shading from the observed scores.
In the second step, I use kernel smoothing to recover the joint distribution of bids and
quality, while ignoring the bids equal to the reserve price. I use the boundary correction
advocated in [HH15] to estimate the density at the boundary, that is, the bids just below
the reserve price. Finally, by reversing the shading, I recover the joint distribution of costs
and quality wherever it is fully identified.
The last piece of the puzzle is the part of the distribution of costs and quality that maps
into the reserve price, which I could not recover from the second step. Since there are multiple
distributions that are consistent with the data, I pick a simple one. Namely, I extrapolate the
missing part of the distribution from the boundary, that is, from the bids that were placed
just below the reserve price. The final estimator therefore has a semiparametric flavor.
To relax some of the restrictions that the model puts on the data, I investigate the
implications of auction-level heterogeneity. By assuming a multiplicative error term, I show
that it has no impact on the estimation as long as it affects the reserve price in the same
way as it affects the cost. This means that instead of the actual bids, I can simply use the
normalized bids on a scale between 0 and 100, where 100 stands for the reserve price. For
this to be empirically justified, I need evidence that the reserve price serves as a signal of
the scale of the contract. I find such evidence in the regulation behind the data.
Finally, I am able to simulate the equilibria in both the default and the counterfactual
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scoring designs and, additionally, pick an arbitrary weight in the scoring formula. However,
two problems prevent us from making decision on the mechanism choice right away. First,
it is not absolutely clear which log-linear scoring rule to pick, as they vary by the weight
in the scoring formula. Second, the welfare of the scoring auction is measured, at the very
least, in two dimensions: expected quality and expected rebate, and so the two scoring rules
might not necessarily be successfully ranked.
To overcome these problems, I propose the following approach. For each of the two
scoring designs, I construct a frontier in the space of expected quality and rebate, spanned
by the weight in the scoring formula, see Section 1.1. The weight is a natural parameter
to vary as it controls the trade-off between quality and rebate. By fixing a target level of
expected quality, it is then possible to rank the two mechanisms in the remaining dimension.
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Figure 1.1: Welfare frontiers for the linear and log-linear families
My main empirical finding is that, based on the available data, for any log-linear scoring
rule, there exists a linear one that is better in terms of rebate while having the same quality.
In other words, the linear frontier is above the log-linear frontier, as seen on Section 1.1.
This it is true for every part of my data, see Figure 1.21 and Figure 1.22. The monetary loss
associated with a switch to a log-linear rule with the same quality varies between 0.4% and
4%.
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This ranking may seem surprising, as I am comparing two equally plausible shapes of
the scoring rule. However, there is a strong reason for such results. If the firms were to bid
truthfully in a first-score auction, the mechanism would always pick the score-efficient firm.
As a result, the (truthful) linear frontier would be the frontier of first-best mechanisms in the
space of expected quality and rebate, and the (truthful) log-linear frontier would be below.
The actual frontiers, of course, look slightly different due to the distortions associated with
strategic shading and bunching. First, shading is pushing the truthful frontiers to the left,
due to the informational rents paid to the firms. Second, bunching is pushing them towards
the origin due to the inefficient screening. My empirical findings demonstrate that these
distortions are not sufficient to change the ranking, at least with the available distributions.
Of course, these results implicitly rely on the risk-neutrality of the designer as I am using
expected quality and expected rebate as measures of auction success. Mechanism design
literature has long used expected revenue for ranking various classic auction mechanisms
and I am simply following this tradition. It is possible, however, that when higher moments
are considered, the ranking will change.
1.1.1 Related literature
The theoretical literature on scoring auctions is sparse compared to that of the classic auc-
tions. Apart from [AC08] and [HHN16], only a few attempts have been made in — [Bra97],
[Das14] and [Nis15] — to generalize the original [Che93] framework. None of them, however,
deals with the reserve price.
The closest model to ours can be found in [HHN16]. The authors show how to solve
for the symmetric equilibrium with the most general scoring rule. While losing much of
the tractability of the earlier models, the only new scoring rule (used in practice) that this
generality buys is, again, the log-linear. As in [Che93] and [AC08], the quality in this paper
is endogenous, and there is no reserve price.
We stress that our model is not a special case of the model of [HHN16]; rather, we study
different aspects of the scoring auction. While their focus is on nonlinearities in the scoring
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rule, our focus is on the interaction between the scoring rule and the reserve price. Also, our
equilibrium characterization is more tractable due to the exogenous quality and the affine
structure of the scoring rule.
Similar in spirit to our empirical finding of the superiority of the linear design are the
theoretical results on the optimality of quasi-linear scoring rules in [Che93] and [Nis15].
These papers, however, deal with a special environment, in which the distribution of firms’
costs and quality is singular and they are already sorted in terms of productivity. The role
of the auction mechanism then narrows to picking the efficient one. In our environment, the
situation is more complex, as sorting is endogenous due to the full support of firm’s cost and
quality and, moreover, imperfect due to the bunching at the reserve price. Consequently,
neither the linear nor the log-linear scoring rules can be generically considered as optimal,
even from the perspective of the score.
The empirical literature comprises of studies of delegation and favoritism in scoring auc-
tions: [DM14], [AV16], [Hua16] and several reduced form studies of the choice between
scoring and price only designs: [LB11], [KM14] and [ADZ08]. Only a few papers contribute
to the structural modeling of a scoring auction: [HHN16], [Nak13], however, the questions
investigated in these papers do not directly overlap with ours.
Finally, our model of an affine scoring rule could be used to model bid preferences, such
as the ones studied in [Mar07] and [KS11]. Indeed, the intercept and the slope of bid in
the scoring formula could be thought of as additive and multiplicative preferences. A firm
enjoying the preferential treatment can be interpreted as a high-quality firm in a scoring
auction. However, since our model is symmetric, we require that the firms treat each other’s
bid preferences as random, which might be rejected by the data if the pool of participants
and the preferences are made public prior to the bidding stage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I discuss the institutional
background and the features of our data. In Section 1.3 and Section 1.4, I explain the
theoretical and empirical framework for my analysis. In Section 1.5, we discuss potential
heterogeneity problems and how we address them. In Section 1.6, I present the empirical
6
findings, and I conclude in Section 1.7.
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1.2 Data
We access an electronic archive of all public procurement contracts issued by the Russian
federal government and municipalities between January 2011 and December 2013. Out of
the 46,387 contracts that were assigned within the scoring auctions format, we select 3,228
contracts based on such criteria as similarity of contracts, uniformity of the scoring procedure
and low market concentration. These auctions comprise a total award value of 219.6 million
dollars1.
The scoring auction is the most complex and regulated format among all used in Russian
procurement. The contractee, which is typically not a private firm but a public body,
that wishes to start a scoring auction has to follow the detailed instructions written by
the Ministry of Economic Development. The auction process is supervised by a special
commission and each step is made public. The whole process can take more than a month,
depending on the size and complexity of the contract, see Section 1.2.
Step Timing
1. Formation of the supervising commis-
sion and development of the notification
and relevant tender documentation.
Prior to the publication.
2. Publication of the upcoming auction
notification and relevant tender documen-
tation. Starting bid collecting period.
-
3. Ending bid collecting period, opening
quotes and publication of opening proto-
cols.
1-4 weeks since the start of bid collection
period.
4. Evaluation of bids and determining the
winner. Publication of evaluation proto-
cols and winner announcement.
Up to 10 days since the quotes we opened.
5. Signing the contract Up to 10 days since the publication of auc-
tion protocols.
Table 1.1: Scoring auction timing and regulation
The archive consists of three types of files: notifications, protocols and tender documen-
tation. The first two are standardized tables stored in the .xml format. The notification
1using the approximate exchange rate of 30 roubles per dollar in 2012
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file contains an announcement of the upcoming auction together with a brief description of
the contract, the industry code and the reserve price. The official site allows anybody to
search the upcoming auctions by the information contained in the notification, thus reducing
participation costs. The protocol file is created after the auction and contains all submitted
bids together with the announcement of the winner. Finally, the documentation is a detailed
description of the contract and the quality assessment, compiled by the contractee, typically
in a form of one or several .doc files.
To link each contract with a certain type of economic activity, we use a 7-digit industry
code called OKPD, extracted from the notifications. This code is an archaic classification of
industries, currently replaced by a newer version OKPD2. We focus on five groups of eco-
nomic activity: education, scientific research, legal services, technical services, and security.
dataset
name
industry name OKPD
code
price
weight
total
auctions
total
bids
total
awards
in mln $
total
reserve
in mln $
Edu-80 Education 80***** 0.80 89 225 4.6 5.8
Edu-55 0.55 272 712 13.3 16.1
Sci-80 Scientific Research 73***** 0.80 162 487 11.7 17.8
Sci-55 0.55 298 854 30.9 38.0
Leg-80 Legal Services 75***** 0.80 929 3048 5.2 10.9
Leg-55 0.55 55 159 5.6 7.4
Tec-80 Technical Design 71***** 0.80 936 2917 99.5 158.8
Tec-55 0.55 47 129 7.3 9.3
Sec-80 Security 84***** 0.80 409 1181 33.4 42.0
Sec-55 0.55 31 94 8.1 9.6
Total 3228 9806 219.6 315.6
Table 1.2: Auction aggregate statistics
The first group (Edu) consists of contracts for citizen education programs. These types
of services are often purchased by the government when a factory is shut down or experiences
a sharp decrease in labor demand. The type of quality that is required from the firm is mea-
sured in years of operation on the market and the number of people that went through the
education program. The second group (Sci) consists of contracts for sociological, statistical,
economic and other scientific research, with quality being typically some sort of experience,
government accreditation, or the qualification (such as a doctoral degree) of personnel. The
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dataset
name
average
bidder
quality
score
average
bidder
price
score
average
bidder
score
average
winning
rebate
%
average
winning
quality
%
average
bidders
Edu-80 66.2 23.6 32.1 30.7 79.7 2.5
Edu-55 72.9 17.0 42.2 19.6 87.9 2.6
Sci-80 61.5 25.0 32.3 32.8 73.8 3.0
Sci-55 64.6 18.8 39.4 16.7 85.4 2.9
Leg-80 74.7 41.1 47.8 52.3 82.8 3.3
Leg-55 59.0 23.0 39.2 17.3 94.5 2.9
Tec-80 60.2 28.2 34.6 36.3 74.0 3.1
Tec-55 66.2 21.0 41.4 20.8 87.7 2.7
Sec-80 74.0 15.7 27.4 19.9 84.7 2.9
Sec-55 56.2 15.0 33.6 13.4 76.6 3.0
Table 1.3: Auction average statistics
third group (Leg) consists of various legal services, for the most part related to the manda-
tory yearly inspection (audit) of firms. Here, quality is measured by the number of audits in
the past, positive reviews from the clients, and also the number of personnel with a proper
government accreditation. The fourth group (Tec) mostly consists of contracts for develop-
ment of project documentation and estimates, with quality measurements very similar to
(Leg). The fifth group (Sec) has contracts for maintaining security in various civil buildings
and facilities. In this group, the quality is measured by the experience of the personnel and
the availability of special equipment.
In each of our auctions, a linear scoring formula was used, which can be described as:
score “ price weight ¨ price score` p1´ price weight q ¨ quality score (1.1)
price score “ 100 ¨ preserve price´ price bid q{reserve price (1.2)
where the price weight parameter is either 0.8 or 0.55. The quality score is assigned to each
firm independently and strictly according to the evaluation criteria described in the contract
documentation. These criteria vary by contract, but the final quality score is always between
0 and 100. Overall, we have 10 different datasets, which we summarize in Section 1.2.
The participation pattern is similar in all 10 datasets. Approximately 1/2 of the auctions
10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Figure 1.2: Aggregate participation histogram
have 2 bidders, 1/4 with 3 bidders, 1/8 with 4 bidders, etc., see Section 1.2. The are a few
dozens of auctions that have a single participant, which we ignore. Since it is a sealed-bid
format, there is no public signal about the number of firms in the upcoming auction, so we
will treat it is unknown.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. First, in Section 1.2.1, we discuss the
institutional background of our data. Then, in Section 1.2.2, we discuss an example of how
quality is assessed. Finally, in Section 1.2.3, we discuss certain distributional properties of
our data.
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1.2.1 Institutional background
In contemporary Russia, the procurement regulation is very similar to the one in the Euro-
pean Union and the US, with the only exception that it is more centralized. However, it did
not always look the same, rather it was constantly evolving in accordance with a sequence
of federal laws and presidential decrees, gradually shaping the national procurement system
over the last 25 years, see Section 1.2.1.
Our data spans the middle of that time period, beginning with the earliest historical
records in year 2011, available at the central e-procurement website, and ending with the
major overhaul of procurement after the adoption of a new federal law in year 2014.
federal law year general regulation scoring auction regulation
FZ-60,
UP-305,
FZ-97
1994 First attempts are made to
replace central planning with
competitive procurement
Scoring auctions are mostly
unregulated, leaving room for
corruption and preferential
treatment
FZ-94 2006 Upcoming auction notifica-
tions become available online,
on local websites.
The scoring auction format be-
comes limited to a small range
of economic activities
2011 Explicit procedures for deter-
mining the reserve price are in-
troduced.
-
FZ-44 2014 A central auctioning platform
is created, with access to all
past (starting from 2011) and
upcoming auction notifications
and protocols.
The linear formula is replaced
with the minimal bid formula.
All time-related quality crite-
ria are banned.
Table 1.4: Procurement regulation
In our data, one of the most important details is the way the reserve price is determined.
More precisely, each time a government official sets a reserve price in a procurement auction,
he has to follow the precise instructions recommended by the Russian Ministry of Economic
Development. Typically, the reserve price is an average of three of more anonymous market
offers from the firms in the industry, or the costs of similar contracts completed in the past.
Crucially, all the calculations and references have to be made public, together with the
rest of the tender documentation, prior to the auction. The results of the auction could
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be even contested in court if the bidder believed the reserve price to be misleading. This
indicates that the reserve price is also a signaling device that helps firms calibrate their bids.
1.2.2 Quality of the firm
The quality score is assigned to the firm based on several quality criteria, such as experience,
number of successful contracts, qualification, etc. Even within an industry, there is a signifi-
cant variation in the sets of criteria selected for each particular auction and in the evaluation
scheme. This gives rise to an almost infinite variety of schemes for quality evaluation, leaving
us no option but to take the final quality score at face value.
A typical formula for the quality score consists of two criteria:
quality score “ first criterion score` second criterion score.
For example, in the Education industry, these are often the number of customers (graduates)
and the number of years that the firm has been operating on the market:
first criterion second criterion
less than 200 customers 20 points less than 3 years 10 points
between 201 and 500 customers 30 points between 4 and 7 years 20 points
more than 501 customers 60 points between 8 and 10 years 30 points
more than 11 years 40 points
Table 1.5: Quality criteria example 1
The quality evaluation scheme may consist of more than two criteria, or sometimes criteria
have sub-divisions. In the following example from Scientific Research industry, quality is
measured using two criteria: number of past contracts and qualification. However, the first
criterion is split into three sub-criteria that correspond to different types of contracts:
Note that in these examples, the evaluation instructions are fixed and do not depend on
the characteristics of actual bidders. This is not always the case in our data. For certain
auctions, the maximal points are assigned to the firm with the maximal among the current
bidders number of customers (years), and all other bidders get proportionally less. We do not
include these auctions in our datasets since they would require a more powerful structural
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first criterion second criterion
type 1 contracts type 2 contracts type 3 contracts qualified personnell
ě 5 30 points ě 2 25 points ě 1 20 points ě 4 25 points
4 24 points 1 10 points 0 0 points 3 18 points
3 18 points 0 0 points 2 12 points
2 12 points 1 6 points
1 6 points 0 0 points
0 0 points
Table 1.6: Quality criteria example 2
model, able to deal with scoring formulas that depend on the characteristics of many bidders.
In our datasets, we have pooled together a large number of auctions with qualities of
different nature. Since we take the final score at face value, we essentially assume that the
utility of the designer (as a function of various quality criteria) is aligned with the quality
evaluation scheme. For example, in Section 1.2.2, that would mean that 10 quality points
are approximately equivalent to 3 years of experience, or 200 additional customers.
Due to the variety of the schemes and their non-linearity, we will abstain from exact
interpretations of quality and treat it as an ordinal measure. In other words, we care about
the fact that more quality is better than less quality, but not about what that quality means.
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1.2.3 Spikes and bunches
In the examples of the previous section, the functions that map contracts or years into
quality points are bounded from both sides. This means that two firms can be formally
different in terms of their age and experience, but still have the same maximum (or minimum)
quality points. This gives rise to two pronounced spikes in the quality score histogram, see
Section 1.2.3, with the right spike containing approximately 25% of the data (quality between
99 and 100).
Since our model is continuous, we will have to make sure that these distributional anoma-
lies are smoothed out in the estimation phase. But this will happen automatically since we
do not perform boundary correction in the q dimension. While this might seem like a bad
idea because of over-smoothing at the boundary, it will be, in fact, beneficial for the model
because sharp increases in the estimated density of quality might lead to non-existence of
continuous equilibria.
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Figure 1.3: Aggregate histogram of quality scores.
Another distributional anomaly happens when bidders set their bid exactly at the reserve
price, which we refer to as a bunch at the reserve price, see Section 1.2.3. Approximately
7% of the data is concentrated in the range of price scores between 0 and 1, out of which
4.5% are exactly at price score 0. Though it is true that high quality firms tend to bid less
aggressively, only a small fraction of the bunch is attributed to the spike in quality.
To see that the bunch is a separate phenomenon, we drop all the bids with quality greater
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than 99. The resulting histogram remains virtually unchanged, see Section 1.2.3, and 3.2%
of bidders still choose to bid exactly the reserve price. However, if we focus on the auctions
with price weight 0.55, the pattern becomes more pronounced, see Section 1.2.3.
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Figure 1.4: Aggregate histogram of price scores
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Figure 1.5: Aggregate histogram of price scores conditional on quality scores below 99
This observation indicates that there may be some strategic factor at play that makes
the bidders choose the reserve price with a positive probability. In the theoretical part of
the paper, we will show that this feature is indeed a hallmarc of the scoring auction.
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate histogram of price scores conditional on quality scores below 99 and price
weight equal to 0.55
1.3 Model
A single contract is auctioned among N ex-ante identical, risk-neutral firms. Each firm
simultaneously and secretly submits its bid b to the auctioneer. Each firm has quality q,
which, together with the bid, is mapped into the firm’s score, using a publicly known scoring
rule. The firm with the highest score wins the contract at the price equal to its bid, which
can not exceed a publicly known reserve price r.
A critical assumption in our model is that q is an exogenous and perfectly verifiable
characteristic of the firm, observed by the auctioneer, but not the other firms. The cost c
is private, and there is no technology that allows the firm to exchange it for quality or vice
versa.
Assumption 1. Each firm draws pc, qq independently, from the same distribution with a
twice continuously differentiable cdf F , with full support on r0, rs ˆ rq, qs.
We consider a broad class of scoring rules that we call affine, which nests the quasi-linear
scoring rules studied in [Che93] and [AC08].
Definition 1. A scoring rule is affine if it can be represented by a function spb, qq:
spb, qq “ αpqq ` βpqqpr ´ bq. (1.3)
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Three cases of affine scoring rules are of special interest:
quasi-linear: βpqq “ 1 ñ spb, qq ´ r “ αpqq ´ b,
linear: βpqq “ 1, αpqq “ wq ñ spb, qq ´ r “ wq ´ b,
log-linear: αpqq “ ´r{qw, βpqq “ 1{qw ñ ´ logp´spb, qqq “ w log q ´ log b.
Assumption 2. αpqq, βpqq are twice continuously differentiable, αpqq is strictly increasing,
and βpqq is positive.
Additionally, we assume that some firms will not come to the auction, and the partici-
pating firms hold identical beliefs about the turnout n.
Assumption 3. The turnout is random and follows a discrete distribution with known prob-
abilities pn, where 1 ď n ď N .
We are looking for a symmetric, pure strategy BNE of this game.
1.3.1 Equilibrium Structure
We focus on the equilibrium scoring strategy, since the competition holds in the score di-
mension.
Our first goal is to introduce a function θpc, qq, that we will refer to as the firm’s type,
which can be used as a natural argument of the scoring strategy. We will refer to the level
lines of this function as the iso-types.
Definition 2. Denote the firm’s type by θpc, qq, where
θpc, qq “ αpqq ` βpqqpr ´ cq. (1.4)
The type is similar to the firm’s production potential in [Che93] and the pseudo-type in
[AC08]. Without the reserve price, it would completely define the equilibrium behavior of
the firm, due to the affine structure of the scoring rule. Indeed, if pipsq is the equilibrium
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probability of winning associated with a score s, then the firm’s profit can be written as:
pipsqpb´ cq “ pipsqpαpqq ` βpqqpr ´ cqloooooooooomoooooooooon
firm’s type
´sq{βpqq “ pipsqpθ ´ sq{βpqq,
which proves that θ is a sufficient statistic for the optimal choice of the score. This choice,
however, might be infeasible in the presence of the reserve price.
Note that the iso-types depend only on the shape of the scoring rule, in other words
they are exogenous. For the linear scoring rule s “ q ´ 2b these are parallel lines, and for a
log-linear s “ ´b{q these are rays originating at c “ 0, q “ 0, see Section 1.3.1.
Figure 1.7: Iso-types for a linear and a log-linear scoring rule.
Our second goal is to define two scoring strategies that capture the firm’s optimal choice
of the score, with and without censoring imposed by the reserve price.
Definition 3. Denote the equilibrium scoring strategy by σ˚pθ, qq.
This strategy represents the constrained choice of the score, and we will refer to its level
lines as the iso-scores. By definition, it solves the following optimization problem:
σ˚pθ, qq P arg max
sěαpqq
pipsqpθ ´ sq. (1.5)
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The underlying bidding strategy can be easily recovered from the scoring strategy using
formulas θ “ αpqq ` βpqqpr ´ cq and s “ αpqq ` βpqqpr ´ bq, which are simply accounting
identities. Note that the situation when the bid is equal to r corresponds to the situation
where the score is equal to αpqq.
Definition 4. Define σpθq “ minq σ˚pθ, qq as the equilibrium uncensored scoring strat-
egy.
This strategy represents the unconstrained choice of the score, and its level lines coincide
with the iso-types. By construction, it solves the following optimization problem:
σpθq P arg max
s
pipsqpθ ´ sq. (1.6)
A natural conjecture is that the scoring strategy σ˚pθ, qq should be derived from σpθq
via censoring at the αpqq threshold. This is not true in general, however, if we introduce a
simple refinement of the equilibrium, this property can be established.
Assumption 4. σ˚pθ, qq is continuous and a lower score is chosen when indifferent.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 4, following equation holds:
σ˚pθ, qq “ maxpσpθq, αpqqq. (1.7)
Following equation (1.7), one can see that the iso-scores are kinked. Consequently, they
are endogenous, as the position of the kink relies on the equilibrium through the σpθq func-
tion. We can nevertheless describe them qualitatively. When the score is a function of type,
the iso-scores are aligned with the iso-types, but when the score is a function of quality,
the iso-scores are horizontal. The set of firms that choose the reserve price, which we refer
to as the bunching region, is outlined by the curve traced the kinks of the iso-scores, see
Section 1.3.1 for a stylized illustration.
The equilibrium strategy σ˚pθ, qq can be derived from the equilibrium strategy σpθq using
equation (1.7). Consequently, we only have to characterize the σpθq strategy in order to pin
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Figure 1.8: Iso-scores and the bunching region (grey) for a linear and a log-linear scoring rule.
down the equilibrium. To do that a few additional definitions and a regularity assumption
are required.
Definition 5. Denote the cumulative distribution function of pθ, αpqqq by rF , and its par-
tial derivatives by rF 11 and rF 12. Define a function Zpθ, σq “ př pn rF n´2pθ, σqq{př pnpn ´
1q rF n´2pθ, σqq and a correspondence δpθq “ tσ P rθ, θs : Zpθ, σq rF pθ, σq´pθ´σq rF 12pθ, σq “ 0u,
where rθ, θs is the support of θ.
Assumption 5 (Regularity). δpθq is a function, such that δpθq ě αpqq for some θ in rθ, θs.
The role of this assumption will be discussed in detail in Section 1.3.2. We are now ready
to give a characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-5, there exists a unique symmetric BNE in the scoring
auction, with a strictly monotone uncensored scoring strategy σpθq, that solves:
σpθq “ θ and σ1 “ pθ ´ σq rF 11pθ, σq
Zpθ, σq rF pθ, σq ´ pθ ´ σq rF 12pθ, σq for all types in rθ, θs. (1.8)
To illustrate the derivation of the differential equation (1.8), assume that there are two
firms and there is no uncertainty about the turnout. Observe that the equilibrium probability
of winning associated with a score σpθq is equal to the cumulative distribution function
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rF pθ, αpqqq evaluated at pθ, σpθqq, which is also the area under the iso-score:
pipσpθqq “ Probpσ˚pθˆ, qˆq ď σpθqq “ Probpσpθˆq ď σpθq, αpqˆq ď σpθqq “ rF pθ, σpθqq.
Indeed, if we switch to the pθ, αpqqq coordinates, the probability of winning will be to the
left and below the pθ, σq point. Moreover, the boundary of the bunching region will coincide
with the σpθq curve, as they represent the same event when αpqq is equal to σpθq. In these
coordinates the bunching region is therefore the area between the 45 degree line and the σpθq
curve. Note that while the σpθq is monotone, the boundary of the bunching region, obtained
by tilting the curve to the left, might have an inflection point.
Figure 1.9: Iso-scores and the probability of winning (grey) for a linear scoring rule.
Bunching is typically considered incompatible with the symmetric equilibria in the first
price auctions, as an infinitesimal deviation in the bid generates a sizable increase in the
probability of winning. In the scoring auction, however, this is not the case as competition
holds in the score, rather than the bid dimension. The bunch is spread across different scores
due to the variation in q, and so the distribution relevant to the formation of best response
is, in fact, continuous.
We can now derive the first order conditions associated with the optimal choice of the
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score.
First Order Conditions (2 firms):
marginal costhkkkkikkkkjrF pθ, σqdσ «
marginal benefithkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
pθ ´ σq ¨ p rF 11pθ, σqdθ ` rF 12pθ, σqdσloooomoooon
bunching effect
q . (1.9)
The marginal cost of raising the score above the equilibrium can be written as dσ times the
probability of winning rF pθ, σq, while the marginal benefit is the profit margin pσ ´ θq times
the marginal increase in the probability of winning. The latter comes from two populations
of firms, see Section 1.3.1. The first are the firms outside the bunch, that have a marginally
higher type θ, captured by the rF 11pθ, σqdθ term. The second are the firms inside the bunch
that have a marginally weaker constraint on the score, captured by the rF 12pθ, σqdσ term. We
call the latter bunching effect, as it only appears in the presence of bunching.
After dividing both parts of equation (1.9) by dθ, replacing dσ{dθ with σ1, and solving
for σ1, we obtain a special case of the differential equation (1.8), where Zpθ, σq “ 1. We will
derive it more rigorously and show that the second order conditions hold in Section 1.3.3.
Figure 1.10: Marginal increase in the probability of winning.
While the distribution rF itself is exogenous, the way it enters the first order conditions
is clearly endogenous, as it is evaluated at pθ, σq. That is because the way expectations are
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formed about the strength of the competition depends on the amount of bunching, which in
turn, depends on the amount of equilibrium shading. This creates a feedback loop between
the equilibrium strategy σpθq and the equilibrium probability of winning pipσpθqq, which does
not happen in a classic first-price auction, or in a scoring auction with no reserve price.
While the first order conditions are fairly complex due to the equilibrium expectations
about the bunch, the firm’s bidding problem is simple, as all the relevant information is cap-
tured by the observed distribution of scores. The firm then behaves simply as a monopolist
operating over a downward sloping demand curve pipspb, qqq, with a price ceiling r:
max
bďr pb´ cqpipspb, qqq, spb, qq “ αpqq ` βpqqpr ´ bq.
We are interested in how the monopoly price (equivalently, the optimal bid) responds
to an increase in c or q, assuming that the price ceiling does not bind. The first can be
considered as an increase in the monopoly’s marginal cost, which implies an increase in the
monopoly price since b and c are complements in the profit function. The second can be
considered as a positive demand shock that shifts the demand curve upwards. While it is
natural to assume that the monopoly price will increase, this is not necessarily the case.
Indeed, from the inverse elasticity rule we know that the defining factor is the elasticity of
demand rather than its volume. If the optimal bid does not change with a small increase in
q, the iso-bid will have an inflection point, as on Section 1.3.1.
For the linear scoring rule, the shift of the demand curve can be offset by a proportional
increase in the marginal cost, so that the profit margins remain the same. Consequently, the
iso-bids will be parallel translations of each other, as on Section 1.3.1.
So far our analysis was for the case of two firms with no uncertainty about the turnout.
To allow for random participation, we need to replace the probability of winning against a
random firm rF with the probability of winning against the strongest opponent firm. This
probability is captured by a convoluted function
ř
pn rF n´1, which finds its way into the first
24
order conditions:
First Order Conditions (general):
Nÿ
n“1
pn rF n´1dσ « pθ ´ σq ¨ p rF 11dθ ` rF 12dσq ¨ Nÿ
n“1
pnpn´ 1q rF n´2. (1.10)
By introducing the Zpθ, σq function we are able to isolate the effect of random participa-
tion in our differential equation:
pθ ´ σq ¨ p rF 11 ` rF 12σ1q
σ1 ¨ rF “ Z “
řN
n“1 pn rF n´2řN
n“1 pnpn´ 1q rF n´2 . (1.11)
With a turnout fixed at n, Z is simply equal to 1{pn ´ 1q. Finally, after solving for σ1,
we obtain our differential equation:
σ1 “ pθ ´ σq rF 11
Z rF ´ pθ ´ σq rF 12 . (1.12)
Coupled with the initial value σpθq “ θ, this differential equation can be solved locally
under standard conditions, however, the solution might not necessarily exist globally for a
number of reasons. In the next section we will focus on the conditions that are sufficient for
Figure 1.11: Iso-bids and bunching (grey area).
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the existence of the global solution.
1.3.2 Regularity, Existence and Uniqueness
The Initial Value Problem in Proposition 3 can be interpreted as a direct instruction to find-
ing the equilibrium. However, one should be careful when constructing the σpθq trajectory
as there are two cases how it may fail.
The first case is when Z rF´pθ´σq rF 12 turns into zero thus preventing us from constructing a
global solution. The solution then should be sought in the wider functional space of, possibly
discontinuous, monotone functions. The second case is when rF 11 turns into zero. Then the
first order condition becomes degenerate and the trajectory switches, through a kink, to a
different law of motion: pθ ´ σq rF 12 “ Z rF , which can be interpreted as playing against the
population of firms belonging entirely to the bunch. It is even possible for the trajectory to
switch between the two laws of motion multiple times. The role of Assumption 5 is to make
sure that the two previously mentioned cases do not occur, so that we can focus on the most
regular scenario.
Recall the definition of the δpθq correspondence:
δpθq “ tσ P rθ, θs : Zpθ, σq rF pθ, σq ´ pθ ´ σq rF 12pθ, σq “ 0u.
It is non-empty for all θ P rθ, θs by the Intermediate Value Theorem, and captures the
set of points in the pθ, αpqqq coordinates for which the denominator in the right handside
of the differential equation turns into zero. If, additionally, it is a function, it serves as a
lower boundary to where the σpθq trajectory can go, because any continuous strategy will by
pushed upwards when approaching δpθq. At the same time, when approaching the 45 degree
line, the σpθq trajectory will be pushed to the right. Consequently, the trajectory always
remains between these two functions:
δpθq ď σpθq ď θ.
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In the theory of ordinary differential equations, the αpqq “ δpθq and αpqq “ θ curves are
referred to as fences, and together they form what is called an anti-funnel, see Section 1.3.2.
Existence and uniqueness of the trajectory that originates at pθ, θq follows from the theory
of fences and funnels, see [HW97] and Appendix A for more details.
Figure 1.12: The anti-funnel (grey), the δpθq and the σpθq curves.
The first part of Assumption 5 tells that δpθq is a function, thus allowing us to establish
the existence and uniqueness of the global solution to our differential equation. The second
part tells that there exists a θ such that σpθq ě αpqq, which means that the trajectory never
passes through the point where rF 11 turns into zero. Consequently, there is no switch in the
law of motion and the differential equation correctly represents the first order conditions.
While the first order conditions are clearly necessary, it is not obvious whether they are
sufficient for the equilibrium. To show this we will study a direct mechanism associated with
the game in the next section.
1.3.3 Pseudo-type and the Direct Revelation Mechanism
We introduce a generalization of the pseudo-type in [AC08], which is a function, designed to
be constant along the iso-score lines. Once the pseudo-type is defined, it can be thought of
as a message in the direct mechanism, and the first order conditions can be derived using
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the revelation principle.
Definition 6. Denote the firm’s pseudo-type by ρpθ, qq, where
ρpθ, qq “ σ´1pσ˚pθ, qqq. (1.13)
By construction, the pseudo-type is constant along the iso-scores and, moreover, coincides
with the type when the reserve price is not binding:
ρpθ, qq “
$’&’%θ, if the reserve price is not binding,α´1pσpθqq, if the reserve price is binding.
The intuition behind the pseudo-type is the following. Since for certain types the reserve
price is binding, the mechanism pools them with higher types (but same quality) all the way
up to the value of σ´1pαpqqq, which is the only type that would have chosen the reserve price
willingly. The pseudo-type is therefore the type of the firm as perceived by the mechanism
in equilibrium.
Definition 7. Denote the pseudo-type distribution by Gpρq and the residual pseudo-
type distribution by Gpρq, where
Gpρq “
ÿ
pkG
k´1pρq. (1.14)
The distribution of the pseudo-type plays the same role as the distribution of values in a
classic first-price auction. The area under the iso-score is equal to the probability of winning
against a random opponent while choosing the score σpρq, see Section 1.3.3.
We can now characterize our uncensored scoring strategy σpθq as an equilibrium strategy
in a direct revelation mechanism where the firm submits the pseudo-type. The optimality
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Figure 1.13: Pseudo-type and the probability of winning (grey).
conditions in this game are summarized below:
Direct Revelation Mechanism:
σpθq P arg max
ρ
pθ ´ σpρqqGpρq. (1.15)
Indeed, the probability of winning against a single opponent by signaling ρ to the mech-
anism is equal to Gpρq. The expected probability of winning is therefore Gpρq. The profit
conditional on winning is equal to b´ c “ pθ ´ sq{βpqq, where the score s is assigned based
on the reported pseudo-type and therefore is equal to σpρq.
Notice that the optimality conditions are exactly as in the first-price auction, if we
interpret θ as value, σpθq as the bidding strategy and G as the value distribution. The
classic first order conditions can be therefore written as:
First Order Conditions (general):
marginal costhkkkkkikkkkkj
σ1pρq ¨ Gpρq “
marginal benefithkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkj
pθ ´ σpρqq ¨ G 1pρq . (1.16)
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Since Gpθq “ rF pθ, σpθqq, the direct mechanism approach gives the same first order con-
ditions as (1.10). But even without the first order conditions, the σpθq strategy can be
characterized in terms of the pseudo-type distribution G by simply applying the Envelope
Theorem to (1.15).
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-5, the equilibrium uncensored scoring strategy σpθq
is a conditional expectation of the highest (among the other firms) pseudo-type below θ:
σpθq “ 1
Gpθq
ż θ
θ
zdGpzq “ θ ´ 1
Gpθq
ż θ
θ
Gpzqdz. (1.17)
As in the classic first-price auction, the second order conditions follow from (and are
equivalent to) the monotonicity of σpθq, see, for example, Chapter 5 in [Kri10]. To convince
ourselves that the second order conditions are indeed satisfied in our model, we evaluate the
change in profit when submitting a pseudo-type ρˆ while having pseudo-type ρ:
pθ ´ σpρˆqqGpρˆq ´ pθ ´ σpρqqGpρq “
pρˆ´ σpρˆqqGpρˆq ` pθ ´ ρˆqGpρˆq ´ pρ´ σpρqqGpρq ´ pθ ´ ρqGpρq “ż ρˆ
ρ
Gpzqdz ` pθ ´ ρˆqGpρˆq ´ pθ ´ ρqGpρq “ż ρˆ
ρ
Gpzqdz ´ pρˆ´ ρqGpρˆq ´ pρ´ θqpGpρˆq ´ Gpρqq ď 0.
The change is negative since ρ ě θ by the definition of the pseudo-type.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1-5, the first order conditions are sufficient.
Formula (1.17) also demonstrates that σpθq ă θ for all θ ą θ. As a result, for every level
of quality except for the lowest, the threshold cost cpqq for which the firm is willing to pick
the reserve price lies in the interior of the support:
cpqq “ r ´ σ
´1pαpqqq ´ αpqq
βpqq ă r, for all q ą q.
Consequently, as long as the distribution F has full support, there will be a positive mass of
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bids at the reserve price, conditional on every level of quality except for the lowest.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1-5, there is bunching at every level of q ą q.
Coupled with Gpθq “ rF pθ, σpθqq and Gpρq “ ř pkGk´1pρq, equation (1.17) pins down the
evolution of both σpθq and Gpθq. From this system of non-linear equations, we can derive a
system of differential equations which is linear in σ1, G1 and G 1:
σ ¨ G 1 ` σ1 ¨ G “ θ ¨ G 1, (1.18)
G 1 “ G1 ¨
Nÿ
k“2
pn´ 1qpnGn´2, (1.19)
G1 “ rF 11 ` rF 12 ¨ σ1. (1.20)
By eliminating G1 and G 1 we arrive to the same differential equation as in Proposition 3.
1.3.4 Welfare
In this section, we will introduce three measures of welfare generated by a firm participating
in an auction: firm’s profit, quality and buyer’s rebate r ´ b; that will be later used to rank
the counterfactual scoring rules. It will be convenient to first analyze the interim version.
Definition 8. For a firm with type θ and quality q:
interim expected profit: P pθ, qq “ pb´ cqGpρpθ, qqq,
interim expected quality: Qpθ, qq “ qGpρpθ, qqq,
interim expected rebate: Rpθ, qq “ pr ´ bqGpρpθ, qqq.
By applying the envelope theorem to (1.15), we can find the profit as a solution to the
boundary value problem below:
B
BθP pθ, qq “ G pρpθ, qqq {βpqq, P pαpqq, qq “ 0.
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This allows us to write down the interim expected profit, quality and rebate in the
pθ, αpqqq coordinates in terms of the residual distribution of the pseudo-type and the pseudo-
type itself. The total expected surplus from a single participating firm is measured by
pr ´ cq ¨ Gpρpθpc, qq, qqq “ pθ ´ αpqqq ¨ Gpρpθ, qqq{βpqq,
which is the area of the marked region in Figure 1.14. Similarly to a classic first-price auction,
this area is split between firm’s profit and seller’s revenue (in our case, buyer’s rebate) by
the Gpρp˚, qqq curve, which captures the probability of winning having type θ.
Figure 1.14: The firm’s interim profit is the area under the Gpρp˚, qqq curve, while the buyer’s
interim rebate is the area to the left from the Gpρp˚, qqq curve.
Corollary 3. The interim expected profit, quality and rebate can be computed from the
residual pseudo-type distribution Gpρq and the pseudo-type ρpθ, qq using formulas below:
P pθ, qq “
ż θ
αpqq
Gpρpz, qqqdz{βpqq
Qpθ, qq “ q ¨ Gpρpθ, qqq
Rpθ, qq “ pθ ´ αpqqq ¨ Gpρpθ, qqq{βpqq ´ P pθ, qq.
Had the turnout been fixed, to compute the total ex-ante quality and rebate, we would
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average the interim ones with respect to the density of type and quality, and multiply by
the number of participants. Due to random participation, the formulas are more tricky.
Conditional on the turnout n, the total rebate and quality extracted from firms with coor-
dinates pθ, qq can be computed by renormalizing the interim ones by Gn´1pρpθ, qqq{Gpρpθ, qqq
and multiplying by n. These should be then averaged with the turnout probabilities pn and
integrated over the density of pθ, qq.
Definition 9. Define a function Y pθ, qq “ př pnnGn´1pρpθ, qqqq{př pnGn´1pρpθ, qqqq.
Similarly to the Zpθ, αpqqq function, Y pθ, qqmeasures the extent of competition attributed
to a firm with coordinates pθ, qq. With fixed turnout it is simply equal to n.
Corollary 4. The total (ex-ante) expected profit and quality can be computed from the in-
terim ones, the Y pθ, qq function and the joint density of pθ, αpqqq using formulas below:
total expected quality:
ż ż
Qpθ, qqY pθ, qq rfpθ, αpqqqdθdαpqq,
total expected rebate:
ż ż
Rpθ, qqY pθ, qq rfpθ, αpqqqdθdαpqq.
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1.4 Estimation
In this section, we treat our data as if there is no auction heterogeneity. We will show later
in Section 1.5 that this is a reasonable approach, as long as the reserve price is a credible
signal about the scale of the auction.
The theoretical analysis in Section 1.3.1 has shown that our model of scoring auctions
shares important features with the classic first-price auction. Despite the fact that bidder’s
characteristic is two-dimensional, the core equilibrium strategy σpθq is one-dimensional, and,
moreover, it is a solution to optimality conditions:
σpθq P arg max
s
pipsqpθ ´ sq. (1.21)
Since the probability of winning pipsq is determined by the observed distribution of scores,
nonparametric estimators of [GPV00] and [LPV02], which now can be considered as stan-
dard, can be easily generalized to work in our environment. However, we will make several
important alterations that we explain below.
First, in order to capture the participation patterns in a symmetric model, we will es-
timate the strategy as a best response to the residual distribution of scores, that is the
distribution of the maximum of scores among all but one bidder. Since this distribution can
be thought of as generated by a composite bidder (the strongest among n´ 1 others), from
the perspective of each single firm, the decision problem is as if it was competing against
that composite bidder in a first-price auction. By that logic, it is absolutely justified to rely
on the nonparametric techniques in [GPV00] and [LPV02] for the nonparametric estimation
of the aforementioned distribution and the corresponding strategy.
Second, contrary to the classic first-price auction, it is not possible to use the estimated
strategy σpθq to recover the whole distribution of pθ, qq from the observed distribution of
ps, qq, because only those bids that fall below the reserve price are coherent with that strategy.
The bids that fall exactly at the reserve price therefore can not be used as part of the
nonparametric estimation and should be dropped.
34
We first estimate the joint distribution of pb, qq using a bivariate kernel density estimator
with boundary correction at b “ r, advocated in [HH15]. We then transform it into the
distribution of ps, qq. Finally, by applying the inverse of the estimated σpθq strategy, we
recover the part of the joint distribution of pθ, qq that does not map into the reserve price
in equilibrium. The rest of the distribution is extrapolated from the boundary, namely, for
every level of q, the density of a type that was forced to bid the reserve price will be set
equal to the density of the type that chose the reserve price willingly, see Section 1.4.
Figure 1.15: Estimation of the density of type, conditional on quality.
With the estimated distribution of pθ, qq at hand, we simulate the equilibria for the
counterfactual scoring rules and calculate the expected quality and expected rebate using
formulas derived in Section 1.3.4.
The rest of this section is split in three parts. In Section 1.4.1, we estimate the σ strategy.
In Section 1.4.2, we recover the part of the distribution of pθ, qq that is identified. And,
ultimately, in Section 1.4.3, we extrapolate the remaining part of the distribution, explain
how to find the counterfactual equilibrium and compute welfare.
1.4.1 First-stage smoothing and strategy estimation
The first step in our estimation is to capture the equilibrium behavior imposed by the
optimality conditions (1.21). The probability of winning pipsq is measured by the distribution
of the highest among n´ 1 firms score, which we refer to as a residual distribution of scores.
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Definition 10. Denote the residual distribution of scores by H , and the corresponding
density by h .
Following the logic of [GPV00], we estimate the perceived distribution H against which
each firm is playing in our symmetric model together with its density h .
Definition 11. Denote the auction index by j and the bidder index (in that auction) by i.
Definition 12. Denote the sample of scores by S “ tsiju and its size by M .
We apply a classic kernel density estimator to the residual scores, that is the maximal
score among all but one firm, for each firm i in each auction j:
phpsq “ 1
M
ÿ
sijPS
Kpmaxk‰i skj ´ s
hs
q,
with the kernel K and the bandwidth bs borrowed from [LPV02]:
Kpuq “ 35
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p1´ u2q3Ip|u| ď 1q, hs “ 3.16 ¨ sdpsq ¨m´1{5,
where sdpsq is the standard deviation of the score in S. The choice of this bandwidth is based
on the popular statistical recipe called the ’Silverman rule’, which is calibrated for normal
distributions, see [Har12]. The score distributions in our data look reasonably bell-shaped,
see Section 1.4.1, so we have no reason to distrust this approach.
Similarly, pH can be obtained. From the practical point of view, however, we find it more
natural to simply integrate the estimated density ph numerically.
The estimator of [GPV00] is based on the first order conditions, and so it does not
guarantee monotonicity of the strategy. However, a natural extremum estimator will have
this property by construction:
pσpθq “ inf arg max
s
´ pH psq ¨ pθ ´ sq¯ .
This estimator is convenient because it is aligned with our theoretical knowledge, and
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Figure 1.16: The estimators of densities of the score and residual score distributions.
because extremum estimators are among the most studied and well-understood in the liter-
ature, see [NM94] for an extensive overview.
1.4.2 Second-stage smoothing and boundary correction
The second step in our estimation is recovery of the joint distribution of pθ, qq.
If we were to blindly follow the recipe in [GPV00], we would use the estimated strategy σˆ
to produce a sample of estimated pairs pθˆij, qijq, from which the density of the distribution of
pθ, qq could be obtained using a 2-dimensional kernel density estimator. The reason why we
cannot do this is that only the part of the distribution of pc, qq which maps into the interior
bids, i.e. above the reserve price, can be correctly identified.
Definition 13. Denote the sample of interior bids by DI and its size by MI :
DI “ tpbij, qijq|bij ă ru.
To estimate the part of the distribution of pc, qq that is nonparametrically identified, we
find it easier to change the order or actions in the [GPV00] algorithm. Namely, we will first
apply a 2-dimensional kernel smoothing to DI and only then use the estimated strategy σˆ
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to recover the relevant part of the distribution of pc, qq. We will also put an additional effort
to estimate the density at the boundary b “ r, using reflection method advocated in [HH15].
Definition 14. Denote the reflected sample of interior bids by DIR:
DIRpτq “ tpbij, qijq|bij “ r ´ τpb˜ij, qijq, pb˜ij, qijq P DIu,
where
τpy, qq “ y ` dpqqy2 ` 0.55 ¨ d2pqqy3, (1.22)
dpqq “ logpϕph1, qqq ´ logpψph0, qqq
h1
, (1.23)
φph1, qq “ 1
M2I
` 1
MIh1hq
ÿ
DI
K
ˆ
h1 ´ pbij ´ rq
h1
˙
K
ˆ
qij ´ q
hq
˙
, (1.24)
ψph0, qq “ maxt 1
M2I
,
1
MIh0hq
ÿ
DI
K0
ˆ
bij ´ r
h0
˙
K
ˆ
qij ´ q
hq
˙
u, (1.25)
and K0 is the endpoint kernel:
K0puq “ p6` 18x` 12x2q ¨ It´1 ď u ď 0u.
The idea behind the reflection method is that when the data is censored at a certain
threshold, we can anticipate the unobserved part of the data assuming smoothness of the
original distribution.
Definition 15. Denote the densities of pb, qq, and pθ, αpqqq by g and rf respectively.
Below is a boundary corrected kernel density estimator of the joint distribution of pb, qq:
pgpb, qq “ 1
2MIhbhq
ÿ
DIYDIRpτq
K
ˆ
bi ´ b
hb
˙
K
ˆ
qi ´ q
hq
˙
,
where the main bandwidths are taken in accordance with the ’Silverman rule’:
hq “ 3.16 ¨ sdpqq ¨M´1{5I , hθ “ 3.16 ¨ sdpθq ¨M´1{5I
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Figure 1.17: Estimator of gpb, qq before and after boundary correction for Leg-55.
and the bandwidths used in the construction of τ are:
h1 “ hθ ¨M´1{20I , h0 “ 1.48 ¨ h1.
The practical consequence of not doing boundary correction is that the density would
unnaturally decrease near the boundary (b “ r), as seen on the left side of Section 1.4.2.
This would directly violate our knowledge of the equilibrium behavior, which predicts that
firms bid essentially as if there is no reserve price and therefore the density should be smooth
at the boundary.
We do not perform boundary correction for the quality dimension, on purpose, to over-
smooth the spike in the neighborhood of q “ 100, see Section 1.2.3. If the estimated distri-
bution is not smooth enough, there is a risk of non-existence of a continuous strategy.
Finally the relevant part of the joint distribution of pθ, qq can be obtained from the
estimated joint distribution of pb, qq using the standard density transformation formula:
density of pθ, qq “
$’&’%k ¨
σ1pθq
βpqq ¨ gpr ´ σpθq´αpqqβpqq , qq , 0 ď σpθq´αpqqβpqq ď r
˚ , otherwise
,
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where ˚ stands for the unknown value of the density in the non-identified part of the distri-
bution, and k stands for the constant to normalize the density. We will have to find a way
to fill in the missing part of the distribution, which will be discussed in the next section.
1.4.3 Extrapolation and counterfactuals.
The last thing that impedes our ability to simulate equilibria in a counterfactual scoring
rule is the part of the distribution of pθ, qq that is not identified. This fundamental problem
stems from the censoring of the σpθq strategy due to the presence of the reserve price.
It is important to understand at this point that multiple densities rfpθ, qq will be consistent
with the data. We will pick one such density due to its particular simplicity. Namely, we will
say that the the density at the type θ ă σ´1pαpqqq is equal to the density at σ´1pαpqqq, which
is the closest type for which it is identified. The equilibrium strategy serves as a boundary in
the pθ, αpqqq coordinates to the types that choose the reserve price, therefore the level lines
of the distribution are horizontal to the left of the strategy, see Section 1.4.3.
This gives us the following estimator for the whole range of θ P rαpqq, αpqq ` βpqqrs:
prfpθ, aq “ k ¨ pσ1pθq
βpα´1paqqα1pα´1paqq ¨ pgpminpr, r ´ pσpθq ´ aβpα´1paqqq, α´1paqq,
where k normalizes the density.
Figure 1.18: Estimator of the density of pθ, αpqqq after extrapolation for Leg-55.
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Once the density is estimated, for a new counterfactual scoring rule, we can solve the
differential equation (1.8) using any suitable numerical integration method, such as, for
example, Runge-Kutta, to obtain the new σpθq strategy and the new distribution Gpρpθ, qqq.
There are two ways how the numerical integration may fail, see Section 1.3.2. The first
is if the trajectory reaches the boundary of the anti-funnel, then a continuous strategy does
not exist, however, this never happens in our data. In the hypothetical situation where it
happens, increasing the smoothness of the estimated distributions should generally help. The
second is if the trajectory passes through the point where rF 11 “ 0. In this case, starting from
the level of quality q˚ at which it happened, all bidders choose the reserve price. As a result,
the interim rebate for all q ą q˚ is zero and the interim quality can be calculated according
to the distribution of probabilities of winning, based on the fact that highest quality wins.
Finally, the welfare properties of the scoring rule are captured by two functions: Qpθ, qq
and Rpθ, qq, calculated using formulas in Corollary 3. The ex-ante versions of quality and
rebate are then computed using the estimated density of pθ, αpqqq, see Corollary 4.
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1.5 Heterogeneity
Typically in the literature on structural estimation, an auction model is complemented with
a separate model of heterogeneity, which instructs how to prepare the data before passing
it to the main estimation routine. A common approach is to represent the value (in our
case, the cost) of the bidder as either a sum or a product of two components: common
and idiosyncratic. The common component is then filtered out using the observed auction
characteristics. Such approach was taken, for example, in [HHS03] and [Kra11].
In this paper, we take a different approach by relying on the reserve price as a control for
heterogeneity. Precisely, we will assume that the bidder’s cost is a product of an auction-
specific component and a bidder-specific component:
cij “ ciγj, rj “ rγj,
where γj represents the latent scale of the contract, and rj is the reserve price in that auction.
Crucially, the reserve price should follow the same scaling pattern.
Later in this section, we will show that, in this framework, the bids can be effectively
homogenized by just normalizing them by the reserve price. But before that, it is important
to understand why the reserve price is traditionally avoided as a control for the scale of the
auction, and why our situation is different.
1.5.1 Reserve price as a control
In the classic value auctions, for which the bulk of empirical methods were developed, the
reserve price is often set ad-hoc and is even sometimes entirely missing. That is because the
benefits of fine-tuning the reserve price are very limited. In fact, a theoretical argument in
[BR89] shows that it is more profitable to simply attract an additional bidder rather then set
an optimal reserve price. Another explanation might be that costs of acquiring the statistical
information needed for the optimal mechanism are prohibitively high. All of this makes the
reserve price an unreliable instrument for economic analysis.
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In procurement the situation is slightly different. First of all, since there is no natural
upper bound to the bid (in value auctions bids are typically non-negative) the reserve price
is always present, to cut the contractee’s losses. Second, because the procurement contracts
are often very complex and not all cost-relevant information can be conveyed in the tender
documentation, the contractee might want to use the reserve price as a signaling device to
help the firms estimate their costs. The reserve price then can be thought of as a publicly
observed first bid. This signaling role is so important that it was, in fact, institutionalized
by the Russian authorities, see Section 1.2.1
1.5.2 Homogenization of bids
Assume that, in any given auction j, the score, on top of satisfying all the assumptions of
the model, has a particular shape:
spb, q | rq “ s˜pb{r, qq,
which is true for the linear scoring formula that we have in our data. We can write down the
equilibrium conditions for a representative auction with reserve price r in the Lagrangean
form as in (1.26). It is easy to see that the equilibrium conditions stay unchanged if the
same linear transformation ψjpxq “ γjx, where γj ą 0, is applied to all of the three variables
c, b, and r:
H pspb, q | rqq ¨ pb´ cq ` λpr ´ bq Ñ min
λě0 maxb , (1.26)
H pspψjpbq, q | ψjprqqq ¨ pψjpbq ´ ψjpcqqq ` λpψjprq ´ ψjpbqq Ñ min
λě0 maxb . (1.27)
Indeed, the same bidding strategy b˚pc, qq is the solution to both (1.26) and (1.27), which
means that the equilibrium bidding strategy in an auction that is scaled by γj, is also scaled
by γj. In other words, the same equilibrium strategy σpθq can explain the behavior in multiple
heterogeneous auctions as long as they are scalable to a single representative auction with a
fixed reserve price, which is our model of heterogeneity.
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Since in our data all the bids are divided by the reserve price inside the score, this
effectively eliminates the impact of γj on the equilibrium behavior. Consequently, the model
can be estimated as if there is no auction-specific heterogeneity.
Corollary 5. Consider a model of heterogeneity, where for a firm i in auction j:
sjpb, qq “ s˜pb{rj, qq, cij “ ciγj, rj “ γjr, qij “ qi,
where pci, qiq are drawn as in a symmetric model. Then the equilibrium strategies σpθq and
σ˚pθ, qq do not depend on the scale of the auction γj.
While theoretically appealing, our approach to homogenization of bids has to yet prove
itself successful in the data. To test it, we will randomly pick two bids (without return) from
each auction and plot the scatterplot of logarithms of the two bids, and a scatterplot of the
two bids normalized by the reserve price, see Section 1.5.2 for the Leg-55, Sci-55 and Sec-80
datasets.
It can be seen with a naked eye that while the log-bids indeed require additional ho-
mogenization, it is far less obvious for the normalized bids, as the reserve price absorbs a
significant portion of heterogeneity.
before normalization after normalization
Dataset Kendall Pearson Kendall Pearson
Edu-80 0.86 0.97 0.27 0.39
Edu-55 0.85 0.97 0.23 0.29
Sci-80 0.81 0.94 0.21 0.29
Sci-55 0.79 0.94 0.01 0.03
Leg-80 0.68 0.91 0.2 0.13
Leg-55 0.82 0.94 0.21 0.13
Tec-80 0.81 0.94 0.33 0.5
Tec-55 0.86 0.97 0.27 0.39
Sec-80 0.89 0.99 0.36 0.52
Sec-55 0.78 0.97 0.11 0.4
Table 1.7: Correlation in bids before and after normalization.
The quality of homogenization varies across the datasets, see Section 1.5.2, but since
there is no clear rule on how much correlation among bids is acceptable, we leave the data
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Figure 1.19: Normalization of bids.
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as it is.
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1.6 Empirical results
For each of the ten datasets, and both scoring designs, I have traced the corresponding
frontiers in the space of expected rebate and expected quality (both measured from 0 to
100), spanned by the weight in the scoring formula. For each dataset, I produced a figure
that contains these frontiers, as well as the coordinates of the default linear scoring rule and
its primary competitor: the price-quality-ratio (spb, qq “ ´b{q) scoring rule.
I will focus below on the results for the Leg-55 dataset, characterized by the diagram in
Section 1.6. The diagram contains two arks, representing the welfare frontiers spanned by
the two families: linear and log-linear.
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Figure 1.20: Welfare frontiers for the linear and log-linear families.
Several observations can be made.
(a) The arcs meet at the end points.
(b) The arcs are decreasing.
(c) The default linear rule is to the bottom-right from the price-over-quality rule.
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(d) The linear design arc lies above the log-linear one.
All four observations are true for each of our datasets, see Figure 1.21. We will now explain
the relevance of these findings for the main economic question addressed in the current paper.
Observation (a) should not be a surprise since the pure price auction and the pure quality
auction can be considered as polar in the spectrum of scoring auctions produced by varying
the weight in the scoring formula. The figure then confirms our basic intuition that for the
weight approaching 0 or 8 the two scoring designs become indistinguishable in terms of
welfare.
Observation (b) is also anticipated, since the weight in the scoring formula is an intuitive
control for the trade-off between quality and rebate. The figure confirms that no two members
of the same scoring family can be ranked without the knowledge of designer’s preferences.
In other words, we can only hope to achieve an unambiguous improvement by switching
between the linear and log-linear designs.
Observation (c) demonstrates the failure of the traditional approach to mechanism choice,
when a default linear design is compared to a single member of the log-linear design. Indeed,
a switch to price-over-quality would increase expected quality by approximately 10 points,
but would decrease the expected rebate by approximately 30 points. Whether this is a
beneficial exchange depends completely on how the contractee values quality in monetary
terms, which can not be inferred from the auction data.
To quantify our findings, we compare the default linear scoring rule to the quality-
equivalent member of the log-linear family. This can be interpreted as switching to the
price-over-quality scoring rule, with a specially calibrated measure of quality to guarantee
the same expected quality. Our results are summarized in Section 1.6, and can also be
inferred from the frontiers in Figure 1.21.
Finally, observation (d) is the main qualitative result in our paper. It appears that, for
every member of the log-linear family, a member of the linear family dominates it in both
welfare dimensions. In other words, even without knowing the designer’s preferences for
quality and rebate, we can tell that his utility, as long as it is a nondecreasing function of
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dataset
name
switch to price-over-quality switch to log-
linear with same
expected quality
Edu-80 –26.42 % rebate and +11.99 % quality -0.90 % rebate
Edu-55 –2.79 % rebate and +0.28 % quality -2.10 % rebate
Sci-80 –27.59 % rebate and + 13.59 % quality -1.16 % rebate
Sci-55 –5.90 % rebate and + 1.04 % quality -3.12 % rebate
Leg-80 –14.50 % rebate and +4.25 % quality -2.21 % rebate
Leg-55 –18.45 % rebate and +5.60% quality -3.94 % rebate
Tec-80 –47.11 % rebate and +19.24 % quality -1.31 % rebate
Tec-55 –4.11 % rebate and +0.61 % quality -2.69 % rebate
Sec-80 –9.72 % rebate and + 6.10 % quality -0.41 % rebate
Sec-55 –5.24 % rebate and +1.14 % quality -1.80 % rebate
Table 1.8: Quantitative results
expected quality and rebate, is maximized at one of the linear scoring rules. Thus the linear
design can be considered as superior to the log-linear one.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated whether the linear scoring design is better than its main
competitor, price-quality ratio, in terms of welfare, and received a strong positive answer.
My methodological contribution to the literature on scoring auctions is a class of models
that are sufficiently flexible to feature both linear and log-linear scoring rules, yet they
hold enough structure to produce a very tractable solution. These models are built on two
core assumptions: exogenous quality and explicit reserve price. We have also developed a
complete machinery for the estimation of these models and simulation of counterfactuals.
My empirical contribution is a qualitative result about the superiority of the linear scoring
design. From Section 1.6, as well as from every other simulation, it appears that every
possible log-linear scoring rule is dominated by some linear scoring rule. Moreover, this
finding does not depend on the exact knowledge of designer’s preferences over quality and
rebate, which makes it easy to be interpreted as policy advice.
Implicit in this assessment is the risk-neutrality of the designer’s preferences, and so it is
not surprising that the linear design succeeded over the log-linear. Had the preferences been
risk-averse, the log-linear scoring rule could be advantageous.
Several avenues for future research are suggested.
Endogenous quality. My analysis of the affine scoring rule can be partially extended
to the situation where quality is endogenous. This model can be thought of as part of a
two-stage game, where the quality is chosen at the first stage, and is considered exogenous
afterwards. However, to find an equilibrium in this game, more complicated tools, such as
the ones developed in [HHN16], will be required.
Discontinuous strategies. Though I focus on the most regular case of a continuous
strategy, situations may arise in practice where such equilibrium will not exist. In this case,
the non-linear equation (1.17) may be considered as a heuristically derived characterization
of the equilibrium. In fact, there is nothing in this equation, that particularly requires
continuity.
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Other scoring rules. While it might seem that the next logical step is to consider a
scoring rule of an arbitrary shape, as in [HHN16], the empirical application calls for an even
more general model where the scoring rule additionally depends on certain statistics of other
firm’s bids and qualities. This model would be useful for understanding the complicated
scoring rules such as the “average bid” used in Italy and the “minimal bid” used in Russia.
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1.8 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that for some θˆ, qˆ, it is true that σ˚pθˆ, qˆq ‰ maxpσpθˆq, αpqˆqq, which means:
σpθˆq “ σ˚pθˆ, qq ď αpqˆq ă σ˚pθˆ, qˆq.
This can only be the case if σ˚pθˆ, qˆq is a local maximum of a continuous function pipsqpθˆ´sq.
Moreover, this function has to stay constant all the way between s1 “ σ˚pθˆ, qq and s2 “
σ˚pθˆ, qˆq, otherwise the actual score σ˚pθˆ, qq would be discontinuous in q somewhere in the
range between q and qˆ, thus contradicting the continuity assumption. Staying constant, on
the other hand, contradicts the assumption that a lower score is chosen when indifferent.
Proof of Proposition 3
The first step in the proof is to establish several important properties of the σpθq strategy.
Clearly, σpθq “ minq σ˚pθ, qq is continuous, because σ˚pθ, qq is continuous in both arguments.
It is also weakly increasing, by super-modularity of pipsqpθ ´ sq, see [MS94].
To see that σpθq “ θ, note first that the actual distribution of scores s “ αpqq`βpqqpr´bq
is constrained by αpqq “ θ from below, as no firm is allowed to bid above the reserve price.
The best (unconstrained) response σpθq therefore can not go below θ as that would induce an
upwards deviation for the lowest type. On the other hand, σpθq can not go above θ as that
would guarantee a negative profit with positive probability for any type θ ą θ. Consequently,
by continuity, the σpθq function at the lowest type θ is confined to a single possible value θ.
To prove strict monotonicity, assume that the true range of the σ˚pθ, qq function is rθ, ss.
The pipsq function is strictly increasing in this range by continuity of σ˚pθ, qq and F pc, qq.
Therefore, the σpθq strategy is strictly increasing for all types that map into ps, sq, see [MS94].
In other words, it can only be flat at two segments: one adjacent to θ and one adjacent to
θ. Typically, flat strategies are incompatible with symmetry in classic first-price auctions,
however, due to the 2-dimensional firm characteristic and the wedge between σ and σ˚,
eliminating such behavior requires slightly more work.
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First, assume that there is a segment of types adjacent to θ that maps into σ. That would
mean that, for all types in that segment such that θ ą θ, the actual score σ˚ is equal to
αpqq ą αpqq “ θ after truncation. Consequently, before truncation, the perceived probability
of winning for all those types would be zero, which is worse than if they chose any other
score above θ but below their own type θ. Second, assume that there is a segment adjacent
to θ, that maps into s. That would mean that s is the maximum value of both σ and σ˚.
Consequently, for a positive measure of pθ, qq the actual score would be s, and, therefore
there will exist at least one pθ, qq that would deviate. The σpθq strategy is therefore strictly
monotone in the whole range of types.
Once we have invertibility of σ, we can construct the pseudo-type ρpθ, qq “ σ´1pσ˚pθ, qqq
and proceed with the direct mechanism approach in Section 1.3.3. Using the residual pseudo-
type distribution G we can characterize σpθq as a solution to the optimality conditions below:
σpθq P arg max
ρ
pθ ´ σpρqqGpρq. (1.28)
The necessary first order conditions can be written as a system of equations:
σG 1 ` σ1G “ θG 1, ZG 1G “ G1G , G1 “ rF 11 ` rF 12σ1,
that can be uniquely solved, assuming that rF 11 ą 0:
σ1 “ pθ ´ σq rF 11
ZG´ pθ ´ σq rF 12 , G1 “ ZG
rF 11
ZG´ pθ ´ σq rF 12 , G 1 “ G
rF 11
ZG´ pθ ´ σq rF 12 .
Recalling that Gpθq “ rF pθ, σpθqq, we obtain our differential equation:
σ1 “ pθ ´ σq rF 11
Z rF ´ pθ ´ σq rF 12 .
The second order conditions are satisfied as σpθq strategy is a conditional expectation of the
highest pseudo-type below θ, see Section 1.3.3 for a discussion. If the σpθq trajectory passes
through the point where F 11 “ 0, it will switch to a different law of motion: pθ´σq rF 12 “ Z rF ,
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however, under Assumption 5 this never happens, see Section 1.3.2 for a discussion.
It remains to show that coupled with the initial condition σpθq “ θ, the differential
equation has a unique solution in the range rθ, θs, for which we will employ the theory of
fences and funnels from [HW97].
An anti-funnel consists of two functions of time (in our case θ), called upper fence and
lower fence. Both functions should be continuously differentiable and such that for each
point on the fence, the slope of the vector field passing through is lower than the slope of the
upper fence and greater than the slope of the lower fence at that point. The obvious choice
of the upper fence is σ “ θ, because the vector field has zero slope there. For the lower fence
a natural candidate is the σ “ δpθq curve:
δpθq “ tσ P r0, θs : Zpθ, σq rF pθ, σq ´ pθ ´ σq rF 12pθ, σq “ 0u,
which is well defined under Assumption 5 and the vector field has an infinite slope there.
The coordinates pθ, σq are inconvenient for the formal proof of uniqueness and existence,
because the right handside of the differential equation is formally not defined at the lower
fence. But this is only a notational problem. Assume for simplicity that θ “ 0 and make a
change of coordinates:
t “ pθ ` σq{2, x “ pσ ´ θq{2,
which corresponds to a 45 degrees clockwise rotation of the vector field around the p0, 0q
point. The new differential equation x1 “ fpt, xq is now well-defined at the boundary of the
new anti-funnel. Moreover, since all the functions α, β, F are assumed to be twice continu-
ously differentiable, so does rF and Zpθ, σq. Therefore, fpt, xq is continuously differentiable,
for all points inside and on the boundary of the anti-funnel. And since the new anti-funnel
is a compact, fpt, xq is uniformly bounded together with its first derivatives.
To establish existence we apply Theorem 4.7.1 (Fence Theorem) and Theorem 1.4.4
(Anti-Funnel Theorem: Existence) which only require that fpt, xq satisfy continuity in t and
Lipshitz condition in x inside the anti-funnel, which follows from continuous differentiability
54
of f .
To establish uniqueness we apply Theorem 4.7.5 (Second Uniqueness Criterion For Anti-
Funnels) which additionally requires that the anti-funnel is narrowing at the initial point
(which is true in our case) and that inside the anti-funnel the following property holds:
B
Bxfpt, xq ě wptq,
ż b
a
wptqdt ą ´8,
which follows from the fact that BBxfpt, xq is uniformly bounded there.
Proof of Proposition 4
We start from the direct mechanism derived in the proof of Proposition 3:
σpθq P arg max
ρ
pθ ´ σpρqqGpρq. (1.29)
To apply the envelope argument, we use Theorem 2 from [MS02]. The premises of this
theorem are satisfied since the profit function in (1.29) is continuously differentiable in θ, and
its partial derivative with respect to θ is uniformly bounded. Since σ is strictly monotone
(see proof of Proposition 3), for any θ there exists a q such that ρpθ, qq “ θ, and therefore
the envelope conditions can be written as:
pθ ´ σpθqqGpθq ´ pθ ´ σpθqqGpθq “
ż θ
θ
Gpzqdz. (1.30)
Finally, since σpθq “ θ (see proof of Proposition 3), we obtain our formula:
σpθq “ θ ´ 1
Gpθq
ż θ
θ
Gpzqdz. (1.31)
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1.9 Appendix B
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Figure 1.21: Welfare frontiers in the space of expected rebate and expected quality.
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Figure 1.22: Joint distribution of bids and quality.
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CHAPTER 2
Optimal Robust Divisible Public Goods
2.1 Introduction
We study divisible allocation of a pure (non-excludable) public good among n agents with
quasi-linear utility. Divisibility means that the good can be allocated at different levels,
in contrast with the binary allocation that can pick either full scale or nothing. Non-
excludability suggests that everyone has an unrestricted access to the full amount produced.
Such public goods are easy to find in any modern community, the simplest example being
public security, which can vary in quality and, therefore, costs of provision. We restrict
attention to the special case when both the costs and the utilities are linear in production
level.
We are interested in finding an optimal robust mechanism, meaning that expected welfare
is maximized subject to incentive compatibility (IC ), individual rationality (IR), and budget
balance (BB) constraints that have to be satisfied for all realization of types, or, in other
words, ex-post. The budget balance property indicates that the mechanism never produces
deficit or surplus. This definition of robustness is in line with [HR87] and [CP16], but there
are several other interpretations such as in [BM05], [BS11], or [BS12]. Instead of the ex-post
IC, a dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC ) constraint is commonly used in the
literature. These two types of constraints are equivalent for direct mechanisms in private
values environments like ours.
It was recently shown in [KS17] that robust mechanisms for public good, which minimize
expected welfare loss among binary ones, have to take a certain threshold form. However,
it is not obvious that such mechanisms should be binary in the first place. The goal of our
58
paper is to study mechanisms in the public goods setting, that are robustly optimal among
the divisible ones.
Our contribution consists of two main results. The first main result is that, under certain
additional assumptions, expected welfare loss attains minimum at a simple posted price,
or, equivalently, a threshold mechanism. This finding reinforces the results in [KS17] by
justifying the restriction to binary mechanisms in two steps. First, in Proposition 3, we
show that a robust divisible mechanism is a lottery over simple posted prices. Second, in
Proposition 4, we argue that, for any prior belief, expected welfare loss is maximized at
the vertex of the lottery simplex. Our second main result is that, under certain beliefs,
a significant portion of welfare is guaranteed to be lost even if the mechanism was chosen
optimally among the robust ones. In Proposition 5, we derive a lower bound for the associated
welfare loss, which grows linearly in the number of agents. This bound is tight for the case
of two agents.
Most of the assumptions required for our results are of technical nature and barely restrain
their applicability. But there is one substantial restriction, namely Assumption 8, which
requires that each agent’s equilibrium utility at the lowest type is equal to zero. A similar
property was derived in [KS17] as a result of expected welfare loss minimization, for binary
mechanisms. Due to complexity of the divisible good setting, we do not derive it, instead in
Section 2.3.1, we argue that in a variety of situations it is automatically satisfied.
On the technical side, our approach is closest in spirit to [HR87], who studied robust
mechanisms for bilateral trade. This problem is dual to that of a public good with two
agents, and so our results can be considered as a direct extension. A distinct feature of
our paper is that we consider a broad class of upper semi-continuous allocation functions,
as opposed to differentiable ones in [HR87], or binary ones in [KS17]. These two classes of
mechanisms typically involve different solution techniques. In contrast, we develop a unified
method that suits both, which is demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 3.
The tools are novel to the mechanism design literature, and can be possibly applied to
other economic environments.
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2.1.1 Literature review
There are multiple opinions in the literature on what robustness exactly means. For example,
in [BM05], robustness is defined as Bayesian implementation on all type spaces, which is a
stronger concept than ex-post implementation. An alternative method was proposed in
[BS12], which eliminated weakly dominated strategies based only on the knowledge of the
support of distribution. Robustness in [BS11] means that the maximal regret from a small
misspecification of beliefs is also relatively small.
Robustness in our paper implies that the incentive compatibility, individual rationality,
and budget balance constraints are formulated in such a way that they do not rely on common
knowledge of the distribution of types. In the context of direct mechanisms, this amounts
to all the constraints being evaluated ex-post. This is the exactly same approach that was
used in [HR87] to study robust bilateral trade.
In the classic papers by [MS83a] and [GH86], the optimal Bayesian (second-best) divisible
mechanisms were identified for bilateral trade and pure public goods respectively. The opti-
mal robust (third-best) divisible mechanisms were described in [HR87] and further studied
in [CP16]. A systematic analysis of the second-best and third-best mechanisms for bilateral
trade, which can also be thought of as a pure public good with two agents, can be found in
[BKS15].
Related are numerous papers that aim at selecting a thin set of mechanisms without
any particular welfare assessment. Typically, a strong solution concept like coalition-proof
stability as in [Mou94] and [BH16], or a symmetry/anonymity assumption as in [Ser99] is
used. Compared to these papers, we harness a relatively weak solution concept, that allows
to select a rich but tractable family of asymmetric mechanisms.
The optimality of posted prices in our paper is similar to the result in [CP16], but there
are a few substantial differences. On the one hand, they consider a broader class of welfare
criteria captured by the notion of ex-post Pareto optimality. On the other, they insist on
the interpretation of mechanisms as lotteries, which allows them to use a stronger version
of ex-post IC and ex-post IR constraints. Our interpretation of mechanisms is that the
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allocation is divisible, and so it is more general and consistent with the classic approach in
[HR87].
Our assessment of welfare losses of robust mechanisms is similar to how revenue losses of
certain simple mechanisms were studied by [HN17] in the context of monopolistic screening.
Instead of directly solving for the profit, they show that a constant fraction of optimal
(second-best) revenue can be attained, for all prior beliefs. Likewise, in our setting, a constant
fraction of optimal (second-best) welfare is forgone by robust mechanisms, under certain
beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the setup in Section 2.2,
and the preliminary results in Section 2.3. The latter consists of three parts, in which we
discuss the additional assumptions, introduce the tools for studying divisible mechanisms,
and prove the technical lemmas needed for the main results of the paper. The main results
are in Section 3.3, which consists of three parts: the characterization of robust mechanisms in
terms of lotteries over posted prices in Section 2.4.1, the proof that posted prices are optimal
in Section 2.4.2, and the derivation of the welfare bounds in Section 2.4.3. We discuss our
findings in Section 2.5.
2.2 Setup
A divisible public good can be produced at any level in the segment r0, 1s, where zero stands
for no production, and the marginal cost of production is equal to c ą 0.
Let there be n agents with quasi-linear utilities. Each agent has constant marginal
valuation from the public good, which is unknown to the designer. Denote by v “ tviu the
profile of valuations, and let it be distributed on a rectangular area V “ tv : vi P rai, bisu,
where
ř
ai ă c ă ř bi.
Following the tradition of mechanism design, we focus on a direct mechanism that assigns
the level of production and transfers based on the reported profile of types v. We consider
a divisible (as opposed to binary) mechanism, which means that for a profile of types v a
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certain level of production between 0 and 1 is assigned.
Definition 16. A direct mechanism µ is a mapping from V into Aˆ Rn:
µ : v ÞÑ pϕ, τq
where A is equal to t0, 1u for the binary and to r0, 1s for divisible case.
A mechanism µ maps the profile of valuations v into ϕpvq - the expected allocation
function, and τ “ tτiuni“1 - the vector of expected payments made by the agents. For the
rest of the paper, two mechanisms are considered equivalent if their allocation function and
transfers coincide.
For the reported profile v “ pvi, v´iq and a true type vˆi of agent i, his off-equilibrium
utility Uipvˆi, vq is:
Uipvˆi, vq “ vˆiϕpvq ´ τipvq
For the truthfully reported profile of types v “ pvi, v´iq the equilibrium utility Uipvq and
the equilibrium budget Bpvq are:
Uipvq “ Uipvi, vq, Bpvq “
ÿ
i
τipvq ´ ϕpvqc
Definition 17. A mechanism µ is robust (with budget balance) if it satisfies:
1. ex post IC: vˆi P argmaxvi Uipvˆi, vq,
2. ex post IR: Uipvi, vq ě 0,
3. ex post BB: Bpvq “ 0,
for all v and vˆi in the support.
A standard exercise in mechanism design is to characterize an ex-post IC mechanism as
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a non-decreasing allocation function ϕpvq such that utilities and transfers satisfy:
Uipv2i , v´iq ´ Uipv1i, v´iq “
ż v2i
v1i
ϕpz, v´iqdz (2.1)
τipv2i , v´iq ´ τipv1i, v´iq “
ż v2i
v1i
zdϕpz, v´iq (2.2)
for all v1i, v2i , v´i in the support.
Formulas (2.1) and (2.2) represent the same enveloping conditions in the quasi-linear
setting, see [HR87] or [MS83a] for the discussion. A mechanism is additionally ex-post IR,
if and only if for every agent i:
Uipai, v´iq ě 0 (2.3)
because the equilibrium utility is non-decreasing in own type. Finally, the mechanism is ex
post BB if the total surplus is equal to the sum of equilibrium utilities:
Bpvq “ p
ÿ
vi ´ cqϕpvq ´
ÿ
Uipvi, vq “ 0 (2.4)
Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) will be the starting point of our analysis in the next section.
2.3 Preliminary results
Our first observation about the family of robust mechanisms is that they form a convex
cone (with the origin at the autarky) in the space of mechanisms pϕ, τq. That is because
a convex combination of any collection of ex-post IC, IR and BB mechanisms also satisfies
these properties, which follows from formulas (2.1)-(2.4).
For analytical convenience, we will often consider randomized mechanisms, that are dis-
tributions over a certain family of mechanisms. The hierarchy of robust mechanisms in our
paper is therefore:
binary Ă randomized binary Ă divisible “ randomized divisible
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The fact that robust divisible mechanisms form a convex set, however, is of little use unless
we know the minimal set of mechanisms that span the whole family through convexification,
which will be the goal of Proposition 3.
To find this minimal set we need several additional assumptions that are described in
Section 2.3.1, and a few technical tools and lemmas listed in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Additional assumptions
Here we discuss in detail the four assumptions used in the paper.
Assumption 6. A mechanism is non-wasteful if supvϕpvq “ 1.
This assumption was used in [CP16] and is merely a normalization of the mechanism.
Clearly, any robust mechanism such that supV ϕpvq P p0, 1q can be appropriately scaled to
be non-wasteful, which would also be an improvement from the social point of view.
Assumption 7. The allocation function ϕpvq is upper-semicontinuous on V if:
lim sup
vÑv0
ϕpvq “ ϕpv0q
This assumption was used in [DMR17] in the context of binary mechanisms and is yet
another normalization. For non-decreasing functions it is equivalent to right-continuity in
each coordinate vi separately, or in the vector of coordinates v as a whole. The role of this
assumptions is also discussed in Section 3.3 in the definition of a simple posted price.
Assumption 8. For every i there exists a pivotal type ξpv´iq such that Uipξ, v´iq “ 0.
This assumption requires that for any realization of types v´i there exist a type of agent
i that is just indifferent to participate, and, crucially, this pivotal type should not depend
on the actual type of agent i. Though seemingly artificial, this is a fairly natural property
of the mechanism. In the context of binary mechanism, it was derived from a variety of
different assumptions in [KS17]. For divisible mechanisms it can be derived from one of the
following assumptions on the primitives of the model:
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3.1 Largest type space: V “ Rn,
3.2 Veto power : ai `řj‰i bj ă c, for all i,
3.3 Cost sharing : ai “ 0 and τipvq ě 0, for all i.
If the public good can be disliked by an agent, then it is natural to pick the largest
possible type space V “ Rn. We can think of Assumption 3.1 as part of the robustness
concept, that requires the mechanism to work for distributions with unknown supports. It
then follows that the pivotal type of agent i is ξpv´iq “ c´řj‰i vj.
A slightly weaker version of Assumption 3.1 is Assumption 3.2, that does not require
negative valuations. It posits that, for any agent, there exists a type that will make the
public good inefficient no matter what the types of other agents are. That means that
every agent has a power to veto the public good by announcing just below his pivotal type
ξpv´iq “ c ´řj‰i vj, which is closely related to the instance of full veto power assumption
in [KS17].
Finally, if the setting implies that the valuations are nonnegative, that is ai “ 0,
the restriction to non-positive transfers as in Assumption 3.3 guarantees that a situa-
tion where somebody who does not care about the public good earns free money by
just stepping into the mechanism would not occur. The pivotal type in this situation is
ξipv´iq “ maxtc´řj‰i vj, aiu.
Assumption 9. ai “ 0, bi “ b ă c, for all i.
This assumption tells that the support is an equilateral cube with bounds such that
nobody can have marginal value above marginal costs, and the lowest marginal value exactly
zero. We use this assumption is far from necessary for our results, but we invoke it for the
welfare loss bounds in Proposition 4 to have a concise analytical form.
2.3.2 Technical tools
In order to formulate and derive the main results of the paper we need to introduce some
technical tools, such as n-th mixed difference operator and a distribution function, adapted
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from Chapter 3 in the [Shi16] textbook. These are necessary for the construction of a
random variable out of its conjectured CDF, which will be at the core of Proposition 3. In
the context of binary mechanisms such as studied in [KS17], these tools are redundant since
no randomization takes place.
Consider an n-dimensional (not necessarily equilateral) cube C Ă V with left-open and
right-closed boundaries:
C “ tv P V | vi P pa˜i, b˜is, @iu
and let C be the set of all such cubes C in V . The following definition generalizes the concept
of a mixed n-th derivative to functions that do not have to be differentiable.
Definition 18. For a cube C P C the n-th mixed difference operator D1,...,nC is defined as:
D1,...,nC ϕ “ D1pa˜1,b˜1sp. . . pDnpa˜n,b˜nsϕpvqqq
Dkpa˜k,b˜ksϕpvq “ ϕpb˜k, v´kq ´ ϕpa˜k, v´kq
Note that each separate coordinate-wise difference is an operator acting on the space of
functions on V , but the n-th mixed difference maps an allocation function into a constant
and thus is a functional. If ϕpvq is a CDF of a random variable, then D1,...,nC ϕ measures the
probability of that random variable landing inside the cube C.
One useful property of D1,...,nC is that for two adjacent (sharing the same face) cubes C1
and C2 the sum of the two corresponding functionals is equal to the functional that of the
merged cube C1 Y C2:
D1,...,nC1YC2ϕ “ D1,...,nC1 ϕ`D1,...,nC2 ϕ. (2.5)
In the case of random variables this means that the probability of landing in either of the
two cubes is the same as the sum probabilities of landing in each cube separately.
The following definition captures the idea of the cumulative distribution function of a
random variable, adapted to a special case when the domain is a bounded subset of the
Euclidean space such as V .
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Definition 19. A function ϕ on V is a distribution function if and only if:
1. infvPV ϕpvq “ 0, supvPV ϕpvq “ 1,
2. it is right-continuous in the profile of types v,
3. the n-th mixed difference D1,...,nC is non-negative for any C P C.
Note that for the special case of a non-decreasing allocation function ϕpvq, the sec-
ond property is equivalent to upper-semicontinuity. The third property is equivalent to
non-wastefulness, because there is always a region in V where production is inefficient and
therefore ϕpvq “ 0.
2.3.3 Technical lemmas
Let E be the part of the type space, where production of public good is efficient or break-even,
and its complement E¯ - where production is strictly inefficient:
E “ tv P V |
ÿ
i
vi ě cu, E¯ “ tv P V |
ÿ
i
vi ă cu
The following lemma takes advantage of Assumption 8 and obtains a concise analytical
transcription of the budget balance property, as an integral equation with the allocation
function as an unknown.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 3, if a mechanism is ex post IR, IC, BB then:
p
nÿ
i
vi ´ cqϕpvq ´
nÿ
i“1
ż vi
ξipv´iq
ϕpz, v´iqdz “ 0, (2.6)
where ξipv´iq is the pivotal type, and v P E.
Proof. Consider the budget surplus as in formula (2.4). By formula (2.1), agent i’s ex post
utility can be represented as an integral over the allocation function ϕp¨, v´iq with the bounds
of integration ξipv´iq and vi plus the utility at the boundary, that must be equal to zero.
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The following lemma further transforms the budget balance condition into a property of
the mixed difference operator. This property will be the bedrock for the construction of the
random variable in the main section.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 2, 3 if a mechanism is ex post IR, IC, BB then the n-th
mixed difference D1,...,nC ϕ is nonnegative for any cube C P C, and zero if additionally the cube
fully belongs to either E or E¯.
Proof. Note first that D1,...,nC ϕ “ 0 for any cube C Ă E¯, because production in that region
is inefficient and therefore ϕpvq “ 0.
Let do the same for C Ă E. If the allocation function is smooth in E, differentiate both
sides of equation (2.6) with respect to every variable:
ÿ
i
ˆ Bn´1
Bv1 . . . Bvˆi . . . Bvn
B
Bvi pviϕpvi, v´iqq ´ c
Bn
Bv1 . . . Bvnϕpvq
˙
´
´
ÿ
i
Bn´1
Bv1 . . . Bvˆi . . . Bvn
˜
B
Bvi
ż vi
c´řj‰i vj ϕpξ, v´iqdξ
¸
“ 0
after cancelling out the terms sides and dropping při vi ´ cq we get:
Bn
Bv1 . . . Bvnϕpvq “ 0 (2.7)
that should hold for all v P E. Integrating over the area of the cube C Ă E we then obtain
the necessary equation. See Appendix for the general proof with upper-semicontinuous
functions.
Finally, let’s show that D1,...,nC ϕ ě 0 for any cube C Ă V . Using formula (2.5) and the
previous result we can replace a cube C that crosses the hyperplane
ř
vi “ c with another
cube C 1 (see Figure 2.1 for a graphical example) such that:
D1,...,nC “ D1,...,nC1 , C 1 “ tv P V | vi P pa˜i, ηis, @iu, ηi “ mintc´
ÿ
j‰i
a˜j, b˜iu.
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Figure 2.1: Cubes C “ ra˜1, b˜1q ˆ ra˜2, b˜2q and C 1 “ ra˜1, c´ a˜2q ˆ ra˜2, c´ a˜1q for the case n “ 2, V “
r0, 1s2 and c “ 1.
For the new cube we can establish the necessary property:
D1,...,nC1 “ ϕpηq ´
ÿ
i
ϕpc´
ÿ
j‰i
ηj, η´iq ¨ Ipb˜i ě c´
ÿ
j‰i
a˜iq ě Bpvq “ 0
which follows from formula (2.6) and monotonicity of ϕpvq.
2.4 Main results
To state the main results of the paper, we need to formally define a special robust mechanism
that we refer to as a simple posted price throughout the paper. Fix a vector of prices
ρ “ tρiuni“1 such that
ř
ρi ě c.
Definition 20. A mechanism µsppρq “ pϕsppρq, τ sppρqq is a simple posted price if:
ϕsppρ, vq “
ź
i
Ipvi ě ρiq, τ sppρ, vq “ ρ ¨ ϕsppρ, vq
For any given ρ, the allocation function ϕsppρ, vq is simply an indicator function with
a rectangular support. If the support were strictly above the hyperplane
ř
i vi “ c as in
Figure 2.2 (left), then the mechanism would generate budget surplus, and if it only touches
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the hyperplane as in Figure 2.2 (right), then it is exactly budget balanced.
Figure 2.2: Allocation function of a simple posted price mechanism that runs budget surplus (left
figure) and the one that is exactly budget balanced (right figure).
Our definition of the simple posted price is in line with the definition of a posted price in
[CP16], but we use the word simple to stress that there are many more robust mechanisms
that can be referred to as posted prices. In the context of binary outcomes, this broader class
of mechanisms is referred to as threshold mechanisms in [KS17].
2.4.1 Characterization
Proposition 3. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the family of robust divisible
mechanisms satisfying Assumptions 1,2,3 and distributions over simple posted prices. The
allocation function of such mechanism coincides with the respective cumulative distribution
function.
Proof. It’s fairly easy to see that the allocation function of a single posted price µp is the
CDF of a corresponding lottery with a single outcome ρ. Same property holds for any lottery
or distribution over simple posted prices:
Probpρ : ρi ď vi for all iq “ ϕpvq.
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To show the converse we will adapt a theorem in [Shi16] that states that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between measures on V and the distribution functions as defined
in Section 2.3.2. Because under Assumption 8, the transfers are uniquely defined by the
allocation function ϕpvq of a robust mechanism, we only have to show that ϕpvq is actually
a distribution function, or precisely, it satisfies the three characteristic properties in its
definition. The first two properties follow immediately from Assumption 6 and Assumption 7,
while the last property follows from Lemma 3. This establishes that ϕpvq is the CDF of
some distribution over vectors ρ P V that are not yet restricted to the ř ρi “ c hyperplane.
The last piece of the puzzle is the additional property in Lemma 3, that states that
for any cube C that lies completely above or completely below that hyperplane, the D1,...,nC
operator is equal to zero. This means that the probability of a posted price p falling outside
of the
ř
ρi “ c hyperplane is zero, in other words they are all budget balanced.
Consider a functional F that maps an allocation function of the mechanism into a scalar.
F is affine if F “ k ` L, where k is a constant and L is linear:
Lpϕ1 ` ϕ2q “ Lpϕ1q ` Lpϕ2q, Lpλϕ1q “ λLpϕq.
The following statement follows immediately from the fact that the family of robust mech-
anisms is a convex hull of simple posted prices.
Corollary 6. Any affine functional F attains minimum over the family of robust divisible
mechanisms satisfying Assumptions 1,2,3 at a simple posted price, for any belief F .
2.4.2 Optimality
Denote the welfare at the first best mechanism and the welfare at mechanism µ as:
Wfbpvq “ p
ÿ
vi ´ cq ¨ Ir
ÿ
vi ě cs, Wµpvq “ p
ÿ
vi ´ cq ¨ ϕµpvq,
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Then denote the welfare loss function:
WLµpvq “ Wfbpvq ´Wµpvq
The welfare loss works as an non-linear operator on the space of functions over V . It maps
an allocation function ϕµpvq of mechanism µ into a function WLµpvq.
We can now define our main welfare criterion.
Definition 21. The expected welfare loss EWLF,µ is a function of a mechanism µ:
EWLF,µ “
ż
WLµpvqdF pvq
where F is the belief about the distribution of types.
Technically speaking, expected welfare loss is a non-linear functional acting on the space
of allocation functions ϕµpvq. We will later show that the first one satisfies a certain strong
property that we define below:
Definition 22. A mechanism µ is robustly optimal for some prior beliefs F , if it mini-
mizes expected welfare loss over a family of robust divisible mechanisms.
Proposition 4. For any prior belief F , a robustly optimal (among those satisfying Assump-
tions 1,2,3) mechanism is either a simple posted price, or a lottery over simple posted prices
that yield the same expected welfare loss.
Proof. By Corollary 6, it is sufficient to verify that, for any prior belief F , expected welfare
loss of a robust mechanism µ is an affine functional acting on the space of robust allocation
functions. This follows directly from formulas (2.2):
EWLF,µ “
ż
WfbpvqdF pvq ´
ż
WµdF pvq “
“ kpF q ´
ż ÿ
i
UipvqdF pvq “ kpF q ´
ÿ
i
ż ż vi
ai
ϕpz, v´iqdzdF pvq
where kpF q is the first best expected utility.
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2.4.3 Welfare bounds
To derive the welfare bounds we introduce another supplementary welfare criterion.
Definition 23. The maximal welfare loss MWLµ is a function of a mechanism µ:
MWLµ “ sup
v
WLµpvq
We will refer to the beliefs that maximize expected welfare loss at the corresponding
optimal robust divisible mechanism as the worst case beliefs.
Proposition 5. Expected welfare loss of a robustly optimal (among those satisfying Assump-
tions 1,2,3,4) mechanism at the worst case beliefs is bounded by:
1
4
¨ pnb´ cq ď sup
F
min
µ
EWLF,µ ď n´ 1
n
n
´1
n´1 ¨ pnb´ cq
Proof. To derive the lower bound, assume than n is even and split the agents in two equal
groups: A, B. Fix a small ε ą 0 and let Fε be distributed on two tiny regions in V , as
shown on Figure 2.3 for the special case of two agents. Precisely, let with probability 0.5
Figure 2.3: Distribution Fε for n “ 2, V “ r0, 1s2 and c “ 1.
the valuations for agents in group A be iid uniformly on the segment rc{n, c{n ´ εs and
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the valuations for agents in group B be iid uniformly on the segment rb, b ´ εs. Let with
probability 0.5 the valuations be distributed similarly but with A and B switched places.
Since by Proposition 4, the optimal robust divisible mechanism is a posted price, it
captures only one of the two regions and thus:
lim
εÑ0 minµ EWLFε,µ “ 0.5 ¨ p
n
2
pb` c
n
q ´ cq “ 1
4
pnb´ cq
If n is odd, let one agent always have the maximal valuation b and then repeat the
procedure for the remaining n ´ 1 agents with costs c ´ b to get the exact same number.
This completes the construction of the lower bound.
To derive the upper bound, notice that by the standard max-min property:
sup
F
min
µ
EWLF,µ ď min
µ
sup
F
EWLF,µ “ min
µ
MWLµ.
Next, consider a uniform distribution of posted prices on a special set S Ă Rn:
S “ t
ÿ
i
ρi “ c, c´
ÿ
j‰i vj ď ρi ď biu.
A corresponding divisible mechanism µ˚ is robust, but it might not satisfy Assumption 8
because prices can be negative. The allocation function of this mechanism and the maximal
welfare loss are easily calculated:
ϕ˚pvq “ p
ř
vi ´ cqn´1
pnb´ cqn´1 , MWLµ˚ “
n´ 1
n
n
´1
n´1 ¨ pnb´ cq
Notice that this mechanism can be modified to satisfy Assumption 8 without increasing the
maximal welfare loss. To do this it is sufficient to replace every lottery outcome ρ1 that
falls outside of the domain V with a lottery ρ2 on the boundary of V such that ρ2i ě ρ1i.
Intuitively, when a lottery offers negative prices to some of the agents, we replace them
with zero and use the net profit to provide discounts to other agents. This completes the
construction of the upper bound.
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From the Theorem above, we can immediately derive the following property.
Corollary 7. The lower bound in Proposition 5 is tight for two agents.
n “ 2 : sup
F
min
µ
EWLF,µ “ 1
4
pnb´ cq.
Corollary 8. For certain beliefs, the expected welfare loss of a robust divisible mechanism
is as big as 1{2 of the expected welfare at the optimal Bayesian mechanism.
Proof. Observe that under the sequence of beliefs Fε defined in Proposition 5, the agents’
types are perfectly correlated in the limit. This gives the designer ability to verify their
reports in equilibrium and thus implement the first best allocation. Clearly, for ε arbitrarily
close to zero, the welfare loss can be made arbitrarily small.
Since the total welfare under the beliefs Fε is arbitrarily close to 1{2 of the maximal
welfare, the result follows from Proposition 5.
2.5 Discussion
Divisible mechanisms have a potential to perform better than binary ones, but at the same
time are significantly harder to study. Unless some sort of reduction is made, constrained
optimization over non-decreasing allocation functions does not have a clear solution. One
such reduction is a characterization of divisible mechanisms in terms of lotteries over binary.
In this paper we pointed out the assumptions under which such reduction is valid in our
linear setting. Once we show that robust mechanisms can be represented as randomizations
over simple posted prices, optimization becomes extremely simple. Clearly, linearity of
utilities and costs is critical to the validity of our results. An interesting avenue of research
would be to identify optimal mechanisms without these strong assumptions.
We do not explicitly solve robustly optimal mechanism for any possible prior distribution
of beliefs, but we show that such mechanism has to take the shape of a simple posted price.
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This gives foundation to a commonly used assumption of a binary allocation.
It is easy to see that under certain beliefs the expected welfare losses can be as small
as zero. It therefore makes sense to try to identify the highest loss at a robustly optimal
mechanism, over all possible beliefs. For the special case of two agents we have identified
this loss to be exactly equal to 1
4
pnb ´ cq, that is, 25% of the maximal possible welfare, or
50% of the second-best welfare in this economy. For the multi-agent setting we show that
the loss keeps growing at least proportionally to the size of the economy.
The question of whether there is a steady upper bound to the welfare losses is open, since
we only provide a weak bound of n´1
n
n
´1
n´1 ¨ pnb´ cq that converges to pnb´ cq - the maximal
possible welfare in the economy.
2.6 Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 2.
To fill in the gap in the proof of Lemma 3 we will show that equation (2.6) implies that
D1,...,nC ϕ “ 0 for any cube C P C that fully belongs to E, as long as the allocation function
ϕpvq is non-decreasing and right-continuous is every variable.
The first step is to transform the equation (2.6) into a differential equation in an appro-
priate sense (see [Eva10] textbook for ’weak differentiation’ of generalized functions):
ż
. . .
ż
ϕpvq
ˆ Bn
Bv1 . . . Bvnψpvq
˙
dv1 . . . dvn “ 0 (2.8)
which holds for any smooth function ψpvq with support in E.
Denote the following differentiation and integration operators:
Bn
Bv “
Bn
Bv1 . . . Bvn ,
Bn´1
Bv´i “
Bn´1
Bv1 . . . Bvi´1Bvi`1 . . . Bvnż
dv “
ż
. . .
ż
dv1 . . . dvn,
ż
dv´i “
ż
. . .
ż
dv1 . . . dvi´1dvi`1 . . . dvn
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Because ψpvq spans the same space of test functions as při vi ´ cqψpvq, let’s write the
desired equation as J “ 0, where
J “
ż
ϕpvqB
n
Bv rp
ÿ
i
vi ´ cqψpvqsdv “
ż
ϕpvqrp
ÿ
i
vi ´ cqB
n
Bvψpvq `
ÿ
i
Bn´1
Bv´iψpvqsdv.
Substituting při vi ´ cqϕpvq from formula (2.6) and rearranging the order of integration we
get the following:
J “
ÿ
i
ż
pAipv´iq `Bipv´iqqdv´i
Aipv´iq “
ż
p
ż vi
c´řj‰i vj ϕpz, v´iqdzq
Bn
Bvψpvqdvi, Bipv´iq “
ż
ϕpvi, v´iqB
n´1
Bv´iψpvqdvi
then, applying integration by parts we get
Aipv´iq `Bipv´iq “ rp
ż vi
c´řj‰i vj ϕpz, v´iqdzq
Bn´1
Bv´iψpvqs
ˇˇˇˇvipv´iq
vipv´iq
where vipv´iq, vipv´iq are boundaries of the support of ψpvq for a fixed level of v´i. Finally,
because ψpvq is a smooth test function, it has zero value at the boundary together with all
of its derivatives, therefore J “ 0 and the first step is complete.
The second step is to transform (2.8) into:
D1,...,nC ϕ “ 0
that should hold for any cube C P C such that C Ă E. To show that we will evaluate (2.8)
at an indicator function
ψˆpvq “ Ipv P Cq, C “ tv P V | vi P pa˜i, b˜is, @iu.
Note that since ψˆpvq is not smooth, we can not do it directly.
Pick any smooth, symmetric kernel function Kpvq with support in r0, 1sn and construct
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a sequence of smooth approximations to ϕpvq:
ψnpvq “
ż
Knpηqψˆpv ´ ηqdη, Knpηq “ Kpnηq
By construction this function is smooth with support in E (if n is big enough), and it’s n-th
mixed derivative is equal to zero everywhere except for the right-neighborhoods of the vertices
of cube C. Because in these neighborhoods ψpvq is an indicator function, differentiating ψnpvq
simply recovers the smoothing kernel with alternating signs:
Bn
Bvψnpvq “
$’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’%
Knpv ´ b˜q, b˜j ď vj ď b˜j ` 1{n for all j
´Knpvi ´ a˜i, v´i ´ b˜´iq, a˜i ď vi ď a˜i ` 1{n, b˜j ď vj ď b˜j ` 1{n for all j ‰ i
. . .
p´1qnKnpv ´ a˜q, a˜j ď vj ď a˜j ` 1{n for all j
0, otherwise
Finally, because the function ϕpvq is right-continuous in pv1, . . . , vnq jointly, the integration
over the smoothing kernel approximates the value at the vertices of the cube, with alternating
signs. The whole integral is therefore an approximation to the sum of the values of ϕpvq at
the vertices of the cube, with alternating signs:
ż
ϕpvqB
n
Bvψnpvqdv “ D
1,...,n
C ϕ` op1q ñ D1,...,nC ϕ “ 0
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CHAPTER 3
Robust Mechanisms of Exchange
3.1 Introduction
The design of efficient trading mechanisms for exchange economies is one of the central
problems in economics. In a complete information environment, one way to achieve efficiency
is to post Walrasian prices and let agents buy and sell freely. The problem is harder if agents
have private information, especially when values are interdependent, as in the case of asset
trade. If agents trade using a double auction, which mimics the protocol on centralized stock,
bond, or commodity exchanges, the equilibria are sensitive to the information structure and
typically inefficient, even with many traders (see [RW12]). Indeed, in this setting, no feasible
mechanism that guarantees a near-efficient allocation in a prior-free way is known.
In a private information environment, the prior-free approach that we adopt guarantees
robustness of the mechanisms in the following sense (see [Wil87], [BM05], [CE07]). Bayesian
approach presumes designer’s knowledge of a joint distribution of agents’ payoff types, beliefs
about payoff types, beliefs about beliefs etc., and builds a different mechanism for each.
Prior-free approach is more demanding in that it asks for one mechanism that works for all
such distributions. We require that it satisfies the incentive constraints and is near-efficient
ex-post, for any realization of payoff types. This is motivated by practical considerations.
The prior-free mechanism can be implemented by an algorithm, much like ones executing
centralized limit order books on modern exchanges. It does not require an informed social
planner.
The goal of this paper is to provide such mechanisms. It has the following three re-
sults. First, we construct a class of direct mechanisms for exchange economies with private
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information and interdependent values, with no symmetry restrictions, that are ex-post in-
dividually rational, incentive compatible, and generate budget surplus for any economy size.
Moreover, they result in an ex-post nearly efficient allocation, when there are many agents
that are appropriately “small”. Second, the level of inefficiency of the mechanisms is tight
and cannot be improved by other mechanisms satisfying the constraints. Third, we show
that the mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double
auction. The auction can be run without any knowledge of either information structure or
utility functions.
We motivate our results using the following stylized example (see [RW12] and Examples
2, 5 and 7). Consider an exchange economy with a single asset and two large groups of
agents, say, “fundamental” and “liquidity” traders. Value of a fundamental trader depends
on his signal and the average of other fundamental traders’ signals.1 How to design a trade
mechanism that achieves a near-efficient allocation?
One may try a double auction: let each agent submit a demand schedule specifying how
much he wants to buy or sell at any price, and have the designer choose the price that clears
the market. Aside from the Bayesian formulation, this game will not lead to a near-efficient
allocation, no matter how large the economy. The problem is that a single price cannot
convey all the relevant public information needed to make the right choice ([RW12]). For
a fundamental trader, a high price might be due to high demand by the liquidity traders,
indicating a perfect selling opportunity, or due to high demand by other fundamental traders,
indicating high own value. Without enough information, he will not be able to trade near-
efficient quantity.
A different mechanism would elicit private information via appropriate scoring rules,
much in the spirit of [CM85] and [CM88], and then use it to set the Walrasian price. The
latter approach, however, works only if the designer knows the distribution of signals.2 Fi-
1For the argument it is irrelevant whether the liquidity traders have private or interdependent values.
2Scoring rules may extract the agent’s beliefs about others. However, exact knowledge of the joint
distribution is needed to map such beliefs to the agent’s payoff type, see [Nee04].
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nally, one could try to use prior-free direct Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanisms, but
in exchange environments they run a budget deficit, and so are infeasible. The mechanisms
we define in this paper provide an alternative, as we explain below.
In this paper we look at exchange economies with N agents that have quasilinear utilities
over a single divisible good and money. Each agent has a one-dimensional payoff type, and his
utility depends on the whole profile of types (interdependent values). We make two important
assumptions. First, the slopes of the individual demand curves are bounded. Second, the
average effect of any single agent’s type on marginal utilities of others converges to zero as
the economy grows (small pairwise interdependence). In the fundamental/liquidity traders
example, pairwise interdependence is of order 1
N
. Both assumptions formulate the notion
of “small” agents in our environment, and guarantee a decentralized, competitive economy
when N is large. As we show, they are sufficient and necessary for the near-efficiency in
large economies.
The main result of the paper is a construction of σ´Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
with quadratic taxes (σV CG), which are direct mechanisms that satisfy all the constraints ex-
post. Moreover, they are almost efficient ex-post, when there are many agents (see Section
3.3). For an economy of size N , the maximal distance to the efficient allocation, across
all agents and type profiles, is proportional to the sum of 1
N
and the bound on pairwise
interdependence. The mechanisms also guarantee a vanishing deadweight loss, when pairwise
interdependence is of order at most
b
1
N
. More generally, σV CG provide a linear trade-off
between inefficiency and budget deficit.
σV CG mechanisms are based on allocations that introduce a wedge between the market
price and each agent’s marginal utility, and the wedge is linear in the quantity traded, with
slope σ. It can be thought of as a controlled version of demand reduction, familiar from the
multi-unit auction literature ([Viv11], [ACP14]). In particular, no-one is excluded from trade
with any other agents (as in [McA92], [CH98], [Tat05], [LM16], [KY16], [LM17]). Instead,
relying on divisibility of the good, each agent’s trade is scaled down. This makes it possible
for the mechanisms to achieve vanishing inefficiency ex-post, and not just in expectation.
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The second main result of the paper shows that the above positive result is tight: any
mechanisms satisfying the constraints must result in efficiency losses proportional to those
achieved by appropriate σV CG mechanisms, for any size of the economy. The idea is that
in any incentive compatible mechanism agents must collect information rents for each in-
framarginal unit traded, with highest rents for the “most inframarginal” units. To prevent
budget deficit, mechanism must collect enough extra funds to cover the rents. The linear
wedge in our mechanism corresponds to a linear per-unit tax on each inframarginal unit
traded. When the slope of the tax matches the rate of change of the information rent, funds
collected cover rents ex-post with little surplus, and so cause minimal distortion. Moreover,
for smaller slopes, the mechanisms trace out a “Pareto frontier” of optimal pairs of budget
deficits and inefficiencies, up to a multiplicative constant.
In the paper we also construct alternative mechanisms which are based on different
ways of collecting extra funds. Examples include a fixed bid-ask spread (constant per-unit
wedge) or a fixed entry fee (no wedge for sufficiently large trade). We show that among
such mechanisms linear wedges are strictly optimal. We also show that our results extend
to the case when goods are discrete, when taxes include a quadratic part together with an
appropriate bid-ask spread.
σV CG mechanisms are direct mechanisms, in which the designer knows how to pick the
allocation and transfers, given reported types. The third main result of the paper is to pro-
vide an implementation using a σ´Discriminatory Conditional Double Auction (σDCDA),
which, in the spirit of [Wil87] or [DM00], requires no such knowledge. In the game, each
player submits his inverse demand, which specifies marginal prices at which he is willing to
clear the market, conditional on not just a total quantity, but on a vector of quantities that
the other agents trade. The mechanism computes the market clearing quantity vector and
price, as well as, for every trader, the residual demand curve that he is facing. Transfers are
discriminatory: each trader pays the area under his residual demand curve, together with a
tax quadratic in quantity. We show that there is an ex-post equilibrium of this game that im-
plements the σV CG allocation. In particular, when taxes are zero, the auction implements
the V CG direct mechanism – and so the efficient allocation, at a deficit.
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σDCDA is characterized by three features, each of which relates to practical problems
in market design. First, there is ample evidence that in practice market participants spend
significant resources trying to identify a source of trade. Learning the source of trade from
market data by high-frequency traders is a recent, well publicized example.3 Conditioning
on the whole allocated vector in a σDCDA is an instrument that mitigates precisely this
information flow. It allows each trader to infer information about the trading behavior on
the market directly as part of the trading protocol. Allowing retail investors to identify
themselves as such on NYSE via Retail Liquidity Program can be interpreted as facilitating
a particular kind of conditional bidding.
High-dimensionality of bids in a σDCDA stems from the generality of our approach,
and is likely not a practical obstacle. At the extreme, when values are private, bids are
conditioned only on the total quantity cleared just as in a standard double auction. We
show that when utilities depend on a low-dimensional statistic of types, the equilibrium
strategies are contingent on a low-dimensional statistic of the allocated vector. In the fun-
damental/liquidity traders example, fundametntal traders submit prices conditional on the
total quantity to be cleared and the average trade of other fundamental traders, with price
increasing in each variable.
Second, quadratic taxes used in a σDCDA are an alternative to the constant (“fixed fee”)
or linear (“bid-ask spread”) taxes, or fees, used in practice. They are designed to make fees
proportional to the price impact that the traders have, and guarantee minimal distortions
while imposing no deficit ex-post. We note that one way to interpret the weaker constraint
of no deficit in expectation is that it requires an informed and financially unconstrained
market maker, who facilitates trade and breaks even in expectation.4 Our mechanisms do
not require such an institution and can be implemented by a computer algorithm (see Section
3.5).
3See e.g. the Concept Release on Equity Market Structure by the [Sec10] or, in more colorful language,
[Lew14]. The rapidly growing literature on HFT is surveyed in [Jon13], [BF14] and the [Sec14].
4Of course, real-life market makers are not interested in efficiency but profit maximization. Near efficiency
requires an additional assumption of competition between such idealized market makers.
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Finally, we show that appropriate discriminatory pricing obviates any form of strategizing
and endogenous demand reduction, with information rents expressed directly in terms of
lower inframarginal prices. This resembles the way second price auction eliminates incentives
for shading in the first price auction, in the classical auction theory. Indeed, in equilibrium
agents use “revelation strategies”, submitting marginal utility adjusted by the linear wedge.
This makes computation of equilibrium strategies relatively easy, even in cases when linear
strategies in uniform price double auction are non-analytical (see Section 3.4). While harder
to quantify than efficiency gain, we consider this strategic simplicity a crucial virtue of our
mechanisms.
Relationship to the Literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on strate-
gic foundations of Walrasian Equilibrium in large exchange economies. One strand of it
focuses on the question of when double auctions approximate efficiency in Bayesian environ-
ment. Important contributions include [Wil85], [PS86a], [PS86b], [KM89], [GS89], [SW89],
[RSW94], [FMS07], [CS06] as well as [Yoo01], [Tat05] for double auctions with entry fees, in
the case of private values; and [Hel80], [MV93], [RP06] and [Viv11] for interdependent values.
In our paper, we require stronger ex-post constraints. Moreover, double auctions guarantee
asymptotic efficiency only with symmetric agents (and so not in the fundamental/liquidity
traders example; see [RW12]) and under additional assumptions on the distribution of sig-
nals, such as conditional independence. Finally, we stress that our mechanisms can be used
for any economy size.
Aside from double auctions, [RP76], [Jac92] and [JM97] show that Walrasian mechanisms
are difficult to manipulate in large replica economies. [GP92] and [MP02] identify, in the
Bayesian framework, crucial information smallness requirements and [MP15] show that the
benefits of ex-post deviations in the efficient mechanism are small. We rely on related
smallness assumptions but build mechanisms that satisfy exact ex-post constraints, and
provide an auction implementation.
In the standard auction context, under common knowledge of benefits of trade, VCG
mechanisms generate budget surplus. In the private-value case the mechanism is imple-
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mented by the second price auction. [Aus99], [DM00], [EM02], [PR02] and [PR05], [Aus04]
and [Izm04] extend and show how to implement VCG mechanisms with interdependent
values and multiple goods. With taxes set to zero, our discriminatory conditional double
auction provides a new implementation of the efficient (unbalanced) VCG in the exchange
setting with interdependencies. The conditional bids in our implementation are related to
the conditional bids in [DM00] and [EM02]. In our case inverse demands condition on vectors
of allocated quantities, while there agents condition on vectors of utility functions. Contin-
gent demands are also used in a context of dynamic trade with private values by [SS16] and
[DZ17].
Few studies have offered mechanisms for exchange environments that satisfy ex-post
constraints and are almost efficient in expectation, when the economy is large. In a seminal
paper, [McA92] provides a simple mechanism and an auction implementation that achieve
this with independent private values and unit demands and supplies, while [HSS02], [CS08]
and [LM16] deal with multiunit trade.5,6. [KY16] allow for interdependent values when
agents are symmetric and types are conditionally independently distributed. Our framework
has interdependent values with no symmetry restrictions. Crucially, σV CG mechanisms are
almost efficient not just in expectation but ex-post.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the setup and
establishes the lower bound on the inefficiency/budget deficit of mechanisms (Proposition
1). Section 3.3 defines the σV CG direct mechanisms and shows that they achieve ineffi-
ciency/budget deficit proportional to the lower bound (Proposition 2). Section 3.4 illustrates
σV CG mechanisms in different economies and compares them to double auctions. σDCDA
auctions are defined in Section 3.5 and Proposition 3 shows that they implement σV CG
mechanisms. Other mechanisms are considered in Section 3.6, and Section 3.7 provides a
discussion. The proofs and the extension to discrete setting is in the Appendix.
5The mechanism in [McA92] also guarantees bounded ex-post inefficiency, as the economy grows; see
[Chu09] for a similar result in a multi-unit setting.
6See [BV03], [Seg03] for robust monopoly pricing, among others.
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3.2 Setup
Payoffs. An exchange economy consists of N agents who can trade a single good, or asset,
for money. Each agent i has a payoff type si P R and has a quasilinear utility function
Uipqi, ti, sq “ uipqi, sq ´ ti,
where qi P R is the quantity of the good that agent i gets, ti is the transfer that he makes, and
s “ ps1, ..., sNq P S is a profile of payoff types.7 We emphasize that utilities may depend on
the whole vector of types (interdependent values) and that we are not making any symmetry
assumptions.
The set of all payoff type profiles S P RN need not be a product set, but we assume for
simplicity that for every s´i the projection tsi| psi, s´iq P Su is an interval.8 Functions ui are
strictly concave in qi and are twice continuously differentiable. We will write q “ pq1, ..., qNq,
t “ pt1, ..., tNq for the profiles of quantities and transfers, respectively, and muipqi, sq “
B
Bqiuipqi, sq, mui,jpqi, sq “ B
2
BqiBsj uipqi, sq and mui,qpqi, sq “ B
2
pBqiq2uipqi, sq for marginal utilities
and their derivatives.
The framework is a standard exchange economy setting with a single divisible good, and
money. The efficient benchmark in this setting is, of course, the Walrasian Equilibrium
(WE) allocation profile tq0psqusPS. For any vector of types s, the allocation q0psq is defined
jointly with the Walrasian price p0psq by
mupq0i psq, sq “ p0psq, @i (3.1)ÿ
i
q0i psq “ 0.
There is a unique WE allocation for any type profile s (see Section 3.3), and, from strict
concavity of the utility functions, any other allocation results in a positive deadweight loss.
7Normalizing the initial endowment to zero is purely for notational convenience.
8This assumption is not essential for the results, but simplifies the incentivizing transfers in the mecha-
nisms that we consider - see (3.9).
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For the main results we will need additional assumptions about the utility functions.
A1q |q0i psq| ď q. @i, s
A2q mui,qpqi, sq P r´mq,´mqs ă 0. @i, qi, s
A3q mui,ipqi, sq ě mo ą 0, @i, qi, s
A4q 1
N´1
ř
i‰jmui,jpqi, sq ď φN , with limNÑ8 φN “ 0, @j, q´j, s
All those assumptions are substantial. Formally, Proposition 1 establishes that each of
the bounds is necessary for near-efficiency in large markets. Informally, we argue below that
they capture the right notion of “smallness” of agents in our environemnt, and guarantee
that the economy is decentralized, or competitive, and not dominated by a single or few
traders. If an agent has a large impact on the economy and can control prices, efficiency is
out of reach.
Assumption A1 bounds the size of the efficient trade. Without this assumption, in any
candidate mechanism one “’big” trader could affect the market clearing price and allocations
for very many other, “small” traders, by chosing to trade either a lot or nothing.9
Assumption A2 bounds the slope of the individual demand curves, in the case when
information is public. Otherwise, if all but one agents were “small”, with steep demand
curves, their aggregate demand curve would have a moderate slope. In other words, the
aggregate of the myriad “small” agents would behave like one, leaving significant power to
determine price and quantity in the hands of the single trader they face.
We note that A2 is violated in a model with discrete allocations. Even though the alloca-
tions can be convexified using lotteries, marginal utility of each agent drops discontinuously
at discrete units. Indeed, as before, no matter how many agents in the economy, the aggre-
gate demand curve may be vertical, for prices between the common grid of marginal utilities.
In Appendix G we show, however, that both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 extend to the
case of discrete allocations, when Assumption A2 is replaced by one that bounds the change
9The assumption is needed only bound efficiency losses: without it, mechanisms we construct satisfy all
other constraints, budget surplus in particular (see Proposition 2).
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in marginal utilities for consecutive units. When units traded are small, the mechanisms
we propose achieve robust asymptotic efficiency; when units are large, no mechanism can
achieve that.
Finally, assumptions A3 and A4 jointly mean that as the economy grows, the average
impact of each single agent on marginal utilities of others becomes relatively insignificant.10
Otherwise, no matter the economy size, a fixed small group of traders could monopolize
the relevant information about the common-value component of the asset. Each of those
“informationally large” traders has a large impact on the price and the incentive problem is
similar as if only they were present. Near-efficiency is out of reach (see [MS83b]). We will
refer to A4 as the assumption of small pairwise interdependence.
We note that A3 and A4 do not restrict the models we consider to small perturbations
of the private value model. Agents’ utilities may be virtually determined by public shocks
(see Examples 1-3). The only restriction is that the information about those public signals
is dispersed.
Working with economies of fixed size N , we will be using the following counterpart of
A4:
A4˚q 1
N´1
ř
i‰jmui,jpqi, sq ď φN , with φN ă 18
mq
mq
mo, @j, q´j, s
In particular, we allow for the single crossing assumption to be violated, and so j1s signal
to be more relevant to some other trader, mui,jpqi, sq ą mj,jpqj, sq. However, A4˚ is related
to strict single crossing, and will play the same role of guaranteing strict monotonicity of
allocations in our mechanisms. It is weaker, in that it bounds only the average effect of j1s
signal on others, but the bound, which is the impact on own utilities mo, is scaled down by
mq
mq
ă 1. The bound is scaled down even further, because our mechanisms are efficient not
for the original, but for the perturbed utilities (see proof of Proposition 2 for details).
10Assumption A3 normalizes the signals. Without it, assumption A4 has no bite and can be assumed in
any family of models, given a straightforward change of variables.
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Example 1. (Fundamental Value Model, [Viv11], [RW12]) Utilities are
uipqi, sq “ pαsi ` βsqqi ´ µ
2
q2i ,
for some constants α, µ ą 0 and β ě 0, where s is the arithmetic average of the types.
Each agent is uncertain about the value of the first infinitesimal unit of the good or the
intercept of the linear marginal utility function. The value is a weighted average of common
and idiosyncratic shocks, s and si. It may reflect both the expected cash flow of the asset,
common to all the agents that are partially informed about it, and private hedging needs. We
have mui,jpqi, sq “ βN for any j ‰ i, and so the small pairwise interdependence assumption
A4 is satisfied; for fixed N , A4˚ holds as long as α ą 7β
N
. The efficient Walrasian Equilibrium
allocation is
q0i psq “ αµ psi ´ sq. (3.2)
Example 2. (Group Model, [RW12]) Suppose agents are divided into two groups of the same
size, and the utilities are
uipqi, ti, sq “ pαGsi ` βGsGqqi ´ µ
2
q2i , @i P G,G “ 1, 2
where s1 and s2 are the average types in each group, α1, α2, µ ą 0 and β1, β2 ě 0. Compared
to Example 1, beside the idiosyncratic shocks now there are two shocks, s1, s2, common to
the respective group and irrelevant to the other. Agents are trading either for fundamen-
tal or liquidity reasons, and values are correlated within a group. The efficient Walrasian
Equilibrium allocation is
q0i psq “ αsi ` βs
G ´ pα ` βqs
µ
. @i P G,G “ 1, 2 (3.3)
Example 3. (Fundamental Value Model with Heterogenous Traders) There are two groups
of agents, “small” and “big”, and utilities are
uipqi, sq “ pαsi ` βsqqi ´ µG
2
q2i , @i P G,G “ S,B
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where µS “ µ, µB “ µ, µ ą µ. As in the Fundamental Value Model, all the agents are
partially and symmetrically informed about the fundamental value of the risky asset, but
they differ now in their capacity to hold large position, with big agents relatively risk neutral
(or bearing large cost of staying away from their ideal position). The efficient Walrasian
Equilibrium allocation is
q0i psq “ αsi ` βs´ p
σpsq
µG
, @i P G,G “ S,B (3.4)
A natural source of interdependence in preferences is informational, when agent’s type
corresponds to a signal informative of all agents’ values of the asset. We have used this
interpretation in the examples above, and will continue to do it throughout the paper. This
informational interpretation can be further justified via Bayesian models. Indeed, suppose
each agent i has a private state space Θi and a continuously differentiable utility function
vipqi, θiq as well as a prior δi P ∆pΘi ˆ S1 ˆ ...ˆ SNq. If one defines
uipqi, sq “ Eδirvipqi, θiq|ss,
then the correlations of signal vectors s and value θi translate to utilities ui with interdepen-
dent values.
In particular, utility functions in the examples above are expected utilities in the model
in which each agent i has linear-quadratic utilities,
vipqi, θiq “ θiqi ´ µ
2
q2i , (3.5)
and believes that pθi, s1, ..., snq has a joint normal distribution, where the linear parameters
wj, j ď N, are such that
Eδirθi|s1, ..., sN s “
ÿ
j
wjsj, (3.6)
from the Projection Theorem. Put otherwise, a fixed linear-quadratic utility function with
parameters wj, j ď N may be justified, for example, by any normal prior beliefs for which
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(3.6) holds. We stress here that many beliefs may give rise to the same utilities ui; we discuss
this Bayesian justification for the interdependent preferences in the context of robustness in
Section 3.7 (see also Example 6).
Our notion of small pairwise interdependence is closely related to the informational small-
ness used in the context of such Bayesian models (see [GP92], [MP02] and [MP15]). If Θi
and
Bmvj
Bθi are bounded for all i, j, then ui satisfy A4 precisely when
11,12
A4Bq 1
N´1
ř
i‰j
ˇˇˇ
Bδipθi|sq
Bsj
ˇˇˇ
ď φBN , with limNÑ8 φBN “ 0 @j, θ´j, s
In other words, given a Bayesian justification, bound on pairwise interdependence A4 is
equivalent to any single agent j having a small average impact on beliefs of others about the
payoff relevant state.
Mechanisms. Given a profile of utility functions pu1, ..., uNq, a (direct) mechanism
in our setting is tpqpsq, tpsqqusPS, where tqpsqusPS is the allocation profile and ttpsqusPS the
transfers profile, qpsq, tpsq P RN . Below we list the constraints and the objective that we
want mechanisms to satisfy. A direct mechanism satisfies
‚ Market Clearing, if
MCq ři qipsq “ 0, @s
‚ δ´Budget Surplus, for δ ě 0, if
δ ´BSq ři tipsq ě ´δ, @s
‚ Individual Rationality, if
IRq Uipqipsq, tipsq, sq ě Uip0, 0, sq, @i, s
11We identify a distribution δi with its cdf .
12The main difference is that [MP02] require the bound in A4B to hold not for every s´j but only for
s´j with probability 1´ φBN . The strengthening in our paper is dictated by the stronger, ex-post version of
incentive compatibility.
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‚ Incentive Compatibility, if
ICq Uipqipsq, tipsq, sq ě Uipqips1i, s´iq, tips1i, s´iq, sq, @i, s, s1i
‚ ε-Efficiency, if
ε´ Effq |qipsq ´ q0i psq| ď ε. @i, s
Finally, consider a family of mechanisms tpqpsq, tpsqqusPS for any number of players N and
any utility profiles pu1, ..., uNq. For a function f : NÑ R`, we say that the family is robustly
asymptotically f -Efficient if each mechanism satisfies the constraints MC,BS, IR, IC and
fN ´ Eff .
Market clearing is a standard feasibility constraint. Budget surplus is similar, as we want
mechanisms to run without an outside source of money; positive δ allows for some slack.
Individual rationality requires participation in a mechanism to be voluntary, and incentive
compatibility means that truthful reporting of own type is optimal.
Crucially, all the constraints and the objective are required to be satisfied ex-post, for
any vector of types. While this is natural in the case of market clearing, those are strong
requirements in the case of IR, IC, BS and Efficiency, relative to their Bayesian counter-
parts. All are motivated by practical considerations. Specifically, the benefits of the ex-post
constraints are as follows.
First, ex-post IR and IC imply Bayesian IR and IC for any type space describing agents’
beliefs – about types, about beliefs of others, etc. (see e.g. [BM05]). Thus, ex-post IR and
IC guarantee that the mechanism is robust with respect to the misspecification of agents’
beliefs. For practical purposes, this means that the designer does not need to know what
agents believe about others, when designing a mechanism.
Second, ex-post IR and IC also guarantee that agents have ex-post no regret about their
allocation. This means that a mechanism will work in a weak contractual environment, when
each agent can walk away from the transaction (or change their action) at any stage, even
after observing the full allocation vector and possibly inferring types of other agents. This
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shares many of the features of a standard spot market. Relatedly, ex-post constraints nullify
any benefits of (inefficient) spying on other agents to infer their types ([BV02]).
Third, ex-post BS and (near) Efficiency guarantee that BS and (near) Efficiency will
be satisfied for any distribution of types. Thus a mechanism is robust with respect to the
misspecification of type distribution, and so the mechanism designer need not know it. Intu-
itively, Bayesian formulation requires an idealized – informed and financially unconstrained
– market maker that facilitates trade. If market maker knows the distribution of types, is
risk neutral and faces no liquidity constraints, he could broker the trade, while breaking even
and achieving near efficiency in expectation.13 Given the volume of trade and the number
of assets traded on centralized exchanges, however, the informational and liquidity require-
ments of such risk-neutral brokering are staggering. In contrast, an ex-post BS and (near)
Efficient mechanisms can be implemented by a computer algorithm (see Section 3.5). What
we have in mind is a counterpart of an algorithm that executes centralized limit order book
on modern exchanges.
We note that, similarly as in most of the literature (see e.g., [McA92], [KY16]), our notion
of efficiency does not penalize for budget surpluses. One interpretation is that extra money
need not be flushed down the drain, but can be used elsewhere. On the other hand, as long
as marginal utilities are bounded, spelling out ε´Efficiency directly in terms of differences
in allocations and not utilities is clearly without loss of generality.14 Moreover, ε-Efficient
mechanisms generate deadweight losses of order ε2N .15
Theorem 4. Suppose that |muip0, sq| ď m, for all i, s. If a mechanism tpqpsq, tpsqqusPS is
13Of course, real-life market makers are not interested in efficiency but profit maximization. Near efficiency
requires an additional assumption of competition between such idealized market makers.
14It trivially follows from Proposition 1 below that without a bound on marginal utilities no mechanism
that satisfies all other constraints can avoid infinite inefficiencies, spelled out in terms of utilities.
15The second part of the Lemma follows from A2 and
ˇˇˇÿN
i“1 uipqipsq, sq ´
ÿN
i“1 uipq
0
i psq, sq
ˇˇˇ
“
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż qipsq
q0i psq
`
muipx, sq ´ p0psq
˘
dx
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ .
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ε-Efficient and satisfies MC, then for every s
ˇˇ
uipqipsq, sq ´ uipq0i psq, s, q
ˇˇ ď εm,ˇˇˇÿN
i“1 uipqipsq, sq ´
ÿN
i“1 uipq
0
i psq, sq
ˇˇˇ
ď ε2Nmq
2
.
The following proposition sets the stage for the main results in the following sections.
Proposition 1. There are constants C1, C2 ą 0 such that for every ε ă q{2 and economy of
size N ą 2 that satisfies A1, A2, A3 and A4˚, the IR, IC,MC and ε´Efficient mechanisms
violate δ ´BS, where
δ “ N
„
C1p 1
N
` φNq ´ C2ε

. (3.7)
The result implies that, for a fixed economy size, no mechanism can guarantee robust
implementation of the efficient Walrasian Equilibrium allocation. Versions of such impossi-
bility in an exchange environment are well known, and go back to the seminal contribution
by [MS83b]. However, the proposition also provides lower bounds for the extent to which the
constraints may be violated, which will be the benchmark for the positive result in Proposi-
tion 2. The exact values of C1 and C2, which depend on the bounds in assumptions A1´A4˚,
are in Appendix A. We postpone interpreting the terms in the bound on the budget deficit
until we establish in Proposition 2 that this bound is tight.
On one extreme, full efficiency (ε “ 0) implies budget deficit at least of order C1p1`NφNq.
The deficit is uniformly bounded for every economy size both in the private value environment
(φN “ 0), as well as when the interdependence is of order 1N . This need not mean that the
subsidies required for efficiency are small; in particular, C1 is proportional to q
2.
On the other extreme, one might “decentralize” the problem of patching up the deficit
and have the traders themselves provide the necessary funds. The result shows that requiring
no budget deficit (δ “ 0) will compromise efficiency by at least a term of order 1
N
`φN . The
term vanishes as the economy grows. Moreover, the proposition traces out a linear curve for
the intermediate cases, when both efficiency and budget surplus are violated.
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3.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms with
σ´Quadratic Taxes
Proposition 1 says that no mechanism can achieve efficiency loss ε and budget deficit δ
below the linear curve (3.7). In this section, in the main result of the paper, we construct
a class of mechanisms that achieve this linear bound (up to a multiplicative constant), for
every economy. This is simplest in the case of full efficiency (ε “ 0), when conditions (3.1)
pin down both the allocation and the incentivizing tansfers. Other cases (ε ą 0) require
a judicious choice of the allocation function, in every economy, so that the accompanying
incentivizing transfers achieve deficit proportional to (3.7).
Our results rely on the following family of mechanisms. We define the allocations and
transfers separately.
Definition 1. (VCG with σ-quadratic taxes: allocation) Fix a profile of utility func-
tions pu1, ..., uNq, σ ě 0 and a vector of types s. The allocation qσpsq and price pσpsq in a
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves with σ´quadratic taxes (σV CG) mechanism are defined jointly via
mupqσi psq, sq “ pσpsq ` σ ˆ qσi psq, @i (3.8)ÿ
i
qσi psq “ 0.
One may think of the σV CG allocation and price as the standard efficient Walrasian
Equilibrium allocation and Walrasian price, but for distorted utilities
ruipqi, sq “ uipqi, sq ´ σq2i
2
.
The second term is a “tax”, which is quadratic in the quantity traded. Of course, 0V CG price
is the Walrasian price, and a 0V CG allocation is the efficient WE allocation. Strictly positive
σ, however, results in insufficient trade and compromises efficiency: a marginal utility of a
buyer (qσi psq ą 0) is strictly greater than a marginal utility of a seller (qσi psq ă 0). This is
related to demand reduction in the multi-unit auctions (see e.g. [ACP14]; see Example 4).
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Given continuous differentiability and strict concavity of the utility functions, for any
σ ě 0, p and i ď N there is at most one qipp, sq that satisfies
muipqipp, sq, sq “ p` σ ˆ qipp, sq,
and the functions qip¨, sq are continuous and strictly decreasing in their domains. This
means that there is at most one p for which
řN
i“1 qipp, sq “ 0, which establishes uniqueness
of ppσpsq, qσpsqq, for any σ ě 0 and s. Existence follows from A2.
Definition 2. (VCG with σ-quadratic taxes: transfers) Fix a profile of utility func-
tions pu1, ..., uNq, σ ě 0 and a vector of types s. The transfers tσpsq in a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves with σ´quadratic taxes (σV CG) mechanism are defined as
tσi psq “
ż qσi psq
0
pσ psi pxq , s´iq dx` σ
2
qσi psq2 , (3.9)
where tqσpsqusPS and tpσpsqusPS are the σV CG allocations and prices, and for any agent i
and quantity x between 0 and qσi psq si pxq is the signal such that16
x “ qσi psi pxq , s´iq , (3.10)
sipxq “
$&% inf Si if qσi ps1i, s´iq ą x for all s1i,supSi if qσi ps1i, s´iq ă x for all s1i.
Transfers by any agent i consist of a discriminatory part and a tax. Tax is quadratic in
own quantity traded, or, alternatively, is a linear per-unit tax. It is a positive contribution
by everyone. Discriminatory part is the integral over per-unit prices for each inframarginal
unit traded, where price for unit x is the σV CG price under a counterfactual report sipxq
that results in i trading exactly x. Thus, it is simply the integral under the residual demand
curve that i is facing.
In the case of private values, at any type profile, the discriminatory transfers by agent
16The second and the third clause in the definition are relevant only in the case when Si is finite. It follows
form strict monotonicity of qσi psq in si, established in the proof of Proposition 2, that sipxq is a function.
96
i are the integral under the aggregate linear tax adjusted marginal utilities of agents other
than i (see Figure 1). With interdependent values the transfers are more discriminatory:
say, a lower report by a buyer, which results in a lower quantity he trades, also decreases
marginal utilities of other agents, and so further depresses the prices for inframarginal units
(see Figure 2).
Figure 3.1: σV CG allocation and discriminatory transfers in a two person economy with private values,
for σ ą 0. Dotted lines are the marginal utility curves, and solid lines adjust for the linear per unit tax.
Shaded areas are the discriminatory payments by the buyer (left panel) and proceeds for the seller (right
panel).
The following is the main result of the paper.17
Proposition 2. Suppose that assumptions A1´A4 hold. For appropriate D ą 0 and slopes
σN , the family of σNV CG mechanisms is robustly asymptotically Dp 1N ` φNq´Efficient.
More precisely, there are constants D1, D2 and D3 such that for every slope σ ă mq{4
and economy of size N ą 2 that satisfies A1, A2, A3, A4˚, the σV CG mechanism satisfies
MC, IR, IC, δ ´BS and ε´Efficiency, where
δ “ N
„
D1p 1
N
` φNq ´D2σ

`
, (3.11)
ε “ D3σ.
17See Appendix B for the explicit values of the constants. The “r¨s`” refers to the positive part of a
number, rxs` “ max t0, xu.
97
Figure 3.2: σV CG allocation and discriminatory transfers in a two person economy with interdependent
values, for σ ą 0. Thin lines are the linear tax adjusted marginal utility curves for the realized type
profile (solid), and lower types for the buyer on the left panel and higher types for the seller on the right
panel (dotted). Thick solid lines are the residual demand curves and shaded areas are the discriminatory
payments by the buyer (left panel) and proceeds for the seller (right panel).
Moreover, when σ ě σN the σV CG mechanism satisfies MC, IR, IC and BS in every
economy of size N ą 2 that satisfies A2, A3 and A4˚ only.
The proposition says that for any number of agents N and any vector of utility functions,
the appropriate σNV CG mechanism, with slope σN of order
1
N
`φN , satisfies all the ex-post
constraints. Moreover, it provides an explicit uniform (or “worst case”) bound, across all
agents and states, on how much the implemented allocation differs from the optimal one,
for any economy size N . It follows from Proposition 1 that the bound is tight, and any
mechanism that satisfies the constraints will generate a proportional efficiency loss, for any
N . The result is more general: for smaller slopes, σ ă σN , σV CG mechanisms achieve the
optimal tradeoff between budget deficit and inefficiency, as established in Proposition 1. In
particular, the efficient VCG mechanism runs a budget deficit of order D1p1`NφNq.
In case of large economies, as long as the assumption A4 of small pairwise interdependence
is met, the σNV CG allocations approximate the efficient ones, and inefficiency vanishes at a
rate 1
N
` φN . In particular, as long as the interdependence parameter φN is of order smaller
than
a
1{N , as in Examples 1-3, Lemma 4 implies that σNV CG mechanisms guarantee
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vanishing deadweight loss, uniformly across all states:
ˇˇˇÿN
i“1 uipq
σN
i psq, sq ´
ÿN
i“1 uipq
0
i psq, sq
ˇˇˇ
ď D23σ2NNmq2 “ Op
1
N
` φN `Nφ2Nq.
Let us sketch the intuition behind the results. As regards the incentive compatibility of
the mechanisms, it relies on the logic that dates back to [Vic61]. In our case, fix a type vector
s and a buyer i, qσi psq ą 0. In order to achieve incentive compatibility, the price that i pays
for every x1th inframarginal unit of the good, x ă qσi psq, must equal his value for this unit
had he reported the type that makes him pivotal. Agent i is pivotal for x1th unit of the good
precisely when he reports the type si pxq such that he gets exactly x, qσi psi pxq , s´iq “ x, and
so his value for it equals mui px, psi pxq , s´iqq. Given the definition of the σV CG allocation,
this marginal utility equals pσ psi pxq , s´iq ` σx. Integrating over such per-unit payments
gives rise to the σV CG transfers. Monotonicity of the allocation follows from the argument
below.
The accounting of efficiency losses due to strictly positive slope σ is as follows. We show in
the proof that the difference between the Walrasian price and the σV CG price is proportional
to σ. By definition, σV CG distorts marginal utilities from σV CG price proportionally to
σqi, and so the overall wedge between the implemented and efficient marginal utilities is of
order σ, given A1. Assumption A2 then implies that the wedge between the quantities is
also proportional to σ.
Establishing budget surplus of the σNV CG mechanism is the centerpiece of the result.
As the first step, let us consider the efficient V CG mechanism and argue that in a large
economy, under assumptions A1´A4, the per-player deficit is small ex-post, for any profile
of signals.
Each buyer i pays the integral of prices, and the price is increasing in units purchased
(for sellers: the price is decreasing in units sold). Since only the price for the marginal unit
equals the Walrasian price p0, the per-player deficit is proportional to the speed with which
it decreases when buyer i decreases demand, Bp
0
Bqi . Now, the effect of i
1s type on the Walrasian
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price, Bp
0
Bsi , is the average of its effect on marginal utilities of the agents, muj,i, weighted by
the slope of their individual demand curves, muj,q. Given A2, the weights can be ignored,
and so the effect is of order 1
N
mui,i` N´1N φN , or simply 1Nmui,i`φN . Assumption A4˚ implies
that the price changes slower than i1s marginal utility, which results in strict monotonicity,
Bqi
Bsi Á mui,i´ Bp
0
Bqi ą 0. In sum, the effect of i1s quantity traded on the Walrasian price, equal
to Bp
0
Bsi { BqiBsi , is of order 1Nmo`φN , using A3. Small pairwise interdependence, A4, implies that
this effect is small in a large economy.
As an aside, one may consider also a mechanism that naively implements the Walrasian
price-posting allocation: for any profile of types, the allocation is the efficient one, and
agents pay the uniform per-unit Walrasian price. Proof of Proposition 2 implies that truthful
reporting is almost ex-post IC. This follows immediately from the fact that the price impact
Bp0
Bqi vanishes in a large economy. This, however, does not imply that one can use this
Walrasian price-posting mechanism to design a mechanism that is fully IC, and, in particular,
does not imply that there is a “nearby” nontruthful ex-post equilibrium in the game.18
Second, we argue that for the right choice of a slope σN , σNV CG mechanism allows to
elimininate the budget deficit, while introducing minimal distortion of the allocation ex-post,
for any profile of signals. The idea is simple. In the efficient allocation, buyer i that ends up
with qipsq units “gets a discount” of order p 1N ` φNqx for the qipsq ´ x’th unit he purchases,
contributing to the deficit. Setting quadratic tax p 1
N
` φNqq2i psq is equivalent to setting a
per-unit tax of p 1
N
` φNqx on every inframarginal qipsq ´ x’th unit that he buys. In other
words, each trader pays in taxes exactly what he gains via information rents, resulting in
budget surplus with minimal distortions. This argument shows that budget deficit will be
eliminated even when the quantities traded are unbounded, as stated in the proposition.
18In an ex-post equilibrium, for fixed i1s type si the fixed report rsi must remain ex-post optimal for any
profile s´i. But this generically cannot be the case, when crosspartials muij are nonzero. For example,
one may consider utilities uipqi, sq “ ϕi psq qi ´ q
2
i
2 , for which the Walrasian price, p
0psq “ ϕ psq and the
allocation, q0i psq “ ϕi psq ´ ϕ psq, can be computed explicitly. To act optimally, trader i’s fixed report must
shade his trade proportionally to his price impact, which in the Walrasian mechanism depends on the effect
of his signal on the marginal utilities of others. But this is not possible if i1s price impact depends on
the (reported) types of the opponents. In a sense, mechanism must use finer instruments, which allow to
condition i1s allocation and transfer on the type vector of others in a precise way. This conditioning is a
central feature of our mechanisms, made explicit in the implementation.
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As we noted in Section 3.2, the results extend to environemnts with discrete allocations,
as long as the units traded are small (see Appendix G). The problem with discrete allocations,
when all traders’ utilities may lie on a fixed grid with step ∆, is as follows. When a buyer
reports a lower signal and decreases his demand, the price might have to drop by the grid
step ∆ before any of the other traders picks up his demand to clear the market, no matter
how big the economy. In a sense, a buyer gets both a linear discount, as above, as well as a
fixed discount of size ∆ for each inframarginal unit he trades. Following the same logic as
above, adding a constant per-unit tax of ∆ eliminates budget deficit with minimal distortions
(see Section 3.6 for such fixed per-unit taxes, or “bid-ask” spreads).
3.4 Examples
In the following, we derive σV CG mechanisms for the examples from Section 3.2. For each
example, we also look at information structures with normal beliefs that can be used to
justify the utilities (see Section 3.2) and compare the σV CG mechanisms to the Bayesian
equilibria in standard double auctions.
Example 4. Consider the Fundamental Value Model from Example 1. For any σ, the σV CG
price and allocation are
pσpsq “ pα ` βqs, (3.12)
qσi psq “ αµ` σ psi ´ sq.
Using Proposition 2, the slope that guarantees BS equals
σN “ µpα ` βqpN ´ 2qα ´ β , (3.13)
which is positive, given A4˚ (see Example 1). For σ “ σN the mechanism boils down to
qσNi psq “ pN ´ 2qα ´ βµpN ´ 1q psi ´ sq, t
σN
i psq “ pσN psq ˆ qσNi psq, (3.14)
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and so satisfies budget balance. This follows from the fact that in this example Bp
σN psipxq,s´iq
Bx “
σN , as can be verified from (3.12).
Consider now a Bayesian framework as in [Viv11] and [RW12]. Each agent i has a linear-
quadratic utility function vipθi, qiq as in (3.5), and agents believe that their values pθ1, ..., θNq
are jointly normally distributed with mean zero, variances 1 and covariances ρ ě 0. Each
agent i observes a signal si “ θi ` εi, with noise εi „ Np0, ζq, ζ ą 0, independent of all
other variables. One may think of private value θi “ θ` θidi as consisting of a common shock
θ „ Np0, ρq and an idiosyncratic shock θidi „ Np0, 1´ ρq.
Applying Proposition 2 from [RW12] to this information structure, we verify in Appendix
C that
Ervipθi, qiq|ss “
ˆ
1´ ρ
1´ ρ` ζ si `
Nρζ
p1´ ρ` ζq p1` pN ´ 1qρqs
˙
qi ´ µ
2
q2i , (3.15)
and the linear Bayesian equilibrium in double auction results in the identical allocation and
transfers as the σNV CG mechanism given by (3.14).
The main takeaway is that in the Fundamental Value Model the most efficient σNV CG
mechanism – with the lowest slope σN still consistent with BS – agrees with, and so can be
implemented by a double auction. Since a demand schedule in a double auction allows an
agent to condition his demand on own signal and the equilibrium price, given that the price
is privately revealing (i.e., carries the same onformation as the type vector, [RW12]), agents
are effectively choosing ex-post optimal price-quantity pairs. Moreover, in this example,
the equilibrium demand reduction and the positive slope σN of σNV CG mechanisms have
the same effect on allocations and transfers. In particular, it follows that this Bayesian
equilibrium remains an equilibrium for any information structure justifying payoffs as in
Example 1.
Example 5. Consider the Group Model from Example 2, for the simplest case of symmetric
agents, with α1 “ α2 and β1 “ β2 (see [RW12]). For any σ the σV CG allocation and σV CG
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price satisfy
pσpsq “ pα ` βqs,
qσi psq “ αsi ` βs
G ´ pα ` βqs
µ` σ . @i P G,G “ 1, 2
The slope that guarantees BS equals (Proposition 2)
σN “ µpα ` βqpN ´ 2qα,
and just as in Example 4 it is easy to verify that the corresponding transfers are tσNi psq “
pσN psq ˆ qσNi psq, and so satisfy budget balance.
Suppose now agents have utility functions vipθi, qiq as in (3.5) and believe that their values
pθ1, ..., θNq are jointly normally distributed with mean zero, variances 1 and covariances ρ ě 0
for the agents only in the same group. Thus, private value θi “ θG ` θidi consists of a shock
θG „ Np0, ρq, i P G, common to own group, and an idiosyncratic shock θidi „ Np0, 1 ´ ρq.
As before, each agent i observes a signal si “ θi ` εi, εi „ Np0, ζq. Just as in Example 4, it
follows that the expected utilities conditional on a profile of signals take the form of utilities
in the Fundamental Value Model, for own subgroup: for any i P G,G “ 1, 2,
Ervipθi, qiq|ss “
ˆ
1´ ρ
1´ ρ` ζ si `
pN{2q ρζ
p1´ ρ` ζq p1` pN{2´ 1qρqs
G
˙
qi ´ µ
2
q2i . (3.16)
Applying Proposition 2 from [RW12] to this information structure, we verify in Appendix
C that in the linear Bayesian equilibrium in double auction the equilibrium price and alloca-
tion are
pl,Npsq “ c
N
s
1´ cNp s, q
l,N
i psq “ c
N
s
µ
˜
N´2
N´1 ´ cNp
1´ cNp
¸
psi ´ sq, (3.17)
for constants cNs , c
N
p that depend on ζ, ρ,N such that
lim
NÑ8 c
N
s “ 2´ ρ2´ ρ` 2ζ , limNÑ8 c
N
p “ 2ζ2´ ρ` 2ζ .
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Allocations and transfers in the two mechanisms now differ. Figure 3 shows ratios of
expected utilities in each mechanism, for different correlations of values ρ within each group,
noise variances ζ and economy sizes N . In particular, when economy grows expected utilities
converge to efficiency only in the case of σNV CG:
lim
NÑ8Ervipθi, q
σN
i psqq|ss “ lim
NÑ8E
”
qσNi psq
´
Erθi|ss ´ µ
2
qσNi psq
¯ı
(3.18)
“ E
”
q0i psq
´
Erθi|ss ´ µ
2
q0i psq
¯ı
“ µ
2
E
“
q0i psq2
‰ “ 1
µ
˜
ρ
4
` p1´ ρq
2
2p1´ ρ` ζq
¸
,
lim
NÑ8E
”
vipθi, ql,Ni psqq|s
ı
“ µ
2
E
”
ql,8i psq2
ı
“ 1
µ
ˆ p2´ ρq2
4p2´ ρ` 2ζq
˙
ă 1
µ
˜
ρ
4
` p1´ ρq
2
2p1´ ρ` ζq
¸
,
for every i P G,G “ 1, 2, where replacing the order of limits under the expectation may
be justified by the Dominated Convergence Theorem, and the fourth equality is justified by
Erq0i psqpErθi|ss ´ µq0i psqqs “ 0.
When the economy is large, in a σV CG mechanism agents can trade across groups to
exploit the difference between the realized group shocks, θA and θE, based on the arbitrarily
precise estimates sA and sE. This is captured by the first term in the limiting expected
utility in (3.18). The second term represents the benefit of trading away the idiosyncratic
part of agent i’s value, θidi , given the idiosyncratic part of his signal, θ
id
i `εi. In the Bayesian
equilibrium of the double auction price shifts each agent’s estimate of his value in step.
Consequently, trade of each agent i is based solely on the information about θi provided by
his private signal si. In particular, large gains from intergroup trade are not realized. For
example, large noise ζ of private signals may render trade in a double auction nearly useless
without wiping out the gains from trade in a σV CG mechanism.
Example 6. In the Fundamental Value Model with Heterogenous Traders from Example 3,
for any σ the σV CG allocations and prices satisfy
qσi psq “ αsi ` βs´ p
σpsq
µG ` σ , @i P G,G “ S,B
pσpsq “ α `γSsS ` γBsB˘` βs,
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Figure 3.3: Ratios of σNV CG mechanism to double auction expected utilities in a Group Model,
for different correlations within group ρ, signal noise variances ζ and economy sizes N .
where sS and sB are average signals in each group and γG “ σ`µ´G2σ`µB`µS , G “ S,B. Compared
to the Fundamental Value Model, now big agents trade more aggressively on their information
and thus have a larger price impact. Given the allocations and prices, we compute the
transfers as in the previous examples (see Appendix C).
While the same Bayesian model as in Example 4 can be used to justify the utility function,
there are many more. Specifically, suppose the agents have the utilities vipθi, qiq as in (3.5),
and believe that, for i P G,G “ S,B,
θi “ θ ` θG ` θidi ,
si “ θi ` εG ` εi,
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where all random variables θ, θG, θ
id
i , εG, ε
id
i , for G “ S,B and i ď N, are independently
normally distributed with variances σ2θ , σ
2
θG
, σ2θid , σ
2
εG
, σ2εid. In other words, there is a common
schock θ to everyone’s value, there are two separate group value shocks θS, θB and idiosyn-
cratic value schocks θidi . Likewise, noise consists of a group noise component εG, G “ S,B,
and idiosyncratic noise εi. Intuitively, agents in the same group care about similar aspects
of the asset and also observe signals from similar sources, giving rise to positively correlated
noises.19
With no group value and noise shocks, we recover the model from Example 4 as a special
case. However, for fixed parameters α and β in utility function there is a continuum of
Bayesian models from this class, with variances solving the system of linear equations (see
Appendix C):
σ2θid “
ασ2εid
1´ α, σ
2
θG
“ ασ
2
εG
1´ α, σ
2
θ “
β
`
2σ2εid `Nσ2εG
˘
2Np1´ αq p1´ α ´ βq . (3.19)
For example, increasing common group noise σ2εG, which decreases the attractiveness of sig-
nals from own group, is compensated by the increase in correlation σ2θG of values within a
group.
This continuum of models gives rise to a continuum of different linear Bayesian equilibria
in double auctions. Moreover, for a fixed vector of parameters that solve (3.19), generically
an analytical characterization of the equilibrium is unavailable (see Appendix C). However,
we may argue indirectly as follows. The same linear equilibria result in the same linear
market clearing price plpsq “ γSsS`γBsB, for appropriate γS, γB, and the same price impact
Bpl
Bqi “ di ě 0, for any agent i. Agent i1s demand qlipsi, pq, given signal si and price pl, satisfies
qlipsi, pq “
E
“
θi|si, pl
‰´ pl
µG ` di , (3.20)
19Other Bayesian models are available. We assumed that agents that share a group value shock and have
positively correlated noises also share the degree of risk aversion. The two splits could disagree, or there
could be more groups with correlated values and signals. Likewise, variances of either group value shocks or
idiosyncratic value components could differ (see Section 3.7).
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for i P G,G “ S,B. As we show in the Appendix C, the expectation function E “θi|si, pl‰
can agree for at most countably many models.
Despite the differences in risk aversion among the agents, in the model with uncorrelated
noises (σ2εG “ σ2θG “ 0) expected utilities converge to the efficient ones ([MV16], see also
[Hel80]). This, however, is the only model featuring asymptotic efficiency. It follows from
equation (3.20) that with vanishing price impacts, as long as µB ‰ µS, the market clearing
price plpsq “ γSsS ` γBsB may not assign equal weights to the two group averages, γS ‰ γB.
As long as noises are positively correlated within a group (σ2εG , σ
2
θG
ą 0), neither sS nor
sB, and thus also not the price converges in probability to the average of all signals s. It
follows that E
“
θi|si, pl
‰ ‰ E rθi|si, ss, and so, from (3.20), allocations do not converge to the
efficient ones.
The example shows how a continuum of Bayesian models underlying a fixed utility profile
may i) feature a continuum of Bayesian equilibria in double auctions that are sensitive to the
details of the underlying information structure, and which ii) (generically) lack analytical
characterization, and iii) (generically) do not yield asymptotic expected efficiency. All this
contrasts with uniqueness, simplicity and asymptotic efficiency of the σNV CG mechanism.
3.5 Implementation
σV CG mechanisms are direct mechanisms: agents report their types to the mechanism
designer who enforces the reallocation of good and payments. While robustness strips him
of the responsibility to know the information structure, he must know the utility functions.
In this section we present a way to implement σV CG mechanisms in a way that does not
require any such knowledge.
We will make the following two assumptions (see Section 3.7):
INF q Si “ R, @i
INJq inf
q,s
det
”
mui,jpqi, sq
ı
i,jďN
ą 0.
107
For the linear-quadratic utility functions, the assumption INJ needs to be checked only at
a fixed pair q“ H, s “ H, and is easily verified in each of the examples from Section 3.3.
Fix slope σ ě 0 and consider the following auction format.
Definition 3. (σ´Discriminatory Conditional Double Auction, σDCDA)
Actions. Each agent i chooses a continuous conditional inverse demand correspondence
di : RN´1  R,
where dipq´iq is the set of marginal prices at which i is willing to clear the market and
purchase
ř
j‰i qj, when each other agent j ‰ i is allocated qj.
Allocation. Mechanism finds the price-allocation pair pp, qq that clears the market:
p P dipq´iq, @i (3.21)
Transfers. A continuous function pi : RÑ R is a residual demand curve for i, i ď N ,
if for every qi there is q´i such that the price-allocation pair ppipqiq, qi, q´iq clears the market.
Transfers by i are defined as
ti “
ż qi
0
pipxqdx` σ
2
q2i ,
for the residual demand curve pi.
If for the submitted conditional inverse demands there is no unique residual demand curve
for every i ď N , and so no unique market clearing pp, qq, then the allocation and transfers
are zero.
The first step in running a σDCDA, which is finding the price-allocation vector, requires
solving a system of N inclusions (3.21) in N ` 1 unknowns pp, qq, together with the market
clearing condition. Aside from the added difficulty in allowing for set-valued demands dis-
cussed below, this generalizes the fixed point problem of finding the market clearing price
in a double auction. It boils down to it when inverse demands condition only on the total
quantity to be cleared.
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Again, much like in a double auction, reports by all agents other than i determine the
residual demand curve that i is facing. It is the menu of (marginal) price-quantity pairs
pp, qq that i is choosing from, which is pinned down by market clearing and N ´ 1 demands
submitted by other agents. One term in the transfers is a tax quadratic in the quantity
traded, paid by every agent. The other term is the discriminatory payment: an integral over
all the inframarginal units under the residual demand curve that i is facing.20
We note that the discriminatory nature of payments refers to the trader paying different
prices for each unit he trades. Different discriminatory payments are used in practice, such
as, for example, when a trader pays the area under his own submitted demand curve. This
is analogous to “paying own bid” in the first price auction. Traders paying the area under
the residual curve they face, in our auction, is analogous to the payments in the second price
auction.
Consider the following bids in the auction. For any σ ě 0, a σV CG conditional inverse
demand strategy in a σDCDA for agent i ď N is defined as
dipsiqpq´iq “
!
muip´
ÿ
j‰i qj, si, s´iq ` σ
ÿ
j‰i qj
ˇˇˇ
qσ´ipsi, s´iq “ q´i
)
.
In the case of σ “ 0, the 0V CG conditional inverse demands are reports of own marginal
utilities, evaluated at the efficient allocation. In the case of private values, the conditioning
is vacuous, and the agents are simply reporting their marginal utilities tmuipqi, siq| qi P Ru.21
This is in analogy with the bids in the second price auction, in the standard auction set-
ting. When the values are interdependent, conditioning on the efficient allocation is a way
to provide the agents with additional information about the types of other agents. Such
information is necessary for the efficient trade. Finally, in the case of strictly positive slope
20Given little restrictions on bids, they need not determine unique allocation or transfers, in which case
the economy reverts to autarky. This is a standard proviso from double auctions when multiple market
clearing prices exist. Alternatives such as picking an allocation or residual demand curves according to some
pre-specified order would do just as well. Of course, we verify in the proof of the following Proposition that
the multiplicity does not arise in equilibrium.
21Strictly speaking, for qi that do not arise in any efficient allocation consistent with si, the agent is
reporting H. The difference does not play any role.
109
σ ą 0, the agents report their modified, tax adjusted marginal utilities.
The following Example solves for the σV CG conditional inverse demands in case of linear
utilities.
Example 7. In case of linear quadratic utilities, as in the previous examples, σV CG allo-
cations satisfy
qσi psq “
ř
j wijsj ´ pσpsq
µi ` σ ,
where wij “ mui,jp0, 0q. This implies
pσpsq ¨
ÿ
j
rwij “ ´si ´ÿ
j
rwijpµj ` σqqσj psq¯ (3.22)
“
´
si ´
ÿ
j‰ip rwijpµj ` σq ´ rwiipµi ` σqqqσj psq¯ ,
where
” rwijı
i,jďN
is the inverse of the matrix
”
wij
ı
i,jďN
.
In the Fundamental Value Model, matrix inversion yields σV CG conditional inverse de-
mand functions
dipsiqpq´iq “ pα ` βq
”
si ` µ` σ
α
ÿ
j‰i qjpsq
ı
,
which depend only on the total quantity an agent must clear.
In contrast, in the Group Model from Example 2, in the symmetric case when α1 “ α2
and β1 “ β2, σV CG conditional inverse demand functions are
dipsiqpq´iq “ pα ` βqsi ` µ` σ
α
„ˆ
α ` βN ´ 2
N
˙ÿ
j‰i qj ` βq
own

,
Marginal price at which an agent is willing to clear the market is increasing in own signal
and in the quantity
ř
j‰i qj that he must clear, due to decreasing marginal utility of absorbing
more units. Unlike in a standard inverse demand function, however, each agent conditions
his price also on the average trade by the agents in his group. For a fixed own type and total
quantity to be cleared, higher demand by own group indicates higher own group shock and so
value of the good to the agent, thus increasing the price.
Similarly, in the Fundamental Value Model with Heterogenous Traders, σV CG condi-
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tional inverse demand by a big agent i is (and similarly for small agents):
dipsiqpq´iq “ pα ` βq
”
si ` µ` σ
α
ÿ
j‰i qjpsq
ı
` β pµS ´ µBq
2α
qS.
While small agents have equally precise information as big agents, they trade less aggressively.
Thus, keeping the total demand by all other agents fixed, high demand by small agents reveals
high value of the good and so pushes up the price demanded to clear the market.
The following is the second main result of the paper. Recall that an ex-post equilibrium
is the game theoretic counterpart of ex-post incentive compatibility. It means that each
agent’s strategy is optimal at every type profile of other agents, and so irrespectively of the
underlying information structure (see [BM05]).
Proposition 3. Suppose that assumptions INF, INJ,A2 and A4˚ hold. Fix σ ě 0 and
consider a game induced by the σDCDA. The profile of σV CG conditional inverse demand
strategies constitutes an ex-post equilibrium that results in transfers and allocation as in the
σV CG mechanism.
The idea behind the result is as follows. Assumptions INF and INJ are sufficient
for the function from signal to marginal utility profiles, evaluated at any allocation, to be
globally invertible. Crucially, given the definition of σV CG, this implies that the function
from signal profiles to σV CG allocation-price pairs is invertible, for any σ ě 0. But this,
intuitively, establishes that the informational content of either is the same. More precisely,
when each agent i reports the σV CG conditional inverse demand dipsiq, it is equivalent to
reporting the set of σV CG allocation-price pairs consistent with own signal si. Injectivity
implies that the intersection of the reports across all the agents is the unique σV CG price-
allocation ppσpsq, qσpsqq. Uniqueness of residual demand curves follows analogously, and
ex-post optimality follows from IC of the σV CG mechanism.
The conditional inverse demands in our implementation are related to the conditional
bids in [DM00], [EM02], in an auction setting. In each paper they serve the same purpose of
allowing to express own demand as a function of types of other agents, and a fixed point has
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to be solved to determine the alocation. In [DM00] as well as [EM02] bids are conditioned
on vectors of opponents’ utility functions, where a utility function assigns utility to each
allocation a trader could get. In our setting such vectors of functions would be elements
in
`
RR
˘N´1
.22 Our inverse demands are conditioned on vectors of opponents’ allocations,
and so elements of RN´1. We show that the allocation vectors carry enough information
to condition on. The bids are thus simpler; formally, the set of all the available bids has a
smaller dimension.23
The extent to which σV CG conditional inverse demands are complicated reflects the
relatively unrestricted nature of the primitives in our framework. On the other hand, as
Example 7 shows, when utilities are simple, and depend only on low-dimensional statistic of
the types of others, the inverse demands are also simple. This is not a coincidence:
Theorem 5. Fix n ě 0 and suppose that for every i there exist functions wi : S´i Ñ Rn
and rui : Rn`2 Ñ R such that
uip¨, si, s´iq “ ruip¨, si, wips´iqq.
Then there is a function rwi : RN Ñ Rn such that σV CG conditional inverse demand satisfies
dipsiqpq´iq “
!
x|x “ mruip´ÿ
j‰i qj, si, rwipq´i, xqq ` σÿj‰i qj) , @i (3.23)
If dipsiq is a function, then there is rwi : RN´1 Ñ Rn such that
dipsiqpq´iq “ mruip´ÿ
j‰i qj, si, rwipq´iqq ` σÿj‰i qj, @i (3.24)
Another potential complication is that a σV CG conditional inverse demand may be a
22[DM00], [EM02] consider discrete, heterogenous goods, and so in those papers an allocation is a partition
of available goods, not a quantity vector.
23The set of available bids in [DM00] and [EM02], or what they condition on, can be reduced to only those
that occur in equilibrium. The number of equilibrium bids is determined by the set of traders’ signals. From
the implementation perspective, however, this requires designer’s knowledge of traders’ utility functions,
which is precisely the kind of knowledge that the implementation is supposed to do away with.
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correspondence. Intuitively, with a lot of interdependence, high shocks of others can move the
marginal utilities of all the agents in step, not affecting the allocation. Consequently, an agent
may report several marginal utilities consistent with a given allocation. This is a familiar
phenomenon from the rational expectations or the double auction literature. Too much
interdependence may imply demand upward sloping in price, resulting in the nonexistence
of equilibrium (e.g., [Kyl89]). The following lemma shows a sufficient condition (necessary
for linear utilities) for those issues not to arise in our setting.
Consider the following assumption:
FUNq The sum of every row in
”
mui,jpqi, sq
ı´1
i,jďN
is nonzero, @q, s.
Theorem 6. Fix σ ě 0. If FUN is satisfied, then σV CG conditional inverse demands are
functions. In case of linear utilities, the converse is also true.
Below we present two sufficient conditions for FUN . The first one requires, roughly,
that there is not too much interdependence in preferences. Surprisingly, the second sufficient
condition is equicommonality ([RW12]), satisfied when the average level of interdependence
across the agents is constant, no matter its level. It is satisfied in all the examples con-
sidered in this paper. In the Bayesian framework, with normal beliefs and equal quadratic
coefficients, the condition is sufficient for the existence of a symmetric linear equilibrium.
Theorem 7. Either of the following conditions is sufficient for FUN . For every i, j, qi, qj, s
iq mui,ipqi, sq ě 2N ¨muj,ipqj, sq,
iiq
ÿ
k
mui,kpqi, sq “
ÿ
k
muj,kpqj, sq.
3.6 Other Mechanisms
One way to interpret a σV CG mechanism is this. Agents are charged with taxes that are
quadratic in the quantity they trade. Then, assuming that the taxes are internalized by
the agents and so their utilities properly adjusted, σV CG mechanisms are the (generalized)
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VCG mechanisms that implement the efficient allocation. More precisely, fix a tax τ :
R`Ñ R`, which is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and convex. A mechanism
tpqpsq, tpsqqusPS is a VCG mechanism with taxes τ (τV CG) if
qipsq “ rqipsq,
tipsq “ rtipsq ` τp|rqipsq|q,
where tprqpsq,rtpsqqusPS is an IR, IC,MC mechanism implementing the efficient allocation for
utility functions rui, i ď N, ruipqi, sq “ uipqi, sq ´ τp|qi|q.
A VCG mechanism with taxes satisfy IR, IC and MC for every choice of tax function.
Taxes allow to strike a balance between efficiency and budget surplus: Trivial taxes result
in the efficient VCG mechanism and budget deficits. Larger taxes distort efficiency of the
allocation, relative to the underlying utilities, but mitigate budget deficit. The σV CG
mechanisms strike an optimal balance between efficiency and budget surplus (Propositions
1 and 2). In this section we show that they are, roughly, uniquely optimal in this sense.
Consider the following two examples.
Example 8. (Linear tax: Bid-ask spread) Fix δ ě 0 and consider a linear tax τpqq “
δ |q|. For any type profile s the allocation qpsq of a VCG mechanism with such taxes is
determined jointly with bid-ask prices pbpsq, papsq such that papsq “ pbpsq ` 2δ, markets clear
and
muipqipsq, sq “ papsq, @i such that qipsq ą 0 (3.25)
muipqipsq, sq “ pbpsq. @i such that qipsq ă 0
Transfers tpsq that guarantee incentive compatibility and individual rationality are
ti psq “ Tips´iq `
$&%
şqipsq
0
pa psi pxq , s´iq dx if qipsq ą 0,şqipsq
0
pb psi pxq , s´iq dx if qipsq ă 0,
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and ti psq “ Tips´iq if qi psq “ 0, where the si function is defined as in (3.10) and Tips´iq ď 0.
In other words, the allocation is as if market determined the market clearing bid-ask
price pair with a fixed spread of 2δ, each agent got all the relevant information and was free
to trade at those prices. The discriminatory Vickrey transfers are then chosen to guarantee
incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Example 9. (Entry Fee tax) Fix φ ě 0 and consider the entry fee tax τpqq “ φˆ1q‰0. For
any type profile s, the allocation qpsq of the VCG mechanism with such taxes is determined
jointly with a price ppsq such that markets clear and
muipqipsq, sq “ ppsq, @i such that qipsq ‰ 0 (3.26)
qipsq ‰ 0 iff
ż qipsq
0
muipx, sqdx´ ppsqqipsq ě φ.
The transfers tpsq that guarantee incentive compatibility are
ti psq “ Tips´iq ` σ `
ż qipsq
0
p psi pxq , s´iq dx, if qipsq ‰ 0
and ti psq “ Tips´iq if qi psq “ 0, where the si function is defined in (3.10) and Tips´iq ď 0.
Intuitively, now the allocation is as if market determined the market clearing price, each
agent got all the relevant information and then could decide whether to pay a fixed entry
fee φ in order to trade at this price.
Proposition 4. Suppose assumptions A1 ´ A4 hold. If τNV CG mechanisms are robustly
asymptotically E1p 1N ` φNq´Efficient, for some E1 ą 0, then there is E2 ą 0 such that for
every q ą 0
τ 1Npqq ´ τ 1Np0q ě E2
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
ˆ q, for all q P rq, qs, N ě Npqq. (3.27)
The result shows that if some mechanisms converge to efficiency at the optimal rate,
then taxes must be at least quadratic in quantity, as in σV CG mechanisms. In this sense,
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quadratic taxes create strictly minimal distortions. In particular, VCG mechanisms with
entry fees or bid-ask spreads perform strictly worse.
To gain intuition, let us focus on the difference between quadratic taxes on the one hand
and entry fees and bid-ask spreads on the other. When many agents have average signals and
are not willing to pay a fee, or their marginal utilities fall within a spread, the few trading
ones have large price impact. For example, a small fixed fee that a buyer pays results in a
steep decrease in prices for his last inframarginal units before other agents enter the market.
Thus, the fee is dwarfed by the decrease in prices for all but the last inframarginal units,
and so it may not patch up the budget. Similarly, a per-unit fee φ decreases the price for
almost all inframarginal units by φ, which is compounded with the decrease in prices at
signals when most agents trade; while in this case budget can be balanced, it requires large
fee, and so large distortion.
3.7 Discussion
We would like to discuss and interpret now some of the assumptions behind the results, and
point to the possible extensions.
Weaker Assumptions. Assumptions on the utilities can be weakened to fit specific ap-
plications: i) Assumptions A2 and A3 can be qualified to hold only when muipqi, sq P
rminiďN muip0, sq,maxiďN muip0, sqs. In particular, this allows environments with nonnega-
tive marginal utilities at any allocation. ii) With large economies, when σV CG allocations
are nearly efficient, assumptions A4 and A4˚, can be weakened to hold only locally, at allo-
cations q´j such that all muipqi, sq, i ‰ j, are close. iii) When in assumption A4˚ the average
interdependence 1
N´1
ř
i‰jmui,jpqi, sq is replaced by maxi‰jmui,jpqi, sq, then the scaling con-
stant
mq
mq
can be dropped. For large N , the other scaling factor 1
8
can approximate 1
2
(see
proofs of Propositions 1 and 2).
Multidimensional Signals. Without additional restrictions, our results cannot be ex-
tended to environments with multidimensional signals. [JVM06] have shown that with
multidimensional signals and interdependence, typically no nontrivial allocation can be ex-
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post incentive compatible. There are, nevertheless, several cases when such analysis is not
doomed. For example, results in [EM02] and [JVM08] suggest that our analysis may be
extended to the case of multidimensional signals as long as marginal utilities are linear func-
tions of signals (see also [Bik06]). In case of private value environments, the impossibility has
no bite, and results in [BCL06] suggest the right notion of monotonicity. Detailed analysis
of each extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
Tightness. Efficiency losses in Proposition 2 are tight in that there is no other class of
mechanisms that converges to efficiency at a faster rate as the economy grows (Proposition
1). While a tight rate of convergence is a standard optimality criterion in the asymptotic
worst case analysis, we may strengthen the result as follows. Assume that the marginal
utilities decrease linearly in quantity,
A21q mui,qpqi, sq “ mq ă 0, @i, qi, s
and consider the following alternative measure of ex-post efficiency loss:
ε´ qEffq ˇˇqipsq ´ q0i psqˇˇ ď ε|q0i psq|. @s
Proposition 5. Suppose assumptions A1, A21, A3 and A4 hold. σqNV CG mechanisms, with
σqN “ mqp 1N´1 ` φNmo q, are robustly asymptotically p 1N´1 `
φN
mo
q´qEfficient. Moreover, for any
γ ă 1, no robustly asymptotically γp 1
N´1 ` φNmo q´qEfficient mechanisms exist.
Signals as Types. One source of interdependence in preferences is informational, when
agent’s type corresponds to a signal informative of each agent’s value. In a Bayesian model,
interdependencies in expected utilities, conditional on a profile of signals, arise naturally
when either signals or values are correlated (see Section 3.2). It seems like this informational
motivation of the interdependence does not square with the prior-free approach of this paper.
We note that, despite this objection, one may still view σV CG mechanisms as particularly
simple Bayesian mechanisms that attain asymptotic efficiency.
However, the problem is only apparent. It is true that ex-post utilities and a fixed distri-
117
bution of correlated signals and values pin down expected utilities with interdependencies,
but the reverse is not true. Since many distributions may give rise to one expected utility
function, knowing only the latter assumes strictly less than the Bayesian framework. The
following example makes the point stark. Suppose agent i has a linear ex-post utility function
vipqi, θiq as in (3.5) and fix a linear expected utility function
uipqi, sq “ qi
ÿ
wijsj ´ µ
2
q2i ,
for some µ,wij, j ď N . Prior-free analysis requires knowledge of ui only, while a Bayesian
game complements ui with a fixed distribution δS P ∆pSq. We may assume that δS is normal.
Theorem 8. For any normal distribution δS P ∆pSq, there is a normal distribution δΘiˆS P
∆pΘi ˆ Sq such that
uipqi, sq “ EδΘiˆS rvipqi, θiq|ss.
The proof is the statement of the Projection Theorem read as a system of N linear
equations in N variables, Covps, θiq. In other words, expected utilities put no restrictions
whatsoever on the distribution of signals δS.
Equilibrium Uniqueness. Ex-post implementation implies that, in every information
structure, the game induced by a σV CG mechanism has a truthtelling equilibrium. In
the paper, we are not requiring that this equilibrium is unique. The following is a direct con-
sequence of Theorem 1 in [BM09]. In case of linear utilities, with mui,ipqi, sq normalized to
1, i ď N , truthtelling is the unique equilibrium of a σV CG mechanism in every information
structure precisely when the matrix
»——————–
0 |w1,2| ... |w1,N |
|w1,2| 0
... ...
|w1,N | 0
fiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
with wij “ mui,jpqi, sq, has the largest eigenvalue λ ă 1. Moreover, the condition is also
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necessary for the equilibrium uniqueness under any mechanism ([BM09], Section 3).24 In
other words, whether ex-post near-efficient implementation can be strengthened to guarantee
equilibrium uniqueness in every information structure is not a mechanism design problem,
and the answer depends solely on the properties of an exchange economy.
Conditions for implementation. Assumptions INF and INJ in Section 3.5 are sufficient
for the function from the type to the marginal utility profiles (at any allocation) to be globally
invertible.25 Given the definition of σV CG mechanisms, this guarantees that the mapping
from type profiles to endogenous σV CG allocation and price profiles is globally invertible as
well. The conditions help achieve a sensible implementation, but are not necessary. If they
are violated, a profile of reported σV CG conditional inverse demands may result in multiple
profiles of market clearing price-allocation pairs and transfers. In such event, instead of
shutting down trade, a mechanism may allow another stage with “all-out” communication:
Have each agent report his type, and then agents pick the allocation and transfer profile,
with the unanimous choice implemented. While such communication requires a daunting
amount of coordination (see [DM00]), there seems to be little alternative if there is no
simpler sufficient statistic for the information carried by the types.
3.8 Appendix D
A Proof of Proposition 1
Fix N even, and consider the following utility functions:
uipqi, ti, sq “ ppmo ´ φNq si ` φN
ÿ
j
sjqqi ´ mq
2
q2i , @i, qi, s (3.28)
24Since we are not insisting on responsive allocation functions and strict ex-post incentive compatibility,
we may not use Theorem 2 in [BM09]. However, the direct analysis in Section 3 of their paper applied to
our linear setting implies that if the above condition is violated, then there is an agent i and his beliefs over
the types of his opponents such that all i1s types are indistinguishable.
25There are alternative sufficient conditions for the global invertibility (see (38) in [DM00], chapter 6 in
[KP12]).
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with φN ă 18
mq
mq
mo, so that A4
˚ is satisfied, for which the efficient allocation and price are
defined as (see Example 1)
q0i psq “ mo ´ φNmq psi ´ sq, p
0psq “ pmo ` φNpN ´ 1qq s. (3.29)
Let the signal space S be such that A1 is satisfied. Note that for every s´i the projections
tsi| psi, s´iq P Su are closed intervals.
In this environment, the derivative of the Walrasian price with respect to WE quantity
allocated to player 1 satisfies
dp0 ps01 pq1q , s´1q
dq1
“
Bp0ps01pq1q,s´1q
Bs1
Bq01ps01pq1q,s´1q
Bs1
“ pmo ` φNpN ´ 1qq1
mq
pmopN ´ 1q ´ φNpN ´ 1qq
(3.30)
“ mq
mo ´ φN
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 ` φN
˙
“: p0q,
where the function s01pxq is defined so that q01ps01pxq, s´1q “ x, for every x.
Consider the signal profile s˚, with
s˚i “ rs ą 0, q0i ps˚q “ N ´ 1N q, @i ď N{2
s˚i “ ´rs ă 0, q0i ps˚q “ ´N ´ 1N q. @i ą N{2
The signal profile is chosen in such a way that for the function s1pxq defined as in (3.10),`
s1pxq, s˚´ 1
˘ P S, for every x P r0, q01ps˚qs.26
Fix ε ą 0 and a mechanism that satisfies IR, IC,MC and is ε´Efficient. The transfers
26When, say, agent 11s signal is changed to ´ 1N´1 , we have that
q01p´ 1N ´ 1 , s
˚´
1q “ 0,
q0i p´ 1N ´ 1 , s
˚´
1q “ q, @i, j ď N{2
|q0i p´ 1N ´ 1 , s
˚´
1q| ă q. @i, j ą N{2
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by player 1 satisfy27
t1ps˚q ď
ż q1ps˚q
0
mu1px, s1pxq, s˚´1qdx ď
ż q1ps˚q
0
mu1px, s01px` εq, s˚´1qdx
“
ż q1ps˚q
0
“
mu1px` ε, s01px` εq, s˚´1q ` εmq
‰
dx
“
ż q1ps˚q
0
“
p0ps01px` εq, s˚´1q ` εmq
‰
dx,
where the first inequality follows from local IC and IR at s1p0q, and the second one follows
from ε´Efficiency. Consequently,
t1ps˚q ď
ż q1ps˚q
0
“
p0ps01px` εq, s˚´1q ` εmq
‰
dx
“
ż q1ps˚q
0
“
p0ps˚q ` p0q ˆ px` ε´ q01ps˚qq ` εmq
‰
dx
ď q1ps˚q ˆ
„
p0ps˚q ` p0q ˆ
ˆ
q01ps˚q ` ε
2
` ε´ q01ps˚q
˙
` εmq

ď qεmq
ˆ
1` 3
2
p0q
mq
˙
´
ˆ
N ´ 1
N
q ´ ε
˙
3
2
N ´ 1
N
qp0q
ď C2 ˆ ε´ C1
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
,
where, using ε ă q
2
, N ą 2 and p0q
mq
ă 5
7
, from A4˚,
C1 “ q2 1
6
mq
maxt1,mou , C2 “ q
29
14
mq.
The same bound holds for the transfers by any buyer i ď N
2
. Analogous argument shows
that the same bound on transfers holds for any seller i ą N
2
. This establishes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Fix a slope σ ě 0 and a σV CG mechanism. By construction, the mechanism satisfies MC.
27Note that the allocation q1p¨, s˚´ 1q must be weakly increasing, from IC. If q1p¨, s˚´ 1q “ q11 is constant
over a range of signals rs, ss, then s1 pq11q can be defined as any selection from rs, ss.
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1. σV CG mechanism satisfies IR and IC
Note that the σV CG transfers satisfy
tσi psq “ rti pqσi psq , s´iq
for appropriate functions rti, i ď N . Fix a type vector s and an agent i and consider the
allocation qσi p¨, s´iq as a function of i1s signal. Local IC is equivalent to
mui pqσi psi, s´iq , psi, s´iqq Bq
σ
i psi, s´iq
Bsi “
Brti pqσi psi, s´iq , s´iq
Bqi
Bqσi psi, s´iq
Bsi ,
Brti pqσi psi, s´iq , s´iq
Bqi “ mui pq
σ
i psi, s´iq , psi, s´iqq ,
and so for any s1i ă si
tσi psq “ rti pqσi psq , s´iq “ tσi ps1i, s´iq ` ż qσi psq
qσi ps1i,s´iq
Brti px, s´iq
Bqi dx
“ tσi ps1i, s´iq `
ż qσi psq
qσi ps1i,s´iq
mui px, psi pxq , s´iqq dx
“ tσi ps1i, s´iq `
ż qσi psq
qσi ps1i,s´iq
rpσ psi pxq , s´iq ` σxs dx,
which is precisely the definition of σV CG tranfers. This implies local IC.
Let us establish monotonicity of the allocation,
Bqσi psq
Bsi ě 0, for all i and s. From the first
order condition we have for any j and i
muj,qpqσi psq, sq
Bqσj psq
Bsi `muj,ipq
σ
j psq, sq “ Bp
σpsq
Bsi ` σ
Bqσj psq
Bsi . (3.31)
With i “ j this establishes that
Bqσi psq
Bsi “
mui,ipqσi psq, sq ´ Bp
σpsq
Bsi
σ ´mui,qpqσi psq, sq
. (3.32)
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On the other hand, since market clears for all s1, it follows that
0 “
ÿ
j
Bqσj psq
Bsi “
ÿ
j
muj,ipqσj psq, sq ´ Bp
σpsq
Bsi
σ ´muj,qpqσj psq, sq
,
and so
Bpσpsq
Bsi “
ř
jmuj,ipqσj psq, sq ˆ pσ ´muj,qpqσj psq, sqq´1ř
jpσ ´muj,qpqσj psq, sqq´1
. (3.33)
Since the ratio of any two weights pσ ´muj,qpqσj psq, sqq´1 in formula (3.33) is at most mqmq ,
formulas (3.32) and (3.33), together with A2 and A4˚ establish monotonicity. Given local
IC and mui,ipqi, sq ą 0 this implies full IC. By construction, IR is satisfied in each of
the three (exclusive) cases: for the signal si under which q
σ
i psi, s´iq “ 0, signal inf Si when
qσi pSi, s´iq ą 0 and supSi when qσi pSi, s´iq ă 0. IC implies then IR at all signals, in each of
the three cases.
2. σV CG mechanism satisfies δ ´ BS, for δ as in (3.11), and appropriate constants
D1, D2.
Fix s, i and qi and let us write
yj “
ˆ
σ ´ Bmujpq
σ
j psipqiq, s´iq,sipqiq, s´iq
Bqj
˙´1
, ryj “ yjřN
k“1 yk
, (3.34)
with si pxq as in (3.10). Using formulas (3.32) and (3.33) we may bound the sensitivity of
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σ´Walrasian price with respect to i1s allocation:
dpσ psi pqiq , s´iq
dqi
“
Bpσpsipqiq,s´iq
Bsi
Bqσi psipqiq,s´iq
Bsi
“
ř
jmuj,ipqσj psq, sqryj´
mui,ipqσi psq, sq ´
ř
jmuj,ipqσj psq, sqryj¯ yi (3.35)
“ mui,ipq
σ
i psq, sq
mui,ipqσi psq, sq
ř
j‰i yj ´
ř
j‰imuj,ipqσj psq, sqyj
`
ř
j‰imuj,ipqσj psq, sqryj´
mui,ipqσi psq, sq
ř
j‰i ryj ´řj‰imuj,ipqσj psq, sqryj¯ yi
ď mo
mo
N´1
σ`mq ´ N´1σ`mqφN
`
N´1
σ`mqφN´
mo
N´1
σ`mq ´ N´1σ`mqφN
¯
1
σ`mq
ď mo´
mo ´ mqmqφN
¯
N´1
σ`mq
`
mq
mq
φN´
mo ´ mqmqφN
¯
1
σ`mq
“ σ `mq
mo ´ mqmqφN
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 `
mq
mq
φN
˙
.
Given this bound the transfers satisfy
tσi psq “
ż qσi psq
0
rpσ psi pxq , s´iq ` σxs dx (3.36)
ě
ż qσi psq
0
»–pσ psq ´ σ `mq
mo ´ mqmqφN
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 `
mq
mq
φN
˙
pqσi psq ´ xq ` σx
fifl dx
“ pσ psq qi psq ` q
σ
i psq2
2
»–σ ´ σ `mq
mo ´ mqmqφN
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 `
mq
mq
φN
˙fifl .
This implies that BS will be satisfied as long as
σ ě σN :“ σN :“ mqN´2
N´1mo ´ 2mqmqφN
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 `
mq
mq
φN
˙
.
Moreover, given assumption A4˚ and N ą 2 we have 1
mo´mqmq φN
´
mo
N´1 ` mqmqφN
¯
ă 5
7
, which
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implies
tσi psq ě pσ psq qi psq ` q
σ
i psq2
2
„
2
7
σ ´ 8
7
m2q
momq
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 ` φN
˙
(3.37)
ě pσ psq qi psq `
„
D2 ˆ σ ´D1
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
´
,
where
D1 “ q2 6
7
m2q
mq mintmo, 1u , D2 “
q2
7
.
Adding up the bounds (3.37) over all the agents establishes the proof of part 2.
3. σV CG mechanism satisfies ε´Eff , for ε as in (3.11), and appropriate constants D3.
Fix a σ´Walrasian Equilibrium mechanism tpqσpsq, tσpsqqusPS and s. First, we claim that
for the Walrasian price p0psq,
p0psq P
”
min
i
muipqσi psq, sq,max
i
muipqσi psq, sq
ı
.
This is because the allocation qσpsq clears the market. If, say, p0psq was above
maximuipqσi psq, sq and so each agent i got less than qσi psq, market would not clear.
This in turn implies that
max
i
ˇˇ
qσi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ ď 1
mq
max
i
ˇˇ
muipqσi psq, sq ´ p0psq
ˇˇ
ď 1
mq
´
max
i
muipqσi psq, sq ´min
i
muipqσi psq, sq
¯
ď σ 1
mq
2 max
i
|qσi psq|
ď σ 1
mq
2
´
q `max
i
ˇˇ
qσi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ¯
,
and so, as long as σ ă mq{4,
max
i
ˇˇ
qσi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ ď 2σ
mq
q
1´ 2σ
mq
ď D3 ˆ σ,
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with
D3 “ 4q
mq
.
This concludes the proof of the second part of the proposition. The first part of the
proposition follows, with
D “ D1D3
D2
“ 16q m
2
q
mom
2
q
.
C Proofs for Section 3.4
Example 4. Proposition 2 (and the preceding discussion) in [RW12] implies that (using
original notation)
α “ cs “ 1´ ρ
1´ ρ` ζ ,
β
α ` β “ cp “
`
2´ N´2
N´1
˘
ρ
1´ N´2
N´1 ` ρ
ζ
1´ ρ` ζ “
Nρζ
p1´ ρ` ζq p1` pN ´ 1qρq ,
and so
β “
Nρζ
p1´ρ`ζqp1`pN´1qρq
1´ρ
1´ρ`ζ
p1´ρ`ζqp1`pN´1qρq´Nρζ
p1´ρ`ζqp1`pN´1qρq
“ Nρζp1´ ρ` ζqp1` ζ ` pN ´ 1qρq .
The submitted inverse demands are
rppsiqpÿ
j‰i qjq “
cs
1´ cp si `
µ
N´2
N´1 ´ cp
ÿ
j‰i qj “ pα ` βq
„
si ` µpN ´ 1q
αpN ´ 2q ´ β
ÿ
j‰i qj

,
whereas the market clearing price plpsq and allocation qlipsq, for any s, satisfy
plpsq “ cs
1´ cp s “ pα ` βqs,
qlipsq “ csµ
˜
N´2
N´1 ´ cp
1´ cp
¸
psi ´ sq “ pN ´ 2qα ´ β
µpN ´ 1q psi ´ sq ,
which means that the transfers and the allocation is the same as in the σNV CG mechanism
(see (3.14)).
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Example 5. Proposition 2 in [RW12] implies that for any s the equilibrium price plpsq
equals cs
1´cp s, and the linear equilibrium has the form (3.17) for constants (using the original
notation):
cs “
1´ N´2
2pN´1qρ
1´ N´2
2pN´1qρ` ζ
,
cp “
N
N´1
N´2
2pN´1qρ
1
N´1 ` N´22pN´1qρ
ζ
1´ N´2
2pN´1qρ` ζ
“
NpN´2q
2pN´1q ρ
1` N´2
2
ρ
ζ
1´ N´2
2pN´1qρ` ζ
.
Example 6. 1. With slope σN from Proposition 2 the transfers for i P G,G “ S,B,
become:
ti psq “
ż qipsq
0
rpσN psi pxq , s´iq ` σNxs dx “ pσ psq qi psq
` qi psq
2
2
„
σN ´ σN ` µG
αpN ´ 2γGq pβ ` 2αγGq

“ pσ psq qi psq ` qi psq
2
2
«
σN ´ σN ` µG
αpN ´ 2 σN`µ´G
2σN`µB`µS q
ˆ
β ` 2α σN ` µ´G
2σN ` µB ` µS
˙ff
.
2. Given a Bayesian model, the parameters σ2θ , σ
2
θG
, σ2θid , σ
2
εG
, σ2εid that give rise to utilities
as in Example (3) are, from the Projection Theorem,
»———–
α
β{2
β{2
fiffiffiffifl “
»———–
1
0
0
fiffiffiffifl´ V arpεS ` εi, sS, sBq´13ˆ3 ¨ CovpεS ` εi, pεS ` εi, sS, sBqT q3ˆ1,
»———–
0
0
0
fiffiffiffifl “ V arpεS ` εi, sS, sBq3ˆ3 ¨
»———–
1´ α
´β{2
´β{2
fiffiffiffifl´ CovpεS ` εi, pεS ` εi, sS, sBqT q3ˆ1
“
»———–
A B σ2θ
B B σ2θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ B
fiffiffiffifl ¨
»———–
1´ α
´β{2
´β{2
fiffiffiffifl´
»———–
σ2εG ` σ2εid
σ2εG ` 2N σ2εid
0
fiffiffiffifl ,
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for i P S and similarly for i P B, where
A “ σ2θ ` σ2θG ` σ2θid ` σ2εG ` σ2εid ,
B “ σ2θ ` σ2θG ` σ2εG `
σ2θid ` σ2εid
N{2 .
It is readily verified that the solution to the above system of linear equations is given by
(3.19).
3. For a fixed set of parameters σ2θ , σ
2
θG
, σ2θid , σ
2
εG
, σ2εid consider a linear Bayesian equilib-
rium in double auction of the form
qlipsiqppq “ aGsi ´ bGp, @i P G,G “ S,B,
and so the equilibrium price pl is given by
plpsq “ aS
bS ` bB s
S ` aB
bS ` bB s
B. (3.38)
From the first order condition, demand schedules are given by equation (3.20), for
di “ 1N´2
2
bG ` N2 b´G
. @i P G,G “ S,B (3.39)
From the Projection Theorem, we compute E rθi|si, ps, for i P G, as
E
“
θi|si, pl
‰ “ raGsi ´rbGpl, (3.40)
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where»– raG
´rbG
fifl “ V arpsi, plq´12ˆ2 ¨ Covpθi, psi, plqT q2ˆ1,
V arppsi, plqq2ˆ2 “
“
»——– σ
2
θ ` σ2θG ` σ2θid ` σ2εG ` σ2εid σ2θ ` aGbG`b´G
ˆ
σ2θG ` σ2εG `
2
´
σ2θid
`σ2εid
¯
N
˙
σ2θ ` aGbG`b´G
ˆ
σ2θG ` σ2εG `
2
´
σ2θid
`σ2εid
¯
N
˙
σ2θ ` a
2
G`a2´G
pbG`b´Gq2
ˆ
σ2θG ` σ2εG `
2
´
σ2θid
`σ2εid
¯
N
˙
fiffiffifl ,
Covpθi, psi, plqT q2ˆ1 “
»– σ2θ ` σ2θG ` σ2θid
σ2θ ` aGbG`b´G
`
σ2θG ` 2N σ2θid
˘
fifl .
Substituting (3.19) into these formulas, we get
a˜G “ 2pα ´ 1qα
`
a2Gpn´ 2qσεid ` a2´Gnpσεid ` σεGq
˘
2pα ´ 1q `a2Gpn´ 2qσεid ` a2´Gnpσεid ` σεGq˘` βpn´ 2qσεidpaG ´ a´Gq2
` βpaG ´ a´GqpαaGpn´ 2qσεid ` a´Gp´αnpσεid ` σεGq ` nσεG ` 2σεidqq
2pα ´ 1q `a2Gpn´ 2qσεid ` a2´Gnpσεid ` σεGq˘` βpn´ 2qσεidpaG ´ a´Gq2 ,
b˜G “ pα ´ 1qβpbG ` b´GqpaGpn´ 2qσεid ` a´Gnpσεid ` σεGqq
2pα ´ 1q `a2Gpn´ 2qσεid ` a2´Gnpσεid ` σεGq˘` βpn´ 2qσεidpaG ´ a´Gq2 .
Equilibrium is thus characterized by the solutions aS, aB, bS, bB of the system of equations
aG “ raGpaG, a´Gq
µG ` dGpbG, b´Gq , bG “
rbGpaG, a´G, bG ` b´Gq ` 1
µG ` dGpbG, b´Gq . G “ S,B (3.41)
Note that aG ‰ a´G as long as µG ‰ µ´G
aG
a´G
“ 1 ñ“ bG
b´G
“ 1 ñ µG “ µ´G.
In the asymmetric case (3.41) is a system of four equations of third order and so generically
does not admit an analytical solution (Abel-Ruffini Theorem).
4. Finally, to see that the solution to the system (3.41) depends locally on the parameters
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σεid and σεG , even when α, β are fixed, observe that:
Ba˜G
Bσ2εid
“ pα ´ 1qβa´Gpn´ 2qnσεGpaG ´ a´Gq
`
2pα ´ 1q `a2G ` a2´G˘` βpaG ´ a´Gq2˘`
2pα ´ 1q `a2Gpn´ 2qσεid ` a2´Gnpσεid ` σεGq˘` βpn´ 2qσεidpaG ´ a´Gq2˘2 ‰ 0,
Ba˜G
Bσ2εG
“ ´pα ´ 1qβa´Gpn´ 2qnσεidpaG ´ a´Gq
`
2pα ´ 1q `a2G ` a2´G˘` βpaG ´ a´Gq2˘`
2pα ´ 1q `a2Gpn´ 2qσεid ` a2´Gnpσεid ` σεGq˘` βpn´ 2qσεidpaG ´ a´Gq2˘2 ‰ 0,
as long as n ą 2, α ‰ 1, β ‰ 0, σεid ą 0, σεG ą 0 and aG ‰ a´G ‰ 0, which is true when
µG ‰ µ´G.
D Proofs for Section 3.5
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix pu1, ..., uNq and σ ě 0. We first establish that the mapping
ϕ : RN Ñ Rˆ B, where B Ă RN has coefficients add up to 0,
ϕpsq “ ppσpsq, qσpsqq,
is a diffeomorphism. For any q P RN the function ζq : RN Ñ RN ,
ζqpsq “ pmu1pq1, sq, ...,muNpqN , sqq,
is a diffeomorphism. This follows from local invertibility assumption INJ and INF
(Hadamard, see e.g., Theorem 6.2.4 in [KP12]). Moreover, the mapping ξ : RN Ñ Rˆ B,
ξpmu1, ...,muNq “ pp, qq such that
mui “ p` σqi, @i
is a diffeomorphism as well. This is because ξ satisfies
ξpmu1, ...,muNq “
»– 1N ¨ eT
1
σ
I ´ 1
N
eeT
fifl
pN`1qˆN
¨ pmu1, ...,muNqT ,
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for N ˆN identity matrix I and N ˆ 1 unit vector e, and so is linear with rank N .
It follows that if ϕpsq “ ϕps1q “ ppσpsq, qσpsqq, then
s “ ζ´1qσpsq ˝ ξ´1ppσpsq, qσpsqq “ s1.
On the other hand, for any pp, qq P Rˆ B we have pp, qq “ ϕpsq for
s “ ζ´1q ˝ ξ´1pp, qq.
We may verify now that that at every s the profile of σV CG conditional inverse demands
yields ppσpsq, qσpsqq as the unique market clearing price-allocation pair. An alternative rep-
resentation of a conditional inverse demand correspondence di is via the set Dpdiq of market
clearing price-allocation pairs consistent with it (see [PR02]),
Dipdiq “
ď
q´i
pdipq´iq,´
ÿ
j‰i qj, q´iq.
Market clearing price-allocation pairs are then represented by the intersection
Ş
iDipdiq. In
the case of the σV CG conditional inverse demand of i at si we have
Dipdipsiqq “
ď
q´i
ď
s´i:qσ´ipsi,s´iq“q´i
ppσpsi, s´iq, qσpsi, s´iqq.
“
ď
s´i
ppσpsi, s´iq, qσpsi, s´iqq.
The injectivity of ϕ implies then that
č
i
Dipdipsiqq “ ppσpsq, qσpsqq,
and so indeed ppσpsq, qσpsqq is the unique market clearing price-allocation pair.
Fix s and a player i. If all the players j ‰ i play the equilibrium strategies, the graph G
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of any residual demand curve for a player i satisfies
G Ď ProjPˆQi
č
j‰iDjpdjpsjqq “ ProjPˆQi
ď
s1i
ppσps1i, s´iq, qσps1i, s´iqq.
In other words the unique residual demand curve pi that i is facing is given by
pipqiq “ pσps1i, s´iq, for s1i such that qi “ qσi ps1i, s´iq.
Given the definition of transfers, at s agent i is choosing between either i) a zero quantity
and transfer pair (when he submits an incompatible conditional inverse demand function) or
2) pairs pqσi ps1i, s´iq, tσi ps1i, s´iqq, for some s1i, when he submits the σV CG conditional inverse
demand at s1i. The result thus follows from IC and IR of the σV CG mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 5 Fix si. Given assumption INJ , the function fi : S´i Ñ RN ,
fips´iq “ ppσpsi, s´iq, qσ´ipsi, s´iq, q is injective. We have
dipsiqpq´iq “
 
x|x “ pσpsi, s´iq and qσ´ipsi, s´iq “ q´i
(
“
!
x|x “ muip´
ÿ
j‰i qj, si, s´iq ´ σ
ˇˇˇÿ
j‰i qj
ˇˇˇ
and qσ´ipsi, s´iq “ q´i
)
“
!
x|x “ mruip´ÿ
j‰i qj, si, wips´iqq ´ σ
ˇˇˇÿ
j‰i qj
ˇˇˇ
and qσ´ipsi, s´iq “ q´i
)
“
!
x|x “ mruip´ÿ
j‰i q
σ
j , si, wipf´1i pqσ´i, xqqq ´ σ
ˇˇˇÿ
j‰i q
σ
j
ˇˇˇ
and qσ´i “ q´i
)
,
and so the result follows for rwi “ wi ˝ f´1i .
If σV CG inverse demands are functions then there are no s´i and s1´ i with qσ´ipsi, s´iq “
qσ´ipsi, s1´ iq but pσpsi, s´iq ‰ pσpsi, s1´ iq. In other words, the function gi : S´i Ñ RN´1,
gips´iq “ qσ´ipsi, s´iq is injective. Following the steps as above establishes the proof, withrwi “ wi ˝ g´1i .
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix σ ě 0 and let
Jpsq “
”
mui,jpqσi psq, sq
ı
i,jďN
.
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be the N ˆ N Jacobian matrix of the function ζpsq “ pmu1pq1, sq, ...,muNpqN , sqq for q “
qσpsq. Totally differentiating equations (3.8) that define the σV CG allocation we get the
system of N equations
Jpsqds “
ˆ
σI ´
”
mui,qpqσi , sq
ı
iďN
¨ I
˙
dq ` e ¨ dp
or equivalently, since Jpsq is invertible by INJ ,
ds “ Jpsq´1
ˆ
σI ´
”
mui,qpqσi , sq
ı
iďN
¨ I
˙
dq ` Jpsq´1e ¨ dp (3.42)
where I is the N ˆN identity matrix and e is the unit vector.
Consider two profiles of signals psk, s´kq and ps1k, s1´ kq with s´k ‰ s1´ k such that
qσpsk, s´kq “ qσps1k, s1´ kq but pσpsk, s´kq ‰ pσps1k, s1´ kq; we need to establish that sk ‰ s1k.
Let γptq, t P r0, 1s be the straight line in RN`1 such that γp0q “ pqσpsk, s´kq, pσpsk, s´kqq and
γp1q “ pqσps1k, s1´ kq, pσps1k, s1´ kqq. Since ϕpsq “ ppσpsq, qσpsqq is a diffeomorphism onto Rˆ B,
where B Ă RN has coefficients add up to 0 (see proof of Proposition 3), ϕ´1pγptqq is also a
path in RN from psk, s´kq to ps1k, s1´ kq. However, it follows from (3.42) that along this path
ds “ Jpsq´1e ¨ dp,
and so in particular, from FUN and the continuity of Jpsq´1e in s, dsk ‰ 0 and does not
change the sign along the whole path. It follows that sk “ ϕ´1pγp0qqk ‰ ϕ´1pγp1qqk “ s1k.
Suppose now that utilities are linear and pJpsq´1eqk “ 0 for some agent k. It follows that
for a vector v “ Jpsq´1e we have
mup0, vq “ mup0, 0q ` Jp0q ¨ v “ mup0, 0q ` e,
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and so for any σ ě 0, from the definition of σV CG mechanism,
qσpvq “ qσp0q,
pσpvq “ pσp0q ` 1,
implying that the σV CG conditional inverse demand of agent k at sk “ 0 is a correspondence.
Proof of Lemma 7 i) Let matrices A and a be the diagonal and off-diagonal parts of
matrix
”
mui,jp0, 0q
ı
i,jďN
, and let b “
”
mui,jp0, 0q
ı´1
i,jďN
´ A´1. We have
pA´1 ` bqpA` aq “ I
A´1a` bA` ba “ 0
aA´1 ` Abp1` aA´1q “ 0
Ab “ ´aA´1p1` aA´1q´1
Since the infinity norm is both sub-multiplicative and sub-additive:
||Ab||8 ď ||aA
´1||8
1´ ||aA´1||8 .
Finally, by assumption, each element of the aA´1 matrix is less then 1{2n, therefore
||aA´1||8 ă 1{2. By the inequality above ||Ab||8 ă 1 and therefore matrix W´1 “ A´1pI `
Abq has positive row sums, since A´1 has only positive diagonal elements.
ii) Equicommonality means that
”
mui,jp0, 0q
ı
i,jďN
¨ e “ rαsNˆ1, for unit vector e and
some α ‰ 0. Left-multiplying by
”
mui,jp0, 0q
ı´1
i,jďN
yields the result.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Fix a sequence of tax functions tτNuNPN so that the respective VCG mechanism with transfers
τN are D
`
1
N
` φN
˘
-Efficient, for some D ą 0. D ` 1
N
` φN
˘
-Efficiency and convexity implies
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that taxes have derivatives uniformly bounded by D
`
1
N
` φN
˘
. Therefore, from the Arzela-
Ascoli Theorem, condition (3.27) is equivalent to pointwise convergence, for every q P p0, qs.
Suppose that the condition (3.27) is violated, and so there is q P p0, qs and a sequence
tεNuNPN of positive numbers converging to zero such that
τ 1Npqq ´ τ 1Np0q ď εN
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
ˆ q. (3.43)
We will establish that for sufficiently large N the mechanisms violate BS.
Consider utility functions as in (3.28), large N (to be determined later) and a profile of
signlas s˚ “ ps1˚ , s2˚ , 0, ..., 0q such that s2˚ “ ´s1˚ and
mu1pq, s˚q “ s˚1mo ` φNs˚2 ´mqq “ τ 1Npqq,
so that qτN ps˚q “ pq,´q, 0, ..., 0q. Let aN “ limqÑ0 τNpqq ´ τNp0q ě 0 be the entry fee of the
tax and, with slight abuse of notation, let τ 1Np0q “ limqÑ0 τ 1Npqq be the intial slope of the tax
scheme. As in Proposition 2 the transfers satisfy
t1ps˚q ď
ż q
0
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1qdx` τNpqq,
t2ps˚q ď
ż ´q
0
pτN ps2pxq, s˚´2qdx` τNpqq,
tips˚q ď 0, @i ą 2,
where pτN psq are defined, analogously to σV CG prices, as the Walrasian prices for the
economy with distorted utilities rui, and s1pxq and s2pxq are defined analogously as in (3.10):
muipqτNi psq, sq “ pτN psq ` τ 1NpqτNi psqq, @i, s
x “ qτNi
`
si pxq , s˚´i
˘
. i “ 1, 2, @x P r´q, qs
Below we establish that t1ps˚q ă 0; as the proof of t2ps˚q ą 0 is analogous, this will establish
the result.
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Let s11 and s21 be the signals for player 1, s21 ď s11 ď s1˚ , such that
max
q3
tu3pq3, s11, s˚´iq ´ q3 ˆ pτN ps11, s˚´iq ´ aNu “ 0, (3.44)
max
q3
tu3pq3, s21, s˚´iq ´
ż q3
0
ppτN ps21, s˚´iq ` τ 1Npxqqdx´ aNu “ 0.
In other words, if the tax scheme consisted of only the entry fee aN then agents i ą 2 would
start trading (buying from agent 2) if 1’s signal drops below s11. Similarly, agents i ą 2 start
trading given the original tax scheme τN when 1’s signal drops below s
2
1.
Let us compute prices pτN ps1pxq, s˚´ 1q for the inframarginal units x, x P r0, qs. For s1 ě s21
only players 1 and 2 trade nonzero quantities, and we have
mu1pqτN1 ps1, s˚´1q, s1, s˚´1q “ s1mo ` φNs˚2 ´mqqτN1 ps1, s˚´1q “ pτN ps1, s˚´1q ` τ 1NpqτN1 ps1, s˚´1qq,
mu1pqτN2 ps1, s˚´1q, s1, s˚´1q “ s˚2mo ` φNs1 `mqqτN2 ps1, s˚´1q “ pτN ps1, s˚´1q ` τ 1NpqτN2 ps1, s˚´1qq,
and so
BqτN1 ps1, s˚´ 1q
Bs1 “
mo ´ Bp
τN ps1,s˚´1q
Bs1
mq ` τ 2NpqτN1 ps1, s˚´ 1qq
,
BqτN2 ps1, s˚´ 1q
Bs1 “
φN ´ Bp
τN ps1,s˚´1q
Bs1
mq ` τ 2NpqτN2 ps1, s˚´ 1qq
.
Using MC, we thus have
BpτN ps1, s˚´ 1q
Bs1 “
mo
mq`τ2N pqτN1 ps1,s˚´1qq
` φN
mq`τ2N pqτN2 ps1,s˚´1qq
1
mq`τ2N pqτN1 ps1,s˚´1qq
` 1
mq`τ2N pqτN2 ps1,s˚´1qq
“ mo ` φN
2
,
and so, for any x such that s1pxq ě s21
BpτN ps1pxq, s˚´ 1q
Bx “ ´
BpτN ps1,s˚´1q
Bs1
BqτN1 ps1,s˚´1q
Bs1
“
mo`φN
2
mo´φN
2pmq`τ2N pxqq
“ `mq ` τ 2Npxq˘ mo ` φNmo ´ φN . (3.45)
Similarly, for s1 ă s21 and x ě 0 such that s1pxq ă s21, when all agents trade nonzero
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quantities, we have
BpτN ps1, s˚´ 1q
Bs1 “ w1ps1qmo ` p1´ w1ps1qqφN , (3.46)
BqτN1 ps1, s˚´ 1q
Bs1 “
mo ´ Bp
τN ps1,s˚´1q
Bs1
mq ` τ 2NpqτN1 ps1, s˚´ 1qq
,
BpτN ps1pxq, s˚´ 1q
Bx “ ´
mq ` τ 2Npxq
p1´ w1ps1pxqqq pmo ´ φNq pw1ps1pxqqmo ` p1´ w1ps1pxqqqφNq ,
where
w1ps1q “
1
mq`τ2N pqτN1 ps1,s˚´1qq
1
mq`τ2N pqτN1 ps1,s˚´1qq
` 1
mq`τ2N pqτN2 ps1,s˚´1qq
` N´2
mq`τ2N pqτN3 ps1,s˚´1qq
.
Since τ 1Np0q ě 0, τ 1N is increasing and bounded by D
`
1
N
` φN
˘
, it follows that for x P r0, qs
τ 2Npxq is bounded above by 1 on an interval of measure q ´D
`
1
N
` φN
˘
. It follows from the
definition of w1ps1q and (3.46) that there are c, c1 ą 0 such that w1ps1pxqq is bounded from
below by c
1
N
, and so
BpτN ps1pxq, s˚´ 1q
Bx ě cˆ
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
, (3.47)
for a subset of x P r0, qs of measure q ´D ` 1
N
` φN
˘
, for every N .
Moreover, it follows from D
`
1
N
` φN
˘
-Efficiency of the allocation for agents i ą 2 that
τ 1Np0q, pτN ps21, s˚´iq, pτN ps11, s˚´iq “ O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
,
and so, from (3.45),
qτN1 ps11, s˚´1q, qτN1 ps21, s˚´1q “ q ´O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
.
Finally, since τ 1N ě 0 and u3pq3, s21, s˚´ iq ď u3pq3, s11, s˚´ iq for every q3, equations in (3.44)
imply that
pτN ps11, s˚´iq ´ pτN ps21, s˚´iq ě τ 1Np0q.
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The integral of the inframarginal prices agent 1 pays is
ż q
0
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1qdx “ I ` II ` III,
I “ qτN1 ps11, s˚´1q ˆ pτN ps11, s˚´1q `
ż q
q
τN
1 ps11,s˚´1q
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1qdx,
II “ qτN1 ps21, s˚´1q ˆ
`
pτN ps21, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps11, s˚´1q
˘
`
ż qτN1 ps11,s˚´1q
q
τN
1 ps21,s˚´1q
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps11, s˚´1qqdx,
III “
ż qτN1 ps21,s˚´1q
0
`
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps21, s˚´1
˘qdx.
Below we bound from above each of the three terms I, II and III.
First, since
aN “ u3pq13, s11, s˚´iq ´ q13 ˆ pτN ps11, s˚´iq “
pτN ps11, s˚´ iq2
2mq
,
where q13 is the maximizer, we have, for N sufficiently high
I ă qτN1 ps11, s˚´1q ˆ pτN ps11, s˚´1q “
ˆ
q ´O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙˙
ˆ pτN ps11, s˚´1q ă aN .
Second,
II “ qτN1 ps11, s˚´1q ˆ
`
pτN ps21, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps11, s˚´1q
˘
`
ż qτN1 ps11,s˚´1q
q
τN
1 ps21,s˚´1q
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps21, s˚´1qqdx
“ qτN1 ps11, s˚´1q ˆ
`
pτN ps21, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps11, s˚´1q
˘`Oˆ 1
N
` φN
˙2
ă qτN1 ps11, s˚´1q ˆ p´τ 1Np0qq `O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙2
“ ´q ˆ τ 1Np0q `O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙2
.
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Finally, the bound (3.47) yields, for c ą 0 independent of N ,
III “
ż qτN1 ps21,s˚´1q
0
`
pτN ps1pxq, s˚´1q ´ pτN ps21, s˚´1
˘qdx
ă ´cˆ
ˆ
qτN1 ps21, s˚´1q ´O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙˙
ˆ
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
“ ´cˆ q ˆ
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
`O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙2
.
The three bounds imply
t1ps˚q “ I ` II ` III ` τNpqq “ I ` aN ` II ` τ 1Np0q ˆ q ` III `
ż q
0
pτ 1Npxq ´ τ 1Np0qq dx
ă ´cˆ q ˆ
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
`
ż q
0
pτ 1Npxq ´ τ 1Np0qq dx`O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙2
ă ´cˆ q ˆ
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
` εN
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
ˆ q2 `O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙2
“ q ˆ
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙
ˆ pεNq ´ cq `O
ˆ
1
N
` φN
˙2
,
where the second inequality follows from assumption (3.43). It follows that for N sufficiently
high the transfers t1ps˚q are negative, which establishes the proof.
F Proof of Proposition 5
In order to establish robust asymptotic p 1
N´1 ` φNmo q´qEfficiency, BS is implied by the in-
equality (3.36) and assumption A21. Moreover, the efficiency loss equals
ˇˇ
qσi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ ď 1
mq
ˇˇ
muipqσi psq, sq ´muipq0i psq, sq
ˇˇ “ 1
mq
σ |qσi psq| ,
where the last equality follows from p0psq “ pσpsq, for every type profile s and σ ě 0, which
is implied by A21.
To establish tighness, fix N and consider the same utility functions and signal profile s
as in the proof of Proposition 1. Fix δ ą 0 small and a mechanism that satisfies IR, IC,MC
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and is δ´Efficient. For the function s1pxq defined as in (3.10) and s01pxq defined the same
way but for the efficient allocation q0psq the transfers by player 1 satisfy
t1psq ď
ż q1psq
0
mu1px, s1pxq, s´iqdx ď
ż q1psq
0
mu1px, s01pxp1` δq ` δq, s´iqdx
“
ż q1psq
0
“
mu1pxp1` δq, s01px` δq, s´iq ` xδmq
‰
dx
“
ż q1psq
0
“
p0ps01px` δq, s´1q ` xδmq
‰
dx
ď
ż q1psq
0
“
p0ps1 ` s01pxp1` δqq ´ s1, s´1q ` xδmq
‰
dx
“
ż q1psq
0
“
p0psq ` p0q1 ˆ pxp1` δq ´ q01psqq ` xδmq
‰
ď q1psq ˆ
„
p0psq ` p0q1 ˆ p
q01psqp1` δq2
2
´ q01psqq ` q
0
1psqp1` δq
2
δmq

“ q1psqp0psq ` q1psqq
0
1psq
2
“p1` δqδmq ´ p0q1p1´ 2δ ´ δ2q‰ ,
where p0q1 “
mq
mo´φN
` mo
N´1 ` φN
˘
is defined as in (3.30).
This implies that if δ ă p 1
N´1 ` φNmo q then for N sufficiently large we have t1psq ă 0, and,
by an analogous argument, t2psq ă 0. p0psq “ 0 and q0i psq “ 0 for i ą 2 together with IR
imply that
ř
ią2 tipsq ď 0, and so establish that the mechanism violates BS.
G Discrete Allocations
In this section we show how our results can be extended to a setting with discrete allocations.
Specifically, we assume that for the feasible allocations qipsq are multiples of ∆ for ∆ ď 1,
qipsq P t...´ 2∆,´∆, 0,∆, 2∆, ...u “: Q∆, @i, s
First, the definition of marginal utility must be adjusted to the discrete setting, with
muipqi, sq “ uipqi`∆,sq´uipqi,sq∆ , for qi P Q∆. Similarly, assumption A2 is now replaced by
A2dq muipqi, sq ´muipqi `∆, sq P r∆mq,∆mqs. @i, qi P Q∆, s
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For the simplicity of the presentation, in this section we use a slightly stronger version of
the small pairwise interdependence assumption, which bounds each individual interdepen-
dece (as opposed to the average, see Section 3.2).
A4dq mui,jpqi, sq ď φN , with limNÑ8 φN “ 0, @i ‰ j, q´j, s
A4d˚q 1
N´1mui,jpqi, sq ď φN , with φN ă 18mo, @i ‰ j, q´j, s
We proceed to define the versions of the σV CG mechanisms in discrete setting. Fix a
slope σ and a spread 2δ, σ, δ ě 0. For any agent i, s and qi define the tax adjusted marginal
utility Ămuipqi, sq as
Ămuipqi, sq “ muipqi, sq´σqi ´ δ1qią0 ` δ1qiă0.
For the taxes τ that correspond to slope σ and spread δ, the τV CG allocation qτ psq is defined
so that
Ămuipqτi psq `∆, sq ă Ămujpqτj psq, sq, @i ‰ j (3.48)ÿ
i
qτi psq “ 0.
The first condition replaces now the equality of all the tax-adjusted marginal utilities. It
explicitly requires that any additional trade of one unit of size ∆, from agent j to agent
i ‰ j, results in strict lowering of the sum of their tax-adjusted utilities. In other words, the
allocation maximizes the sum of tax-adjusted utilities. As in the main text, when σ “ δ “ 0,
the allocation is the efficient Walrasian Equilibrium allocation, for discrete setting.
The τV CG transfers tτ psq are defined as
tτi psq “ ∆
qτi psqÿ
x“∆
mui px, si pxq , s´iq , qτi psq ą 0 (3.49)
tτi psq “ ∆
qτi psqÿ
x“´∆
´mui px, si pxq , s´iq , qτi psq ă 0
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where si pxq is the pivotal signal for good x,
x “ qτi psi pxq , s´iq and x ą qτi ps1i, s´iq for s1i ă si pxq , x ą 0,
x “ qτi psi pxq , s´iq and x ă qτi ps1i, s´iq for s1i ą si pxq , x ă 0,
sipxq “
$&% inf Si if qτi ps1i, s´iq ą x for all s1i,supSi if qτi ps1i, s´iq ă x for all s1i.
The following are the analogues of Propositions 1 and 2, followed by the proofs.28
Proposition 6. Suppose that assumptions A1, A2d, A3, A4d˚ hold. There are constants
Cd1 , C
d
2 , C
d
3 ą 0, independent of the unit size ∆ ď 1, such that for every ε ă q{2 and economy
size N ą 2, the IR, IC,MC and ε´Efficient mechanisms violate δ ´BS, where
δ “ N
„
Cd1 p moN ´ 1 ` φNq ` C
d
2 ∆´ Cd3ε

.
Proposition 7. Suppose that assumptions A1, A2d, A3, A4d hold. For appropriate positive
constants Dd, D1d independent of the unit size ∆ ď 0, slopes σdN and spreads 2δN
the family of the corresponding τNV CG mechanisms is robustly asymptotically“
Ddp 1
N
` φNq `D1d∆
‰´Efficient.
More precisely, there are constants Dd1 ´Dd7 such that for every slope σ ă mq{4, spread
2δ ě 0, unit size ∆ ď 1 and economy of size N ą 2 that satisfies A1, A2d, A3, A4d˚, the
corresponding τV CG mechanism satisfies MC, IR, IC, δ ´BS and ε´Efficiency, where
δ “ N
„„
Dd1p moN ´ 1 ` φNq ´D
d
2σ

`
` “∆pDd3 `Dd4σq ´Dd5δ‰` , (3.50)
ε “ Dd6σ `Dd7δ.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof mirrors that of Proposition 2. Fix N even, and
28In the propositions and the proofs we use the standard notation, with rxs` “ min t0, xu , rxs´ “
max t0, xu and txu the highest integer below x.
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consider the utility functions:
uipqi, ti, sq “ ppmo ´ φNq si ` φN
ÿ
j
sjqqi ´ mq
2
q2i , @i, qi, s
and consider the signal profile s˚, such that
s˚i “ rs ą 0, q0i ps˚q P „N ´ 1N q ´∆, N ´ 1N q

, @i ď N{2
s˚i “ ´rs ă 0, q0i ps˚q “ ´ „N ´ 1N q ´∆, N ´ 1N q

. @i ą N{2
For those signals we have muipq0i ps˚q, s˚q “ 0, for all i. Given the efficient allocation, it is
easy to verify that for agent 1 and any positive x P Q∆,
mui
`
x, s0i pxq, s˚´i
˘ “ (3.51)
“ ∆
ˆZ
x´ q0i psq
∆ pN ´ 1q
^
` 1
˙
mq ` φN
ˆ
x´ q0i psq `∆
Z
x´ q0i psq
∆ pN ´ 1q
^˙
mq
mo ´ φN
“ mq
mo ´ φN
"
∆ pmo ´ φNq ` φN
`
x´ q0i psq
˘`∆mo ˆ Z x´ q0i psq∆ pN ´ 1q
^*
, x ą q0i psq
“ ´∆
ˆZ
q0i psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^
` 1
˙
mq ´ φN
ˆ
z `∆`∆
Z
q0i psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^˙
mq
mo ´ φN
“ ´ mq
mo ´ φN
"
∆mo ` φN
`
q0i psq ´ x
˘`∆mo ˆ Z q0i psq ´ x∆ pN ´ 1q
^*
, x ď q0i psq
Fix ε ą 0 that is a multiple of ∆29 and a mechanism that satisfies IR, IC,MC and is
ε´Efficient. The transfers by player 1 satisfy
29Otherwise, in the rest of the proof consider ε1 ą ε that is.
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t1ps˚q ď ∆
q1ps˚qÿ
x“∆
mu1px, s1pxq, s˚´1q ď ∆
q1ps˚qÿ
x“∆
mu1px, s01px` εq, s˚´1q
“ ∆
q1ps˚qÿ
x“∆
“
mu1px` ε, s01px` εq, s˚´1q ` εmq
‰
ď εmqq1ps˚q `∆
¨˝
q01ps˚q`2εÿ
z“q01ps˚q`∆
mu1px, s01pxq, s˚´1q `
q01ps˚qÿ
z“∆`ε
mu1px, s01pxq, s˚´1q‚˛
ď εmqq1ps˚q `∆2εmq ` 4ε2
mq
mo ´ φN
ˆ
φN ` mo
N ´ 1
˙
´ mq
mo ´ φN
¨˝
∆ pq01ps˚q ´ εqmo ` pq
0
1ps˚q´εqpq01ps˚q´ε`∆q
2
`
φN ` moN´1
˘
´∆2mo N´22 ˆ q
0
1ps˚q´ε
∆pN´1q
‚˛
ď εmq
ˆ
q ` 2∆` 20
7
ε
˙
´ mq
mo ´ φN
¨˝
∆
pq01ps˚q´εqmo
2
`pq01ps˚q´εq
2
2
`
φN ` moN´1
˘ ‚˛
where the last inequality used
p0q
mq
ă 5
7
, from A4d˚, and the second last inequality follows
from (3.51) and the formula
qÿ
x“1
Z
x
N ´ 1
^
ě
qÿ
x“∆
x
N ´ 1 ´
N ´ 2
2
ˆ q
N ´ 1 ,
with the exact equality when x is divisible by N ´ 1. Consequently,
t1ps˚q ď Cd3 ˆ ε´ Cd1 p moN ´ 1 ` φNq ´ C
d
2 ˆ∆,
with
Cd1 “
mq
mo
ˆ
q
6
´ 1
˙2
, Cd2 “
mq
12
q, Cd3 “ mq
ˆ
17
7
q ` 2
˙
.
The same bound holds for the transfers by any buyer i ď N
2
. Analogous argument shows
that the same bound on transfers holds for any seller i ą N
2
. This establishes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix a slope σ ě 0, spread 2δ and the corresponding τV CG
mechanism.
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1. The proof that the τV CG mechanism satisfies MC, IR and IC is analogous to the
corresponding parts of the proof of Proposition 2.
2. τV CG mechanism satisfies δ ´ BS, for δ as in (3.50), and appropriate constants
Dd1 ´Dd5.
Fix s, a τV CG allocation qτ psq, agent i, and suppose that qτi psq ą 0. Define
pτ psq “ min
i
tĂmuipqτi psq, squ , (3.52)
.pτ psq “ max
i
tĂmuipqτi psq, squ .
Step i). pτ psq “ pτ psq.
Let us also first assume that the values are private, φN “ 0. From the definition
of the τV CG mechanism, as well as assumption A2d agent i1s adjusted marginal util-
ity Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq q at the pivotal type for any of his last N ´ 1 units of size ∆ is at
most ∆ pmq ` σq lower than Ămuipqτi psq, sq. Once i1s allocation decreases by ∆ pN ´ 1q (all
the other agents “bought” a unit of size ∆ from i already), the marginal utility for the
qτi psq ´∆pN ´ 1q unit decreases by further at most ∆ pmq ` σq. Consequently, with private
values we have
Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq q ě Ămuipqτi psq, sq ´∆ˆZ qτi psq ´ x∆ pN ´ 1q
^
` 1
˙
pσ `mqq , x ą 0 (3.53)
Let us now consider a general, interdependent case, φN ą 0. In this case, as the signal for
agent i decreases, so does the marginal utility of other agents. The lowest value for si pqτi psqq
satisfies, from (3.48),
Ămuipqτi psq, s´i, si pqτi psqq q “ Ămujpqτj psq, s´i, si pqτi psqq q ´∆ pσ `mqq , (3.54)
rsi ´ si pqτi psqqs ˆmo ď rsi ´ si pqτi psqqs ˆ φN `∆ pσ `mqq ,
si pqτi psqq ě si ´∆ σ `mqmo ´ φN ,
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and, for any x ď qτi psq, the pivotal signals satisfy
si pxq ě si ´
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x`∆`∆
Z
qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^˙ˆ
σ `mq
mo ´ φN
˙
. x ą 0 (3.55)
Given those bounds on the pivotal signals and the interdependence, the adjusted marginal
utilities at those types satisfy,
Ămuipqτi psq, sq ´ Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq q (3.56)
ď∆
ˆZ
qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^
` 1
˙
pσ `mqq ` φN
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x`∆`∆
Z
qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^˙ˆ
σ `mq
mo ´ φN
˙
for x ą 0. The formula implies that the adjusted marginal utility decreases by at most
γ :“ ∆
N ´ 1 pmo ´ φN `N ˆ φNq
σ `mq
mo ´ φN “ ∆
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 ` φN
˙
σ `mq
mo ´ φN , (3.57)
on average for every unit of size ∆ purchased (compare with line (3.35) in the proof of
Proposition 2). Moreover, the difference Ămuipqτi psq, sq ´ Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq q between the
adjusted marginal utilities is always smaller than ∆ pσ `mqq ` γ
´
qτi psq´x
∆
` 1
¯
. Just as in
(3.36) in the proof of Proposition 2, this implies that the transfers satisfy
tτi psq “ ∆
qτi psqÿ
x“∆
mui px, si pxq , s´iq “ ∆
qτi psqÿ
x“∆
tĂmui px, si pxq , s´iq ` σx` δu (3.58)
ě qτi psq pτ psq `∆
qτi psqÿ
x“∆
"
´γ
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x
∆
` 1
˙
´∆ pσ `mqq ` σx` δ
*
ě qτi psq pτ psq ` qτi psq rδ ´∆ pσ `mqqs `∆ p∆` 2∆` ...` qτi psqq ˆ
”
σ ´ γ
∆
ı
ě qτi psq pτ psq ` q rδ ´∆ pσ `mqqs´ `
q pq `∆q
2
„
σ ´
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 ` φN
˙
σ `mq
mo ´ φN

´
.
Step ii). Let us now consider the general case, when at the τV CG allocation the
adjusted marginal utilities are not equal, pτ psq “ pτ psq. From the definition of the τV CG
allocation, the distance between pτ psq and pτ psq is at most ∆ pσ `mqq.
In this case, we need the following adjustments. First, in the private value case, the
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bound (3.53) changes to
Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq q ě pτ psq ´∆ˆZ qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^
` 1
˙
pσ `mqq . x ą 0
Second, given that the difference bewteen Ămuipqτi psq, sq and pτ psq is at most σ ` mq, the
bounds (3.54), (3.55) and (3.56) in the general case change to, for x ą 0
si pqτi psqq ě si ´ 2∆ σ `mqmo ´ φN ,
si pxq ě si ´
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x` 2∆`∆
Z
qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^˙ˆ
σ `mq
mo ´ φN
˙
,
pτ psq ´ Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq qď ∆ˆZ qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^
` 1
˙
pσ `mqq
` φN
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x` 2∆`∆
Z
qτi psq ´ x
∆ pN ´ 1q
^˙ˆ
σ `mq
mo ´ φN
˙
.
Altogether, we have that the difference
pτ psq ´ Ămuipx, s´i, si pxq qď ∆ˆσ `mq ` φN ˆ σ `mq
mo ´ φN
˙˙
` γ
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x
∆
` 1
˙
“ ∆pσ `mqqmo
mo ´ φN ` γ
ˆ
qτi psq ´ x
∆
` 1
˙
,
for γ as in (3.57). Consequently, similarly as in the proof of Proposition 2, using A4d˚ we
have
tτi psq ě qτi psq pτ psq `
„
δ ´∆pσ `mqqmo
mo ´ φN

qτi psq `
”
σ ´ γ
∆
ı qτi psq pqτi psq `∆q
2
(3.59)
ě qτi psq pτ psq `
„
δ ´∆8
7
pσ `mqq

qτi psq
`
„
2
7
σ ´ 8
7
mq
mo
ˆ
mo
N ´ 1 ` φN
˙
qτi psq pqτi psq `∆q
2
ě qτi psq pτ psq `
„
Dd2 ˆ σ ´Dd1p moN ´ 1 ` φNq

´
` “Dd5 ˆ δ ´∆pDd3 `Dd4 ˆ σq‰´
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with
Dd1 “ q pq ` 1q 47
mq
mo
, Dd2 “ q pq ` 1q7 ,
Dd3 “ 8qmq7 , D
d
4 “ 8q7 , D
d
5 “ q.
Since the same inequality holds for every seller i, with qσi psq ă 0, adding up the inequal-
ities establishes the proof of part 2.
3. τV CG mechanism satisfies ε ´ Eff , for ε as in (3.50), and appropriate constants
Dd6, D
d
7.
Fix a τV CG mechanism tpqτ psq, tτ psqqusPS and s. First, just as in the proof of Proposition
2,
max
i
muipq0i psq, sq ď max
i
muipqτi psq, sq ` δ,
min
i
muipq0i psq, sq ě min
i
muipqτi psq, sq ´ δ,
This in turn implies that
max
i
ˇˇ
qτi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ ď 1
mq
max
i
ˇˇ
muipqτi psq, sq ´muipq0i psq, sq
ˇˇ
ď 1
mq
´
max
i
muipqτi psq, sq ´min
i
muipqτi psq, sq ` δ
¯
ď 1
mq
´
2σmax
i
|qτi psq| ` 3δ
¯
ď 1
mq
´
2σ
´
q `max
i
ˇˇ
qτi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ¯` 3δ¯
and so, as long as σ ă mq{4,
max
i
ˇˇ
qτi psq ´ q0i psq
ˇˇ ď 2σq ` 3δ
mq
1
1´ 2σ
mq
ď Dd6 ˆ σ `Dd7 ˆ δ,
with
Dd6 “ 4qmq , D
d
7 “ 6mq .
148
This concludes the proof of the second part of the proposition. The first part of the
proposition follows from the second, with
Dd “ Dd6D
d
1
Dd2
`∆Dd7D
d
4
Dd5
Dd1
Dd2
, D1d “ Dd7D
d
3
Dd5
.
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